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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In my dissertation, I study how beliefs, identity concerns (or, image concerns) and 
moral values affect decision making	and, ultimately, economic outcomes. Within this broader 
research area, I investigate how heterogeneity in moral values and image concerns impacts 
individual choices in markets, market prices and the outcomes obtained by different types of 
individuals, including income and occupation (Chapter 2 and 3). Moreover, I study how 
image concerns shape beliefs (“motivated beliefs”) in strategic settings (Chapter 4).  
In Chapter 2 of my thesis, I study how heterogeneity in social-preferences and image 
concerns affect outcomes in labor markets. This project is joint work with Fanny Brun and 
Roberto A. Weber. We study labor markets for jobs that are widely perceived as involving 
immoral acts. Examples for such jobs include marketing of tobacco products, predatory 
lending and manufacturing weapons. Our work is focused on two specific hypotheses that 
arise from a simple model of compensating wage differentials. First, we investigate whether 
the aversion among many individuals to performing jobs generally perceived as immoral 
contribute to immorality wage premiums, a form of compensating wage differential. Second, 
we study whether individuals least concerned with having a good self- and social-image 
select into such jobs.  
We find that immoral work commands a wage premium over comparable work that is 
not immoral. We show this using Swiss labor market data, where we attempt to control for 
observable worker and industry characteristics and in laboratory labor markets—which vary, 
by treatment, only whether being employed requires doing something immoral while holding 
other aspects of the job constant. We also provide evidence of sorting by immoral types into 
immoral work. We classify subjects into types using two different measures of individuals’ 
aversion to acting immorally, one from a survey and one from a behavioral task. In the 
laboratory labor markets, the immoral types are hired more often for immoral work. In our 
survey data, the immoral types report a significantly greater willingness to work in firms and 
industries that are perceived to be immoral.  
These findings are problematic as immoral jobs and industries often have a great 
potential to do societal harm; social welfare will therefore likely be higher when workers in 
such industries voluntarily internalize the negative impacts of their actions and forgo 
potentially profitable opportunities. However, our evidence suggests that it is the least moral 
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types who will sort into these industries and that, therefore, labor market sorting will make it 
less likely that such internalization will occur. 
Heterogeneity in moral values and image concerns could also play an important role 
in markets for consumption goods. In Chapter 3, I study whether people use consumption to 
signal their moral values to others. Models of identity signaling predict that customers signal 
their desirable characteristics (or, “types”) to themselves and others by avoiding products 
popular among people with undesirable characteristics and by conforming to product choices 
of people with desirable characteristics.  
Suppose, for example, that the customer pool of a product largely consists of 
consumers with certain moral values. This resembles the case of the clothing brand Lonsdale 
in the 1990s; it was public knowledge in Germany that neo-Nazis made up a large share of 
Lonsdale’s customers. If an individual consumes the product in public, others might confuse 
her with the typical consumer of the product, and attribute the typical consumer’s type to her. 
As a result, many consumers might avoid the product. 
In Chapter 3 of my thesis, I provide evidence that consumers indeed care about the 
type-composition of products’ customer pools. My evidence comes from controlled 
experimental settings that allow me to manipulate the type-composition of products’ 
customer pools while keeping other aspects of the choice environment constant. In a first 
study, I investigate consumption in a public setting in which subjects’ social-images are at 
stake. In a second study, I investigate (non-)conformity in a double-blind setting in which 
subjects’ self-images are at stake. In both studies, I find that participants’ willingness to pay 
is substantially lower for a product that is popular among people with undesirable moral 
values than for a product that is popular among people with desirable moral values.  
In Chapter 4 (joint work with Nadja R. Ging-Jehli and Roberto A. Weber), I study 
motivated beliefs in strategic settings where individuals have to form beliefs about the likely 
behavior of opponents. Strategic beliefs are typically assumed to be determined by the 
structure of the game and beliefs about others’ preferences or rationality. However, in light 
of the apparent ease with which people bias their beliefs in self-serving ways in other 
contexts, it seems plausible that they may similarly bias their beliefs about others’ actions 
when doing so can justify acting in a selfish way that harms others. Indeed, a recent paper by 
Di Tella, Perez-Truglia, Babino and Sigman (2015) provides evidence consistent with the 
idea that people engage in such “strategic cynicism.” Specifically, they demonstrate that 
people with a greater opportunity to take from another person believe that this opponent is 
more likely to act in a greedy and harmful manner. 
	 6	
 Our study investigates the phenomenon of strategic self-deception, although we 
initially approach this question in a different manner from Di Tella, et al. Rather than testing 
whether people with a greater incentive to take from others adopt relatively more negative 
beliefs about these opponents, as they do, our focus is on whether people with the 
opportunity to take from others adopt beliefs that are biased in comparison to the beliefs of 
neutral outsiders with no incentive to view others self-servingly. That is, we test the extent to 
which individuals with an incentive to engage in strategic cynicism adopt beliefs that are 
negatively biased in absolute terms. In contrast, Di Tella, et al., study a relative form of this 
bias, investigating whether one group’s beliefs are more negative—or, critically, less 
positive—than those of another group. In contrast with Di Tella, et al. (2015), we find no 
evidence that individuals engage in “strategic cynicism.”  
We reconcile the discrepancy, using Di Tella, et al.’s, data, a simple model of belief 
manipulation and a novel experiment that replicates and extends Di Tella, et al. Across three 
datasets, we find no evidence of negatively biased beliefs. However, Di Tella, et al.’s, results 
and our data indicate that those with a greater incentive to view others’ intentions cynically 
exhibit relatively less positive beliefs. Thus, to the extent that bias exists in people’s beliefs 
about a counterpart’s actions, it appears to be one of positivity rather than cynicism. This 
positivity bias is in line with another form of motivated belief; namely, in the kinds of 
interactions we study here, individuals seem motivated to convince themselves of the 
deservingness of the counterpart, and end up with beliefs that are often too positive. The 
finding that people are too positive about other players’ kindness supports a general tendency 
for distorted beliefs to lie in the direction of positivity and optimism rather than the opposite. 
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Chapter 2: Sorting and wage premiums in immoral work 





We use surveys, laboratory experiments and administrative labor-market data to study how 
heterogeneity in the perceived immorality of work and in workers’ concerns with acting 
immorally interact to impact labor market outcomes. Specifically, we investigate whether 
individuals least concerned with acting morally select into jobs generally perceived as 
immoral and whether the aversion among many individuals to performing such acts 
contributes to immorality wage premiums, a form of compensating differential. We obtain 
two measures of an individual’s aversion to performing immoral acts, one from a behavioral 
laboratory task and the other from survey items. These two measures predict laboratory labor 
market outcomes and expected outcomes in non-laboratory labor markets for “immoral” 
work. In the laboratory, immoral types are more likely to be employed and obtain higher 
wages when a job requires performing immoral acts. In our survey data, immoral types 
express a greater willingness to work in firms and industries rated by others as immoral. We 
also document that wages are higher in such immoral industries, both in laboratory and non-
laboratory labor markets.  
 
Citation 
Schneider, F. H., Brun, F. and Weber, R. A. (2020) “Sorting and wage premiums in immoral 





Immoral behavior in firms has the potential to cause significant social harm. For 
example, scandals in the financial industry involving the intentional sale of toxic assets to 
unsuspecting clients (US Department of Justice, 2016) and the aiding of tax evasion (Hill, 
2012) create significant burdens for public funds and for trust in the financial sector. Tobacco 
companies have long been accused of regularly engaging in unethical marketing tactics such 
as misleading the public about the harmful effects of smoking (Heath, 2016) and developing 
marketing strategies to attract underage smokers (Bates and Rowell, 1998). Aggressive 
marketing of prescription opioids by pharmaceutical firms is responsible for a serious public 
health crisis (Okie, 2010; Case and Deaton, 2015). In cases like these, as well as in many less 
extreme examples, corporate activities that many regard as “immoral” or “unethical”—but 
are nevertheless profitable—may have serious negative impacts on social welfare.  
Rather than representing isolated incidents, there exists a widespread impression that 
some jobs—e.g., marketing tobacco products, manufacturing weapons—likely involve 
inherently immoral acts. Conventional wisdom further posits that such jobs 
disproportionately attract those individuals who experience the least displeasure from acting 
immorally and that workers performing these kinds of jobs receive high wages for their 
unethical conduct—a form of compensating differential driven by the aversion to performing 
immoral acts.1 Thus, “immoral” work shares features with other aspects of employment that 
people may find heterogeneously aversive, such as risk of physical harm (Rosen, 1986).  
However, despite the intuitive appeal of such a connection, there is little empirical 
evidence that links heterogeneity in the willingness to perform work that most people 
perceive as immoral to resulting differential labor market outcomes. Moreover, there are 
many reasons to believe that such concerns may be mitigated in competitive markets (Levitt 
and List, 2008), where wages are set by the moral concerns of the marginal worker  and 
where repeatedly forgoing profitable job opportunities may lessen workers’ concerns for 
avoiding immoral behavior.  
In this paper, we provide novel evidence testing the above relationships between the 
perceived immorality of work, workers’ heterogeneous concerns for morality and outcomes 
																																																								
1 This view dates back to Adams Smith (1776;	Book I; Ch. X), who wrote that “The exorbitant rewards of 
players, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc., are founded upon [..] the discredit of employing them in this manner. 
[..] Should the public opinion or prejudice ever alter with regard to such occupations, their pecuniary 
recompense would quickly diminish. More people would apply to them, and the competition would quickly 
reduce the price of their labour.” At the time, such professions were seen as morally tainted; Smith equated 
them with “a sort of public prostitution.” 
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in labor markets. We do so with a combination of surveys, laboratory experiments and 
administrative labor market data, in which we obtain measures of individuals’ concerns for 
morality and relate these to variation in the morality of work. The administrative data 
provides the clearest evidence of the economic relevance of these relationships, but in these 
data “immoral” industries might differ in many aspects from other industries (for example, in 
regulation threats and litigation risks), meaning that it is impossible to establish causality. 
The control provided by laboratory experiments, however, allows us to observe the kinds of 
outcomes that arise as the nature of work changes only in the extent to which it is immoral. 
We additionally use complementary evidence from different surveys to obtain insights into 
relationships between individuals’ concerns for morality and the morality of different firms 
and industries. 
Our work is focused on two specific hypotheses that arise from a simple theoretical 
analysis of how individuals’ heterogeneous aversion to performing immoral work may 
interact with jobs that vary in the immorality of the work they require. We do not attempt to 
provide a novel theoretical contribution, but rather use simple economic analysis as a 
framework for formalizing standard intuitions and guiding our empirical research. The two 
hypotheses reflect the widely held perceptions that we note above: first, that more immoral 
work should yield higher wages—as long as workers care enough about morality—and, 
second, that immoral work should attract those workers who care the least about morality. 
We then use laboratory experiments, survey evidence and administrative data to test these 
hypotheses. A critical novel contribution of our work is to directly relate heterogeneity in 
individual concerns for morality to differences in labor market outcomes. 
 
Table 1. Overview of our evidence on wage premiums and sorting 
 Laboratory labor market Labor markets outside the laboratory 
Immorality 
premium 
Causal evidence for a wage premium 
for immoral work  
(Section 4; Figure 5) 
Correlation between perceived 
industry immorality and wages in 
Swiss Labor Force Survey 
(Section 3; Figure 1, Table 2) 
Sorting 
Immoral types are more likely to be 
hired, but only for immoral work  
(Section 4; Figure 6, Table 5) 
Immoral types state a greater 
willingness to work in firms and 
industries perceived to be immoral 
(Section 5; Figure 9, Table 7) 
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Our results provide clear support for the above two hypotheses both in and out of the 
laboratory. Table 1 gives an overview of our main findings and refers to the key figures and 
tables.  
First, we show that immoral work commands a wage premium over comparable work 
that is not perceived as immoral. We show this in Section 3 using administrative labor 
market data, where we find that industries that are perceived to be immoral yield higher 
average wages, controlling for observable worker and industry characteristics. Moreover, in 
our laboratory labor markets—which vary, by treatment, only whether being employed 
requires doing something immoral while holding other aspects of the job constant—we 
observe a causal relationship indicating that wages are persistently higher for immoral work 
(Section 4). This wage premium is large and does not decrease with market experience, 
reflecting a strong and stable aversion to immoral work on the part of our laboratory 
participants.  
Second, we provide evidence of sorting by immoral types into immoral work, both in 
the laboratory and in the field. We obtain two measures of individuals’ aversion to acting 
immorally, one from a behavioral task and one from a survey, and find that these two 
measures are positively correlated. These measures of participants’ immorality predict 
individual labor market outcomes: in our laboratory labor markets (Section 4), immoral types 
are employed more frequently, but only when work involves doing something immoral—i.e., 
there is no difference when the labor market does not involve immoral work. In our survey 
data (Section 5), immoral types report a significantly greater willingness to work in firms and 
industries that others perceive to be immoral.2 Aside from confirming one of our main 
hypotheses, this finding also indicates that the perceived immorality of industries and firms 
might be identifiable by a revealed (or stated) preference approach—that is, the immorality 
of firms or industries may be identifiable by the degree to which they are relatively more 
attractive employment opportunities for those individuals less concerned with morality.  
Our work provides the first evidence documenting a differential willingness of 
heterogeneous moral types to work in jobs and industries that vary in their perceived 
immorality. Importantly, this sorting persists with experience in our laboratory experiment 
and extends to stated preferences regarding real labor-market outcomes. We also connect the 
heterogeneity in the immorality of work to wage premiums. In our field data this connection 
																																																								
2 While these job choices are hypothetical, Wiswall and Zafar (2018) provide evidence that such stated 
preferences predict subsequent employment. 
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is correlational and thus subject to caution in drawing interpretations from the relationship, 
but our laboratory study demonstrates a causal relationship.  
The closest prior evidence supporting the relationships we investigate comes from 
studies documenting positive correlations between the perceived immorality of work and the 
wages obtained by workers in those “immoral” firms or industries (Frank, 1996; Moffatt and 
Peters, 2004; Arunachalam and Shah, 2008; Edlund, Engelberg and Parsons, 2009). This is 
similar to the correlational evidence we provide in Section 3, but prior evidence focuses on 
more limited samples. For example, Frank (1996) used data from a Cornell University 
employment survey that included graduates’ occupations, reported salaries and employers.3 
He then asked students in a business ethics class to rate the “social responsibility” of the 
most common occupations and employers of Cornell graduates. A regression controlling for 
other observable characteristics—such as a student’s major, grades and gender—reveals a 
premium for occupations and employers that are rated as socially irresponsible. 
Frank’s evidence is consistent with the notion that concerns for avoiding immoral 
work produce differential wages across occupations and industries. However, there remain 
important gaps in documenting that the relationships observed by Frank are really the result 
of sorting, heterogeneous moral preferences and compensating differentials. Most obviously, 
correlational evidence between wages and the perceived immorality of work might result 
from other unobserved characteristics of workers and the work activities. For instance, 
Moffatt and Peters (2004) document a wage premium for prostitution, which they attribute to 
a compensating differential (see, also, Arunachalam and Shah, 2008; Edlund, Engelberg and 
Parsons, 2009); but it is unclear whether the compensation is for the perceived immorality of 
the work or other aversive aspects of the job (Edlund and Korn, 2002; Gertler, Shah and 
Bertozzi, 2005). 4  Moreover, such studies fail to measure a critical element—the 
identification of workers’ heterogeneous concerns for morality—as a key driver of the 
relationship. While there is some correlational evidence that people in some industries and 
professions exhibit lower concerns for morality (Carter and Irons, 1991; Sjöberg and 
Engelberg, 2009; Dur and Zoutenbier, 2014),5 no study identifies that these concerns for 
																																																								
3 Note that these wages may not correspond to (average) industry wages because his sample is very selective. 
Unlike Frank (1996), we use a sample that is representative of the national work force in Switzerland. 
4 Related work in finance (e.g., Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant, 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Colonnello, 
Curatola and Gioffré, 2019) demonstrates that investing in firms that engage in immoral activities (“sin stocks”) 
yields higher returns. However, other industry and firm characteritics, such as litigation risk, may also differ 
between these types of investments (Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017). 
5 Gregg, et al. (2011) find that non-profit employees are more likely to do unpaid overtime. In line with 
selection, they find that individuals do not adjust their behavior when they change sectors. Note, however, that 
this finding could also be explained by a persistent effect of company culture. Fisman et al. (2015) find some 
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morality drive differential selection into different kinds of work rather than the relationship 
being perhaps the other way around (Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993; Cohn, Fehr and 
Maréchal, 2014). 
We also contribute to the literature on morality and markets (e.g., Falk and Szech, 
2013; Bartling, Weber and Yao, 2015; Kirchler, Huber, Stefan and Sutter, 2016). Levitt and 
List (2007, 2008) question whether social preferences matter in markets, due to factors 
including high stakes, market competition and experience. Our estimates from the labor 
market data indicate a substantial wage premium for immoral work: individuals working in 
industries perceived as highly immoral are estimated to have 35 percent higher wages than 
people working in morally neutral industries. Our survey data indicates that social 
preferences predict sorting into industries. Finally, in the laboratory labor market, we find 
that neither the wage premium nor sorting diminish with market experience. These findings 
suggest that social preferences matter for markets, and that they can impact both market 
wages and individual market outcomes. 
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on compensating differentials. A 
substantial number of studies investigate whether nonprofit employees earn less than for-
profit employees (e.g., Leete, 2001; Mocan and Tekin, 2003; Ruhm and Borkoski, 2003; 
Benedict, McClough and McClough, 2006; Jones, 2015). These studies yield mixed 
correlational evidence, likely due to methodological challenges in estimating compensating 
wage differentials using observational data (see the discussion in Mas and Pallais, 2017). 
Recent papers on compensating differentials rely on experimental methods and/or stated 
preferences instead (Eriksson and Kristensen, 2014; Pörtner, Hassairi and Toomim, 2015; 
Carpenter, Matthews and Robbett, 2017; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Maestas et al., 2018; 
Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). We differ from this work in that we explore the immorality of 
work and the aversion to immoral acts as the driving sources of heterogeneity and we present 
causal evidence on compensating wage differentials in the domain of morality.6 
																																																																																																																																																																											
evidence that distributional preferences (equality-efficiency tradeoffs) of Yale Law School students predict 
students’ career choices. Hanna and Wang (2017) investigate selection into public services in India. In line with 
their theory that there are more opportunities for corruption in the public sector, they find that students who 
cheat in a laboratory experiment are more willing to work for the government.  
6 Our study also relates to research on effort and sorting across different kinds of work by “mission-oriented” 
types (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Prendergast, 2007; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008; Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009; 
Dal Bó, Finan and Rossi, 2013; Fehrler and Kosfeld, 2014; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015; Carpenter and 
Gong, 2016; Cassar and Meier, 2018; Cassar, 2019; Deseranno, 2019; Dur and van Lent, 2019), though this line 
of research typically focuses on worker motivation and effort and not on morality and labor demand. Moreover, 
our findings also loosely relate to recent studies on how income relates to moral behavior (Bartling, Valero and 
Weber, 2018; Andreoni, Nikiforakis and Stoop, 2017). 
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The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a simple 
theoretical framework that we use to motivate the relationships that one would expect to see 
in labor markets under heterogeneity in moral concerns and work characteristics. We then 
use Swiss labor market data to investigate the relationship between the immorality of work 
and wages. Section 4 presents the design and results of our laboratory experiment. Section 5 
gives the design and results of our survey study.  
We conclude in Section 6 by discussing several implications of our findings for 
policy. For example, sorting by individuals more willing to engage in immoral acts may 
exacerbate the potential social harm produced by industries and firms with production 
technologies that involve negative externalities. That is, from society’s perspective we may 
want those people most concerned with acting morally working in industries with the greatest 
potential for producing harm, but our results suggest the opposite may happen. Such resulting 
impacts are of critical importance, since the design of policies and market features aimed at 
mitigating negative social impacts need to take into account heterogeneity in the preferences 
of individuals ultimately making decisions.  
2.2 A simple model of heterogeneous moral concern in labor markets  
In this section, we introduce a simple stylized model of labor markets with varying 
degrees of perceived job immorality and heterogeneity in concern for moral behavior among 
workers. We use the theoretical results to guide our investigation of immoral labor markets.  
We examine a single labor market for a job, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽. The job might involve doing 
immoral work. Firms decide whether to hire a worker to do 𝑗 at the market wage, w, and 
workers decide whether to accept work 𝑗 for the market wage. Workers differ in their 
concerns for morality. We then investigate how the equilibrium wage and selection in this 
labor market change when we increase the immorality of 𝑗 . Our framework is a 
simplification of the theoretical literature on compensating wage differentials (see, e.g., 
Rosen, 1986).7 We do not seek to expand this literature, but rather to apply it to a context in 
which the relevant job dimension is immorality. 
																																																								
7 Unlike most models of compensating wage differentials, we do not have multiple labor markets, but only one, 
along with a fixed outside option. In our laboratory experiment, we also assign subjects to one labor market. 
This abstraction simplifies both the theory and the experiment. However, we show in Appendix E that our 
model allows for an interpretation with two jobs, an immoral job and a neutral job. Our results also apply to 
such a context. 
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The immorality of 𝑗  is measured by a function 𝐼: 𝐽 → [0,∞) , where 𝐼(𝑗!) >
𝐼(𝑗) means that job 𝑗′ is more immoral than job 𝑗, and 𝐼(𝑗) = 0  means that the job 𝑗 involves 
no immoral acts. The set of immoral jobs is 𝐽!" = {𝑗 ∈ 𝐽: 𝐼(𝑗) > 0}. 
Labor demand is represented by an interval of firms, 𝑘 ∈ [0,1]. Firms’ behavior is 
given by the labor demand function, 𝐷:ℝ × 𝐽 → [0,1] , with 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗) = 0 , 
𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗) = 1  for 𝑤 ≤ 0 , 𝐷  continuous in 𝑤  and 𝐷  strictly decreasing in 𝑤  on [0,∞) . In 
addition, we assume that an increase in the immorality of the job does not decrease 
profitability of labor, that is, 𝐼 𝑗′ > 𝐼(𝑗) implies 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗′ ≥ 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗  for all 𝑤.8 
Labor supply consists of an interval of workers, 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] . Each worker has 




𝑗,𝑤 = 𝑤 − 𝑐 − 𝜃! ∗ 𝐼(𝑗), 
where 𝑐 ≥ 0 is the worker’s cost of effort, which is independent of 𝑗.  The parameter 𝜃! ≥ 0 
measures how much the worker cares about the immorality of the job and is distributed 
according to a cumulative density function 𝐹 ∈ ℱ! . The set ℱ! 	consists of all density 
functions 𝐹  that are continuous, strictly increasing on [0,∞), and with 𝐹(0) = 0.10 The 
indirect utility of a worker of type 𝑖 is then given by 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑢,𝑢!
!""#$%
(𝑗,𝑤)}. 








Using this framework, we can now consider the equilibrium properties of this type of 
market. The equilibrium wage, 𝑤∗(𝑗), is implicitly defined by 𝑆(𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗)− 𝐷(𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗) =
0.12 The following Lemma states that for every 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑤∗(𝑗) exists and is unique (all proofs 
are in Appendix D). 
																																																								
8 In our experiment, we vary the immorality of the job, but fix labor demand, that is, 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗′ = 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗  for all 
𝑤 and all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽. If an increase in immorality were to decrease profitability, there would be no incentives for 
firms to operate in immoral industries. Heidhues, Kőszegi and Murooka (2017) provide a basis for why 
deceptively marketed socially harmful products may be more profitable in the presence of naïve consumers. In 
Appendix E, we provide a behavioral foundation for the labor demand. 
9 Models about “mission-oriented” employees commonly assume very similar, additive utility functions (e.g. 
Cassar and Meier, 2018), with the main difference that −𝐼 𝑗 ∗ 𝜃!  is replaced by a positive term, the 
“meaningfulness of work” multiplied by how much the individual cares about meaning. 
10 Note that 𝐹(0) = 0 implies that no worker likes to do immoral jobs (Rosen, 1986, p. 645, makes a similar 
assumption). 
11 The assumptions on 𝐹 (together with the properties of a cdf) imply that 𝑆 is continuous and strictly increasing 
in 𝑤 on [𝑢 + 𝑐,∞), 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑆(𝑤, 𝑗) = 1, and 𝑆(𝑤, 𝑗) = 0  for all 𝑤 ≤ 𝑢 + 𝑐. 
12 Note that for 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ∖ 𝐽!", 𝑆 is a correspondence. For this case, 𝑤∗(𝑗) is defined by 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗 , 𝑗) ∈ 𝑆(𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗). 
Moreover, 𝑤∗(𝑗) depends on 𝐹. When necessary (Proposition 4) we will make this explicit by writing 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐹) 
instead of 𝑤∗(𝑗). 
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Lemma. For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!", 𝑤∗(𝑗) exists, is unique and is in (𝑢 + 𝑐,∞). For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ∖ 𝐽!", 
𝑤
∗(𝑗) = 𝑢 + 𝑐. 
In the following, we derive four properties of labor markets with immoral jobs. While 
straightforward, we use these results to make predictions for our empirical work. In 
particular, the first two propositions derive the primary hypotheses that we test across all of 
our analysis.  
Proposition 1 shows that there is an immorality premium for immoral jobs: an 
increase in the immorality of a job decreases supply and therefore increases the equilibrium 
wage. 
Proposition 1. (Immorality premium) For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽 with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!), 𝑤∗(𝑗) < 𝑤∗(𝑗′). 
The following Corollary further shows that this wage premium will be insignificant if 
workers do not sufficiently care about morality.13  
Corollary. For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽  with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!)  and 𝜀 > 0 , there exists 𝐺 ∈ ℱ!  such that  
𝑤
∗ 𝑗!,𝐺 − 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐺) ≤ 𝜀. 
Formally, the Corollary shows that there are distributions of moral types such that the wage 
differentials are arbitrary small (≤ 𝜀).  
Second, the immoral types, or to be precise, the types that care least about the 




), sort into accepting immoral jobs, while those workers 




), refuse to do the job for the equilibrium 
wage.14 This is formally shown in Proposition 2.15 




≡ 𝜃 𝑗 > 0.  
																																																								
13 Becker (1957) made a very similar point in his analysis of discrimination: discrimination will only affect 
wages if there is sufficiently large share of discriminating employers. 
14 Note that this perfect sorting according to 𝜃 is an extreme, and admittedly unrealistic, case. Heterogeneity in 
the costs of effort, reservation utility or productivity implies partial sorting according to 𝜃 . We do not 
incorporate more than one dimension of heterogeneity in our model to keep it simple. Heterogeneity in both 
productivity (earnings capacity) and risk preferences is investigated in Garen (1988) and Hwang, Reed and 
Hubbard (1992). 
15 Note that for any 𝑎 ∈ ℝ!!, 𝐹(𝑎) > 0 because 𝐹 0 = 0 and 𝐹  is strictly increasing on [0,∞). Therefore 
𝐹(θ j ) > 0, implying that some workers are hired. This is also important for most of the other propositions. 
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Proposition 2 is critical to the notion that immorality wage premiums are driven by those 
who find immoral work most distasteful opting out of such jobs. This important relationship 
has, to our knowledge, not been previously empirically tested. 
 Our next two propositions are less central to our purposes, but nevertheless provide 
some useful and testable insights into behavior in immoral labor markets. Proposition 3 
shows that immoral types profit from an increase in the immorality of work. 
Proposition 3. For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽  with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!) , there exists 𝜃 𝑗, 𝑗! > 0  such that 
𝑣!(𝑗′,𝑤
∗(𝑗′)) > 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤
∗(𝑗)) iff 𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗, 𝑗′).  
More precisely, there are always some types who are sufficiently unconcerned with morality 
who are hired in an immoral market and are overcompensated by the immorality premium.  
Finally, Proposition 4 shows that moral behavior (refusing to do the immoral job) can 
have positive externalities for the most immoral types. If the distribution of types shifts 
toward more concern for morality—in the sense of stochastic dominance—then the supply at 
any given wage decreases, thereby increasing the equilibrium wage and the utility of those 
least concerned with morality. For instance, any completely immoral types (i.e., 𝜃! = 0) will 
always benefit from a higher wage produced by increased moral concerns.  
Proposition 4. For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!" and 𝐹,𝐺 ∈ ℱ! with F(𝑥) < 𝐺(𝑥) for all 𝑥 > 0, there exists 
𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 > 0 such that 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤
∗(𝑗,𝐹)) > 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤
∗(𝑗,𝐺))  iff 𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗,𝐹).	
2.3 Evidence of an immorality premium from the Swiss Labor Force 
Survey  
To begin our analysis, we explore whether individuals working in industries generally 
perceived as immoral receive an immorality premium. We use data from the Swiss Labor 
Force Survey (SLSF)—a representative sample of the Swiss labor force compiled by the 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office—to explore the relationship between the perceived 
immorality of work and the portion of wages that cannot be explained by observable worker 




Figure 1. Correlation between wages and perceived industry immorality 
 
Source: Weighted data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage) and our own survey (perceived industry 
immorality). Notes: Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 
means very immoral. Real gross hourly wage in 2010 CHF. N = 32,638.  
 
We first identified industries that we jointly perceived as likely involving work 
activities widely seen to be immoral; we did so before looking at any data, including wages, 
from these industries. 16  This yielded six “immoral” industries: gambling and betting 
activities, monetary intermediations, credit granting, manufacture of tobacco products, 
wholesale of tobacco products and manufacture of weapons and ammunitions. We then chose 
comparison industries from within the same industrial branch with similar distributions of 
education levels, as well as nine additional industries representing large shares of 
employment in Switzerland.17 We did not look at wages when selecting these industries. 18  
																																																								
16 Specifically, we started with the complete list of industries listed in the SLFS dataset. Each of the three 
authors went through the list and indicated any industries that he or she perceived as having (or, being widely 
perceived to have) a significant immoral component. We selected those industries for which all three authors 
agreed. We proceed this way, rather than using the entire set of Swiss industries, to keep the number of 
questions we ask in subsequent surveys manageable. 
17 We chose five comparison industries: non-life insurance (for monetary intermediations; credit granting), 
organization and operation of sport facilities (for gambling and betting activities), processing of tea and coffee 
(for manufacture of tobacco products), manufacture of electronic components (for manufacture of weapons and 
ammunitions), wholesale of perfume and cosmetics (for wholesale of tobacco products). 
18 One might be concerned that we choose the sample of industries ourselves. In Appendix B we provide 
evidence for an immorality premium that does not rely on our sample of industries. First, we show that 
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We next obtained independent ratings of the perceived morality of the selected 
industries, by asking a sample of 177 students on the campus of the University of Zurich and 
the ETH  to rate each industry on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “very moral” to “very 
immoral” and re-scaled the responses to lie on the -1 to 1 interval. (These survey data were 
collected as part of our survey studies, which we describe in more detail in Section 5.) We 
interpret this variable as a noisy measure of the immorality of working in industry 𝑗, or 𝐼(𝑗), 
a key component of our theoretical model. The mean ratings for each industry are shown on 
the horizontal axis of Figure 1. They confirm that our initial judgments with respect to the 
perceived immorality of certain industries are shared by the student sample.  
The vertical axis of Figure 1 plots the mean real gross hourly wage (in 2010 Swiss 
Francs) in each industry. These data are the reported hourly wages of employees surveyed as 
part of a national representative panel. We use data from the 2010 to 2016 waves. The strong 
positive relationship supports the hypothesis that work in less moral industries yields a wage 
premium.  
Of course, the relationship in Figure 1 ignores the potential role of individual worker 
characteristics, which may vary across industries, and other characteristics of the industries 
themselves that may partly explain the wage gap. To partially address this concern, Table 2 
reports regressions of the hourly wage reported by individuals in different industries on the 
perceived immorality of each industry, along with several additional control variables. Model 
1 displays the results of a simple regression of the natural logarithm of real gross hourly 
wages on the perceived industry’s immorality, supporting the positive relationship in Figure 
1. Model 2 adds observable worker and industry characteristics, while Model 3 additionally 
includes indicator variables for each year and indicator variables for the region where the 
employer is located.19 While the addition of these controls lowers the magnitude of the 
industry immorality coefficient, the immorality premium remains large and statistically 
significant: according to Model 3, individuals working in an industry as immoral as 
manufacture of tobacco products (i.e., Perceived immorality = 0.47) have (geometric) mean 
 
																																																																																																																																																																											
industries. Second, we replicate the entire analysis with another set of industries that were selected by research 
assistants who were not familiar with the research question. 
19 First, note that the number of clusters is relatively small. We also computed the significance levels using the 
wild bootstrap procedure described in Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) with 400 replications: p-values for 
perceived industry immorality are 0.070 for Model 1, 0.000 for Model 2, and 0.005 for Model 3. Second, note 
that numbers of observations differ substantially between industries. If we weight observations by industry size 
(instead of using survey weights), estimates for perceived immorality are smaller (Model 1: 0.489, Model 2: 
0.349, Model 3: 0.344), but still significant (t=3.88, 3.10, and 4.03, respectively). Summary statistics of all 
variables used in the regressions and all of the industries are provided in Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 2. Relationship between wages and perceived industry immorality 
Dependent variable: ln of real gross hourly wage (in 2010 CHF) 
 (1) (2) (3) 




































































N 32,638 32,638 32,638 
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.379 0.397 
Year FE No No Yes 
Region FE No No Yes 
Source: Weighed data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage and demographics), STATENT, years 2011-2016 
(industry size, industry sales), Value Added Tax Statistics, years 2010-2016 (industry sales) and our own survey 
(perceived industry immorality).  
Notes: Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very 
immoral. Control variables: Male in {0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, Education high: higher vocational education and 
training or university/college, Education middle: apprenticeship, full-time vocational school, matura or 
pedagogical training, Education low (reference category): compulsory schooling or pre-vocational education, 
Swiss in {0, 1}, Experience = number of years in the firm, Full-time equivalent = (working hours /42), set to 1 
for working hours >= 42, managerial duties in {0, 1}, Industry size = number employees in this industry / 1000 
(2010 data is not available, we substitute it with 2011 data), Industry sales = Industry sales/number employees 
in this industry. Model (3) controls for company region fixed effects (26 Swiss cantons) and year fixed effects 
(2010-2016). Standard errors clustered at the industry level, t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. 
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hourly earnings approximately 35 percent higher than people working in a neutral industry 
(i.e., Perceived immorality = 0).20  
The above analysis is consistent with the notion that workers are sufficiently 
concerned about morality such that they are compensated for the perceived immoral nature of 
some kinds of work (Proposition 1).21 However, the correlational aspect of the relationship 
leaves open the question of whether additional unobserved characteristics of the industries 
may explain the relationship in Figure 1. Moreover, the above analysis does not tell us 
whether the workers employed in these industries differ in their concerns for morality. In the 
following, we explore the predictions of our model more carefully—controlling for 
unobservable aspects of the work and making a clearer connection to subjects’ heterogeneous 
concerns for morality—by means of a laboratory experiment and a survey study. We 
measure heterogeneity in concerns for morality (𝜃!) and relate this heterogeneity to workers’ 
outcomes as labor markets vary in the immoral nature of work (𝐼(𝑗)). 
2.4 Sorting and wage premiums in a laboratory labor market 
The experimental study uses two different subject samples: workers and clients. Our 
main focus is on the sample of workers, who participate in our laboratory sessions. These 
subjects initially complete an on-line questionnaire, and then participate in a laboratory 
experiment approximately one week later. The questionnaire measured subjects’ concern for 
morality using survey instruments, as well as their preferences regarding future employment 
possibilities. We discuss the on-line questionnaire in detail in the next section, where we also 
report the analysis of the resulting data. In this section, we focus on the design and results of 
the laboratory experiment. In the laboratory, we investigate the causal impact of the 
immorality of work on labor market outcomes. We do so by exogenously varying the degree 
of immorality of work while keeping everything else constant. In addition, we measure 
subjects’ concerns for morality and relate them to outcomes in the laboratory labor markets. 
In the laboratory sessions, subjects perform two choice tasks. First, we elicit a 
measure for concerns for morality (corresponding to 𝜃 in our model) using an incentivized 
																																																								
20 We obtain this number by doing the following calculation: e0.638*0.47 – 1  ≈ 0.350.  
21 This finding is in line with reports from companies that had recent scandals or bad moral reputations: 
Facebook, in wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, struggled to attract top talent (CNBC, 2019). Tobacco 
companies deem difficulties in recruitment arising from their image as an important enough risk to warrant 
disclosure to regulators and shareholders (British American Tobacco, 2015, p. 37; Philip Morris International 
Inc., 2015, p. 14).  
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behavioral task, adapted from Gneezy, Rockenbach and Serra-Garcia (2013), that creates a 
tradeoff between personal monetary gain and moral conduct. We will use this measure to 
investigate whether participants with low concerns for morality sort into immoral labor 
markets. Subjects then participate in a laboratory labor market for 15 periods, in which they 
submit reservation wages for performing a task. Labor demand is simulated according to a 
fixed demand schedule, that is, computerized employers automatically submit wage offers.  
The key feature of our laboratory experiment is that we vary by treatment only the 
degree to which work is immoral, while holding constant all other job characteristics, 
including the specific actions subjects take when employed. We attempt to design an 
“immoral” act that is unambiguously harmful and for which there is likely widespread 
agreement regarding its immorality. We opt for an act akin to giving bad financial advice to a 
non-profit organization, like UNICEF, thereby harming the non-profit’s financial standing 
and thus harming the organization’s employees and its ability to help aid recipients, and 
destroying potential value created by donors’ contributions. Providing harmful information 
and misleading customers is a realistic feature of many existing jobs perceived as immoral.  
We operationalize this kind of scenario in our experiment by informing subjects that 
each session is endowed with an initial donation to a UNICEF fund that provides malaria 
treatments for children (the aid recipients). These initial donations are linked to a donation 
generated by a third party’s blood donation (the donors).22 However, the actual final donation 
for a session is influenced by the behavior of participants in the session. Specifically, 
subjects in our experiment are hired to provide written advice to a “client” (a subject who 
participates later and serves a role analogous to the non-profit’s employee). We vary, by 
treatment, whether workers are assigned to a market with neutral jobs that involve honest 
advice that has little impact on the client and the UNICEF fund or to a market with immoral 
jobs that involve dishonest advice that hurts the client and UNICEF. A worker’s choice of 
whether to accept work is visible to other workers in the labor market.23 
We recruit a separate sample of individuals, the clients, at public locations. These 
participants serve two functions. First, they serve in the role of “clients”  who receive written 
recommendations from laboratory subjects and act upon this advice. From these choices, the 
																																																								
22 Prior to the laboratory session, we approached individuals who had just donated their blood as part of a 
donation campaign. We asked them whether they would agree that the University of Zurich potentially makes a 
donation to UNICEF as a complement to their blood donation. Most donors we approached agreed. 
23 This means that our behavioral measure of “immorality” confounds both internally-driven concerns for acting 
immorally and concerns for being perceived as willing to act immoral by others. Since real-world labor markets 
typically also confound both motives, we do not draw a distinction in our study, but instead combine both 
motives to strengthen the (perceived) immoral nature of work. 	
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clients accumulate money and determine the size of a donation to UNICEF. Second, these 
participants complete a survey in which they evaluate the extent to which various industries 
and firms are “moral” or “immoral.” These are the ratings that we already used in Figure 1 
and Table 2.  
2.4.1 The laboratory experiment 
 In the laboratory experiment, sessions consisted of 24 participants. During the 
experiment, subjects accumulated earnings in “points,” which were converted to money at 
the rate of 20 points = 1 CHF ≈ 1 US Dollar.  
Before subjects entered the lab, we took a portrait photograph of each subject to make 
labor market outcomes public. Participants were asked to make a neutral face while the 
picture was taken. Next, all participants entered the laboratory. As subjects have the ability to 
influence the amount of a donation to a UNICEF fund that provides treatment to children 
with malaria, participants read an information sheet about the consequences of malaria and 
the need for treatments at the beginning of the study—we adopted wording from UNICEF’s 
public materials and referred to each donation unit as helping to “save a child” from malaria 
by providing a treatment.  
In the following, we describe each of the choices subjects completed in the laboratory 
session, in detail. We also provide details on the recruitment and role of the clients. 
1.4.1.1 Behavioral measure of concern for morality (𝜃!"#) 
Participants first played an incentivized game that measures their willingness to lie 
for personal gain while causing harm to others in a non-market environment. The task builds 
on a game by Gneezy et al. (2013), and modifies it such that it mimics the consequences of a 
lie in the immoral treatment in our experimental labor market. Remember that we elicit this 
measure to investigate sorting into immoral labor markets. 
In the game, Participant A privately observes a computerized die roll and sends a 
message reporting the observed number to Participant B. Participant A may claim that the 
observed number r is either “1”, “2,” “3,” “4,” “5,” or “6,” regardless of the actual number. 
Participant A receives 100 + 20 * r points, which means that she has an incentive to lie if r is 
less than 6. Participant B then decides whether “to follow” or “not to follow” the message 
sent by Participant A. If Participant B does not follow the message, he receives 30 points and 
the donations to UNICEF are unaffected. If he follows the message and Participant A 
truthfully reported the observed number, Participant B earns 100 points and the initial 
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donation to UNICEF is increased by an amount corresponding to one additional anti-malarial 
treatment.24 However, if Participant B follows the message and Participant A lied, Participant 
B does not earn any points and the donation to UNICEF is reduced by one additional anti-
malaria treatment.  
Every participant initially plays the role of Participant A. We use the strategy method 
to elicit Participant A’s message for every possible die roll. This allows us to classify all 
subjects by their strategies in the game. At the end of the experimental session, 5 of the 24 
participants in the session have their role changed from Participant A to Participant B. These 
Participants B are then matched with five of the remaining Participants A and decide whether 
or not to follow the corresponding message. All participants whose role is not switched—
who remain as Participant A—are paid based solely on their own choice as Participant A, 
independently of whether or not they are matched with a Participant B.25  
Participants were informed that, at the very end of the session and after all choices 
had been made, their decisions as Participant A would be publicly displayed to other 
participants in the session, along with their portrait photograph. This was all explained 
clearly and publicly at the beginning of the experiment.  
2.4.1.2 Market experiment 
In the labor market, participants play the role of workers competing to be hired by 
automated firms. Before interacting in the market, instructions about the labor market are 
distributed to participants and a recording of the instructions is played aloud. Then, the 
participants answer comprehension questions about the market, including how prices and 
quantities are determined. Only after the above instructions about market procedures, 
subjects receive information about the nature of the job. This ensures that subjects in both 
treatments interpret the market instructions in the same manner. Their understanding of these 
new instructions about the job is again tested through comprehension questions.  
The job. In both markets, workers have the opportunity to be hired as an “advisor” 
whose job is to give advice to another uninvolved participant outside the laboratory, the 
“client.” Specifically, the advisor has to write a recommendation to a client to choose one 
among ten choice options (labeled by the letters “A” through “J”). Which option the advisor 
																																																								
24 The actual cost of providing 30 malaria treatments for children was CHF 29. In order to create small units 
with a strong moral component, our instructions always referred to the amount of money corresponding to 
treating “one child” and did not specify the exact monetary amounts. 
25 This implies that Participant As (whose role was not switched) received their own payment with certainty, 
their decision, however, only had consequences for Participant Bs (and UNICEF) with a probability of 26.3 
percent. This corresponds, roughly, to the stochastic impacts in our experimental labor market. 
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must recommend depends on the treatment. The client receives this recommendation, and 
then selects one of the ten options. The client only knows that the option he selects 
determines his financial reward for completing a survey and influences a donation to 
UNICEF, but does not know the consequences of any specific option. However, the client 
knows that the advisor had complete payoff information at the time of writing the 
recommendation. The client is free to choose the recommended option or any other option.26 
The payoffs associated with each of the ten options are indicated in Table 3. Nine 
options increase the client’s reward by 1 CHF (≈ 1 US Dollar) and increase the donation to 
UNICEF by an amount estimated to correspond to the anti-malarial treatment of one child. 
However, one of the 10 options—in this case, option D—gives 0 CHF to the client, and 
reduces the donation to UNICEF.  
Table 3. Options available to the “client” 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Additional number of children who 
receive the anti-malarial treatment 
1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Financial reward for client 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 0 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 
 
Our two treatments vary only in the recommendation that the advisor is hired to make 
to the client. In the neutral treatment, the advisor’s job is to recommend a specific option that 
is beneficial to the client and to UNICEF (e.g., option G in Table 3). Note that a client is very 
likely to make such a choice independently of any advice, thereby making the impact of such 
advice largely neutral. In the immoral treatment, the job is to recommend the single option 
with negative consequences (option D). In both cases, the advisor makes a recommendation 
by completing a form stating that, the option “will save the highest number of children” and 
“will give you the highest financial reward.”27 By recommending option D, the advisor 
increases the chance that the client selects the single option that will not increase his earnings 
and that will reduce the donation to UNICEF. We vary the letter of the recommended bad 
(neutral) option across immoral (neutral) laboratory sessions. Note that treatments only differ 
in the moral nature of the job; everything else, including effort costs, is kept constant. 
																																																								
26 Subsequently, 84% of all recommendations produced in the laboratory were followed by clients. 
27 Specifically, the advisor has to complete the following recommendation with the option’s name (e.g., G) and 
his initials: „I, [advisor’s initials], have reviewed your possible choices and I recommend that you select the 
option [G]. Following my advice will save the highest number of children and will give you the highest 
financial reward. Your advisor: [advisor’s initials]“ 
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The market. Participants are randomly allocated to markets consisting of 6 workers 
who compete to be hired by 6 automated firms. Each worker can provide up to two units of 
labor—one at a low cost (50 points = CHF 2.50) and one at a high cost (110 points = CHF 
5.50). The induced costs are the same for all participants, which the instructions clearly 
explain.  
Each worker decides whether or not to participate in the labor market. In the former 
case, she (privately) provides two wage requests, one for each of the possible units of labor 
she can provide. Workers may only submit wage requests that are at least as high as the 
corresponding cost of providing that job.  
Firms are simulated by the computer. Each firm can hire up to one unit of labor per 
period. Firms are identical except for the wage that they offer to the workers. Figure 2 
displays the automated demand for labor as well as the induced costs of labor supply. In 
equilibrium, all workers provide one unit of labor and the market wage is between CHF 2.5 
and 2.9.28 The workers have no information about the shape of the automated demand. 
Figure 2. The automated demand and the induced costs of the labor supply 
 
We use a uniform-price sealed-offer auction as the market mechanism, as this 
provides desirable features. First, Smith et al. (1982) show that this type of market typically 
converges to the equilibrium prediction. Second, and more importantly, this mechanism 
allows us to automate the labor demand (see also Sausgruber and Tyran, 2011) and therefore 
to keep the demand constant between the neutral and the immoral treatments. Once all six 
																																																								
28 We selected this specific labor demand function to facilitate equilibrium convergence. As long as the wage is 
substantially higher than the equilibrium prediction (that is, higher than CHF 3.05), at least two workers will be 
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workers have submitted their wage requests, the computer ranks them from lowest to highest 
and compares the workers’ wage requests to the firms’ wage offers, ranked from highest to 
lowest. The market wage is then the lowest number between two potential candidates: (i) the 
last wage offer that is higher than the wage request with the same rank, and (ii) the first wage 
request that is higher than the wage offer with the same rank. This mechanism clears the 
market in the sense that, for the market wage, labor supply equals labor demand and all 
workers with wage requests below the market wage are hired. 
Figure 3. Example of feedback provided after every period 
	
 
The market repeats for a total of 15 market periods. The composition as well as the 
type (immoral or neutral) of each market is fixed across periods. At the end of each period, 
the computer reports the market wage, displays the picture of every worker in the market and 
summarizes information regarding each workers’ outcomes across all periods (see Figure 3). 
Specifically, subjects observe employment outcomes, wages and cumulative earnings for all 
workers in their market across periods, and can connect these to the other workers’ identities 
through the photographs. After observing outcomes, those participants who were hired in a 
period completed the paper forms with the recommendations—they wrote their own initials 
and the appropriate letter (e.g., “G” or “D” in the earlier example).29 If the firm does not 
																																																								
29 Subjects are informed that in each period each firm has a probability of 25 percent of having a client, which is 
independent of whether or not the firm hires a worker. If the firm does not have a client, then the worker’s 
recommendation will be unused, although the worker still completes the recommendation and receives the 
market wage. However, subjects do not know at the time of submitting wage requests or completing the forms 
	 27
succeed in hiring a worker in a period, the firm’s client will not receive any recommendation. 
This implies that in the immoral treatment, if a participant is not willing to do the job for the 
market wage, the number of clients who receive bad advices (weakly) decreases.	
2.4.1.3 Procedural details 
 All sessions took place at the Decision Sciences Laboratory (DeSciL) at the Federal 
Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETH) in February, April and May 2017. Participants were 
recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge and Nicklisch, 2014) from the joint subject pool of the 
University of Zurich and the ETH. Every session consisted of 24 participants, who were only 
accepted at the session if they had previously completed the on-line survey.30 To start a 
session, subjects had to enter an identifier that allows us to link, anonymously, their answers 
in the on-line questionnaire with their behavior in the lab. We conducted ten sessions, 
resulting in a total of 240 participants, allocated to 28 immoral markets and 12 neutral 
markets. The laboratory experiment was implemented with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
All instructions were delivered both on paper and with pre-recorded audio files. 
Instructions and materials are available in the Online-Appendix.31  
2.4.1.4 Survey study (clients) 
We subsequently recruited a different sample of students on the campus of the 
University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) (N=177). We 
invited student passersby to participate in a brief choice experiment in which they could earn 
money and generate a donation for UNICEF aimed at providing treatments for children 
infected by malaria. They were told that they would earn CHF 2 plus possibly some 
additional money for a 5-minute study. These subjects performed two functions.  
																																																																																																																																																																											
at the end of a period whether or not there will be a client for this period. At the end of the experiment, subjects 
learn which of their written recommendations will be distributed. We did this to lower the number of clients we 
have to recruit as part of the follow-up survey. This procedure implies that writing a recommendation has only 
consequences with a probability of 25 percent and, therefore, works against our treatment effect. This 
represents, for instance, a case in which a worker is hired to prepare promotional materials for a harmful 
product, which may or may not ultimately be used in a marketing campaign.  
30 We made an exception if less than 24 subjects who completed the survey showed up to the experiment. In 
total, three subjects were allowed to participate despite not completing the online-survey. 
31	At the conclusion of the laboratory session, we collected several additional individual-level measures. First, 
we measured participants’ affect levels—i.e., pleasure, arousal, and dominance—using the Self-Assessment 
Manikin (Bradley and Lang, 1994). Next, we asked participants whether they thought the clients would or 
would not follow recommendations; this belief was not incentivized. The participants were then prompted to 
answer several questions about the reasons underlying their market behavior. Finally, we measured subjects’ 
concerns for social image using the public self-consciousness scale by Leary et al. (2015), in which participants 
rate seven short descriptions of behaviors by people who care or do not care about their social-image, on a scale 
from 1 (not like me at all) to 4 (a lot like me).	
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First, they served the role of “clients” for the recommendations from the laboratory 
labor market. Each participant made up to six decisions by choosing one of the ten letters 
between A and J. They knew that these decisions influenced their own earnings and also 
possibly the amount of donations to UNICEF, but they did not know the actual payoffs. Each 
decision had the payoff structure in Table 3, but we varied which letter corresponded to the 
bad option. Clients received a mixture of recommendations with good advice, bad advice and 
no advice (corresponding to the case in which a firm was not able to hire a worker). Clients 
were only informed of the total payoffs at the end of their decisions. 
Second, while their payment was determined and prepared, participants completed a 
survey in which they rated various firms and industries on a scale from 1 (very immoral) to 5 
(very moral). For firms, clients also had the option to choose “I don’t know this 
organization.” The complete list of firms and industries is available in Appendix Tables A1 
and A2.  
2.4.2 Results 
In presenting our results, we focus attention on the existence of an immorality 
premium and sorting by heterogeneous moral types. We first discuss how we construct our 
incentivized measure of concern for morality, 𝜃!"#. Next, we study behavior in the labor 
market, and whether it can be predicted by 𝜃!"#. We then study the outcomes in the labor 
market and their connection to the behavioral measure of concern for morality (𝜃!"#), testing 
the predictions of our model. While choices in our experiment were incentivized with 
“points,” we present the results in terms of ultimate payments in Swiss francs (CHF) to 
provide a clearer indication of the economic relevance. 
2.4.2.1 Construction of 𝜃!"#  
We construct 𝜃!"# based on choices in the behavioral task that subjects completed at 
the beginning of the laboratory session (Appendix Table A3 shows the distribution of 
choices). Let 𝑚!"  be the number that individual 𝑖 reports if the actual die roll is 𝑟. We 
classify an individual as low-theta if 𝑚!" ≥ 𝑟 for all 𝑟 ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,6} and 𝑚!" > 𝑟 for at least 
one 𝑟; that is, participant 𝑖 is classified as having a low concern for morality if he or she lies 
at least once for personal gain and never in self-harmful manner. We classify the remaining 
participants as high-theta.32 Based on this classification, we have 66 (27.5 percent) low-theta 
																																																								
32 A total of 13 subjects (5.4 percent, see Appendix Table A3) harmed themselves with a lie (𝑚!" < 𝑟, e.g., 
reporting 𝑚!" = 1 when 𝑟 = 2). Since these subjects do not appear to be motivated by egoism, we classify them 
as high-theta. The remaining 161 subjects classified as high-theta always report the true number. Classifying 
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types and 174 (72.5 percent) high-theta types.33 Given our interpretation of 𝜃, we will often 
refer to low-theta types as immoral and high-theta types as moral types. We next explore the 
differential behavior of the different types in the labor markets and the consequences of this 
behavior. 
2.4.2.2 Labor supply of moral and immoral types  
Assuming that 𝜃!"# measures a stable concern for morality that translates into labor-
market choices, we should observe differential behavior in the laboratory labor markets 
between high-theta and low-theta types, but only when employment requires immoral work. 
This is confirmed in the data. In Table 4, we report the results of a double-hurdle regression 
of the decision of whether to submit a wage request and, conditionally, the actual wage 
request. The key independent variable is a subject’s type from the behavioral task at the 
beginning of the experiment. In the immoral treatment, high-theta workers opted to submit 
wage requests less frequently than low-theta workers (61.6 percent vs. 90.6 percent, 
p<0.001). By declining to submit a wage request, a subject indicates an unwillingness to do 
the work even at a wage of up to 50 CHF (1000 points), the highest possible wage request in 
our experiment. Furthermore, consistent with the model, low-theta types submit conditional 
reservation wage requests that are approximately 0.49 CHF lower than the wage request of 
high-theta types (p=0.073). These effects do not become weaker over time—if anything, the 
coefficients indicate that the greater willingness of low-theta types to participate in the 
immoral labor market becomes slightly stronger over time.34 Moreover, 21.5 percent of the 
high-theta workers never participated in the market (i.e., refused to submit a wage request in 
any of the 15 periods), but this is true of only 4.3 percent of low-theta workers (t = -3.78; 
p=0.001). Hence, our behavioral measure of a subject’s moral type (𝜃!"#) seems to predict 
their willingness to seek employment in an immoral job. 
  
																																																																																																																																																																											
subjects that lied in a self-harmful manner as high-theta types is conservative in that they act less morally than 
the honest subjects (see Table A5 in the Appendix). Results do not change if we drop these subjects or if we 
classify them as low-theta types instead.  
33 In principle, we could classify subjects into more than two categories—e.g., conditional on the number of lies 





!!! ). Due to the low number of subjects with different 
lying-patterns (see Appendix Table A3), we opt for a binary classification. However, as Appendix Table A5 
indicates, we find similar results if we use these alternative classifications.  
34 Specifically, if we add a linear time trend to the hurdle model and its interaction with theta (see Appendix 
Table A4), we find that low-theta types become slightly more likely to participate over time and provide lower 
reservation wages, relative to high-theta types. However, both coefficients are small and statistically 
insignificant.  
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1.024*** -0.494* -0.018 
(4.64) (-1.79) (-0.22) 
Constant 
0.295** 4.056*** 2.909*** 
(2.41) (20.20) (43.79) 
Sigma 
 2.64*** 0.609*** 
 (7.72) (10.57) 
Market Immoral Immoral Neutral 
N 2520 1755 1077 
LL (pseudo) -1427.9 -4194.1 -993.9 
Notes: Estimates from Craggs double-hurdle Model: (1) is a probit model; (2) and (3) are truncated linear 
regressions (truncated from above at 50 CHF). Models (1) and (2) use only data from the immoral markets; 
model (3) uses only data from the neutral markets. For neutral markets, we do not report the regression of 
market participation as we have only 3 incidences in which a subject did not participate. Independent 
variables: Low-theta in {0, 1}. Standard errors clustered at market level; z-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 
0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
 
In the neutral treatment, however, non-participation is virtually non-existent—there 
were only 3 cases in total in which participants chose not to participate, representing 0.28 
percent of all observations. That is, there is nearly universal participation when the job does 
not involve immoral behavior. Moreover, the average wage requests of high-theta (CHF 
2.91) and low-theta (CHF 2.89) types do not differ in magnitude or in statistical significance 
(p-value from hurdle model =	0.827).  
Thus, there seems to be differential participation in the market between moral and 
immoral types, but only when working involves immoral acts. In particular, high-theta types 
withdraw their participation and make higher wage requests when work requires immoral 
behavior. However, when the work activity is neutral, both types almost always participate 
and make similar wage requests. As a direct consequence of these observations, labor supply 
differs substantially between the two kinds of markets, as shown in Figure 4.35 In the neutral 
treatment, labor supply is fairly close to the induced costs. However, for any given wage, 
there is a substantially lower supply of labor in the immoral treatment.  
In the following sections, we explore the implications of the above heterogeneous 
behavior for labor market outcomes. 
  
																																																								
35 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the labor supply if we only consider the last 5 periods. Figure A2 in the 
Appendix displays the labor supply in (simulated) labor markets with only low-theta or only high-theta types.  
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Figure 4. Empirical labor supply for neutral and immoral work in the laboratory 
 
Notes: Wage requests are ranked within each market period of each group. The figure shows the average wage 
request for each rank for both the immoral and the neutral treatment. Note that wage requests are censored at 
the maximal wage request that subjects could make, 50 CHF. For this figure, we set the wage requests of 
subjects who are not willing to participate to CHF 50. Therefore, the supply curve for the immoral treatment 
should be interpreted as a lower bound. 
 
2.4.2.3 Wage premium in immoral labor markets 
In line with Proposition 1, we find a substantial immorality premium, as shown in 
Figure 5. This follows from the differential labor supply in Figure 4. While market wages in 
the neutral treatment converge toward the equilibrium prediction of CHF 2.90, the average 
market wage is persistently higher in the immoral treatment and this difference is statistically 
significant in a t-test from a regression with standard errors clustered at the market-level 
(coefficient=2.581, t=6.00, p<0.001). Hence, our laboratory labor market yields a substantial 
and persistent wage premium for immoral work in a setting in which only the morality of 
work varies. This laboratory evidence corroborates the field evidence in support of 
Proposition 1 shown in Figure 1 and Table 2.  
Of course, one concern might be that the immorality premium is the result of the 
specific labor demand structure that we employ in our design. However, as evident from the 
differences in labor supply that we identify in Figure 4, workers are sufficiently concerned 
with acting morally that we would very likely obtain wage premiums under a wide variety of 



























Figure 5. Immorality wage premium in laboratory labor markets 
 
We also find persistent differences in the employment levels in the two markets 
(Figure A3 in the Appendix). While the neutral market converges to the equilibrium 
prediction of 6, the average market quantity remains below 4 in the immoral markets. This 
difference is significant in a t-test comparing the means (coefficient=-1.201, t=-6.30, 
p<0.001). Moreover, the trends in Figure 5 provide further evidence that the manifestation of 
high-theta participants’ morality in labor market behavior does not erode over the course of 
the experiment. This persistence is remarkable given that participants receive much social 
information at the end of each market round. Remember that participants learn about past 
employment and accumulated earnings of all workers in their market. In immoral labor 
markets, moral participants therefore see other participants less concerned with morality 
earning high wages due to their own reluctance to act immoral.  
2.4.2.4 Sorting in immoral labor markets 
We next turn to Proposition 2, which predicts that low-theta types will be disproportionately 
hired in the immoral markets. Figure 6 shows that, indeed, high-theta types are consistently 
employed less frequently in the immoral treatment. Table 5 shows that, on average, low-theta 
types are 26.6 (= 26.8− 0.2) percentage points more likely to be employed than high-theta 
types (column 1). This difference is highly significant (p<0.001) and robust to adding market 
fixed effects (column 2). Moreover, this finding is robust to other ways of constructing Ө!"# 
from behavior in the behavioral task (see Table A5 in the Appendix). The results are similar 
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binary measure of employment (column 3 and 4). In the neutral treatment, we do not find a 
significant difference in employment rates between the two types (columns 1 to 4; see also 
Appendix Figure A4). This corroborates that the difference in hiring rates in the immoral 
treatment is driven by differences in concerns for morality and not some other difference 
between high- and low-theta types. 
Figure 6. Employment rate by the two types in the immoral treatment 
 
	
Table 5. Relationship between 𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑 and outcomes in the experimental labor markets 
Dependent 
variable: 
Employment rate Number of jobs Market income 
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Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Independent variables: Low-theta in {0, 1}, Immoral 
market in {0, 1}. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 




























2.4.2.5 Market income in immoral labor markets 
Propositions 3 and 4 predict heterogeneous treatment effects in terms of worker’s 
utility. As a simple proxy for utility, we use the sum of all earnings accumulated by a worker 
over the 15 market periods. However, as we show in the Appendix C, the same results obtain 
if we use a slightly more complicated measure that incorporates estimates of workers’ 
disutility from work, which we obtain from their wage requests. 
Figure 7. Market income by moral type 
  
 
Proposition 3 predicts that the immoral types benefit from an increase in the job’s 
immorality. Figure 7 and results from linear regressions (see Table 5, Columns 5 and 6) show 
that the low-theta types earn more market income than the high-theta types in the immoral 
treatment, but not in the neutral treatment. The difference of CHF 7.09 (8.42 – 1.33 in 
column 5) is statistically significant (p=0.026). Note that the potential market income is 
constrained by the market wage. If we control for the market wage by adding market fixed 
effects (column 6), the immoral types are estimated to earn CHF 10.81 more than the moral 
types (p=0.001). Thus, as predicted by Proposition 3, immoral types earn considerably more 
in an immoral market. We do not find such a difference in the neutral market; if anything, 
low-theta types earn slightly less than the high-theta types.  
Finally, Proposition 4 predicts that, in the immoral treatment, immoral types have 
higher utility in the presence of more moral types. To test this prediction, for each subject we 



































based on the median of this measure: we classify a subject as being in a market with few low-
theta types if the number of (other) low-theta type workers is lower than 2, and as being in a 
market with many low-theta types if the number of (other) low-theta type workers is 2 or 
more. This results in 70 subjects in the first category, and 98 subjects in the second category. 
The mean earnings of subjects in the immoral treatment, based on their own type and the 
median type of others in their market is shown in Figure 8, which uses only data from the 
immoral treatment. The income of high-theta types is CHF 4.33 higher in a market with few 
low-theta types than in one with many low-theta types (t=2.05, p=0.051, see Table A6 in the 
Appendix). For low-theta types, being in a market with few low-theta types increases the 
income by an additional CHF 16.35 (t=3.53, p=0.002), resulting in a total difference of CHF 
20.68 (t=4.29, p<0.001).36  
Figure 8. Externalities of moral behavior for immoral types 
 
Our laboratory findings confirm all four predictions from our simple model of 
heterogeneity in the morality of work and concerns for morality. We find evidence that 
people with high concern for morality consistently refuse to do immoral jobs (or require a 
high wage), thereby decreasing labor supply and increasing the equilibrium wage, resulting 
in an immorality premium. As a consequence, subjects with a low concern for morality are 
																																																								
36 If we use the number of (other) low-theta types in the market instead of doing a median split, we find similar 
results. For high-theta types, the income is estimated to increase by CHF 2.45 per additional high-theta type in 
the market (t=2.10, p=0.045). For low-theta types, the income increases by CHF 8.21 for every additional high-
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better off in immoral markets, in particular if they are in a market with many moral 
subjects.37 
2.5 Stated real-world employment preferences and sorting 
Several days (4-7) before subjects participated in the lab experiment, they filled out 
an online-survey. 38  The online-survey includes several questions designed to measure 
subjects’ expectations of their own future labor market outcomes, including the willingness 
to work for different firms and industries and expected future wages, and subjects’ concern 
for morality. The online-survey gives us a second measure of concerns for morality, and, 
more importantly, allows us to investigate whether subjects’ moral types not only predict 
behavior in the laboratory labor markets but also expectations for real labor market 
outcomes—in line with Proposition 2.  
We first construct an individual measure of concern for morality based on the 
answers to the psychological survey questions (𝜃!"# ). We then show that this second 
measure of concern for morality correlates both with the comparable behavioral measure 
from the laboratory experiment (𝜃!"#) and with outcomes in the laboratory labor market. 
This validation of 𝜃!"# is useful for future research, as it is based solely on survey questions 
which are easier to collect than the incentivized measures. Moreover, the comparison of Ө!"# 
and 𝜃!"# provides some evidence on the stability of moral concerns across time and contexts, 
which is necessary for heterogeneous moral concerns to persistently influence labor market 
behavior.  
We then show that both 𝜃!"# and 𝜃!"# predict stated labor market preferences in real 
labor market, consistent with the sorting process described in Proposition 2.  
2.5.1 The on-line questionnaire 
We asked subjects several questions about their future labor-market expectations. 
Subjects were shown a list of 26 well-known companies in Switzerland and another list 
																																																								
37	One additional consequence of heterogeneous concerns for morality is that the income distribution differs 
substantially between the two treatments. While in the neutral treatment, income is almost equally distributed 
(Gini coefficient=0.15), we find substantial income inequality in the immoral treatment (Gini coefficient=0.38). 
Appendix Figure A5 shows the Lorenz curves for both treatments.	
38 Subjects could only sign up for both the on-line survey and the lab study. Three (out of 240) subjects did not 
complete the online-survey. We exclude these subjects from this part of the analysis.  
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consisting of the 20 industries in Figure 1.39 Both lists are available in Tables A1 and A2 in 
the Appendix. Participants rated their willingness to work for each firm and industry (1: not 
at all willing; 5: very much willing). For firms, participants also had the option to choose, “I 
don’t know this organization,” instead of rating their willingness to work for that firm. In 
addition, we asked subjects to provide unstructured responses stating beliefs about their 
future career trajectories—specifically, what work they expected to do after their studies and 
how much they expected to earn at the age of 40. 
In addition, we included several multi-item scales intended to measure an individual’s 
broad concern for morality and moral acts. These were: 
1) HEXACO-PI. We administered 10 items from the short version of the HEXACO 
Personal Inventory (Ashton and Lee, 2009) related to the factor “Honesty-
Humility”—consisting of the four traits, sincerity (3 items), fairness (3 items), greed 
avoidance (2 items) and modesty (2 items). Every item describes a thought that a 
moral or immoral person might have and participants indicate the extent to which 
each thought reflects their own opinions.  
2) Protected Values. The Protected Values scale (Gibson et al., 2013) measures an 
individual’s position regarding values that can be seen as inviolable, and not 
substitutable against money, and that are usually central to the person’s identity. In 
our case, and following Gibson et al. (2013), we adapted the Protected Values to a 
situation where a financial adviser can give bad investment advice to a client for 
personal benefit. First, 5 items assess the morality of this behavior (Protected value 
1); second, 4 items examine how truthfulness matters in such a situation (Protected 
value 2). 
3) Integrity and Work Ethics Test. We used two items from an on-line test designed 
to allow firms to measure the integrity of job applicants (Work ethics 1, Work ethics 
2). In each item, participants read fictitious dialogues between two characters with 
different opinions about a situation (e.g., calling in sick at work to enjoy a sunny day 
outside). Participants then rate with which character they agree more. 
4) Charity attitude index. We used a 9-item scale developed by Brashear et al. (2000) 
in which participants rate statements regarding how important they perceive it is to 
help others in society and how positive and useful they perceive work done by 
charities. 
																																																								
39 Subjects fill out the survey before they learn anything about the rest of the questionnaire or the experiment. 
Also, note that  
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In each case, subjects expressed agreement or disagreement with statements on either a 5-
point or 7-point Likert scale. Thorough descriptions of these survey scales are provided in the 
Online Appendix and in Table A7 in the Appendix.  
Finally, we asked subjects whether several non-profit organizations (including 
UNICEF) are worth supporting and collected additional personal characteristics using a short 
version of the Big Five questionnaire (Gosling et al., 2003), which identifies individuals’ 
extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness, but is largely 
orthogonal to morality. We also elicited several demographic characteristics, such as age, 
gender and field of study. The on-line questionnaire was implemented with the Qualtrics 
software.	
2.5.2 Constructing 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 
In the following, we discuss how we construct a survey-based measure for concerns 
for morality, 𝜃!"#. Table 6 lists the 9 subscales from the morality measures we collected. 
Summary statistics for each of these are provided in Appendix Table A7. We aggregate these 
nine psychological measures by performing a principal-component factor analysis. We 
selected the factor with the highest eigenvalue (eigenvalue = 2.44) to represent our 
psychological measure of concern for morality, i.e., 𝜃!"#.40 Table 6, column 1 presents the 
corresponding factor loadings. We normalized 𝜃!"# such that it lies between 0 and 1; the 
resulting variable has a mean of 0.5 and a median of 0.5. Low values represent a low concern 
for morality. The distribution of 𝜃!"#  is presented in Appendix Figure A6. Given our 
interpretation of 𝜃, we will often refer to subjects with a low Ө!"# as immoral types and 
subjects with high 𝜃!"# as moral types.   
  
																																																								
40 In the Appendix (Table A8, A9 and A10), we demonstrate that our results are robust to different aggregation 
mechanisms. Specifically, we look at two alternative aggregation mechanisms: i) each of the nine survey 
measures is given equal weight and ii) weight of the measures is determined by a regression of 𝜃!"# on the 
survey measures.  
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Table 6. Items comprising 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 and their relationship to 𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑 
 
Factor loadings 
(weights for 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓) 
(1) 
Regression 
coefficient of 𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑 
(2) 
Protected value 1 0.664 0.540*** 
(3.66) 
Protected value 2 0.708 0.352** 
(2.22) 
Work ethics 1 0.213 -0.039 
(-0.39) 
Work ethics 2 0.252 0.042 
(0.52) 
HEXACO sincerity 0.482 0.362** 
(2.53) 
HEXACO fairness 0.611 0.353*** 
(2.61) 
HEXACO greed avoidance 0.477 0.225* 
(1.73) 
HEXACO modesty 0.508 0.236* 
(1.79) 
Charity attitude index 0.545 0.711*** 
(3.11) 
Notes: Each subscale is constructed by taking averages over all items of the scale, and then normalized such 
that it lies between 0 and 1. (1): Factor loadings from principal-component factor analysis of survey measures 
on 𝜃!"#. (2): Coefficient estimates of linear probability models. N = 237 for each regression (3 subjects did not 
complete the online-survey and are excluded). Dependent variable: being a high-theta type according to 𝜃!"#. 
Independent variables: survey measures in [0,1], higher numbers indicate more morality. Robust standard 
errors; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
2.5.3 Does 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 predict behavior in the laboratory? 
To validate 𝜃!"#, we investigate how it correlates with behavior in the laboratory. 
Table 6, column 2, shows the coefficients from independent simple regressions of a subject’s 
type measured by the behavioral laboratory task, 𝜃!"#, on all items	comprising 𝜃!"#. The 
dependent variable is binary, indicating that a subject is a high-theta type. The results show a 
significant positive correlation between 𝜃!"# and all personality measures, except for Work 
ethics 1 and Work ethics 2. Consistent with the positive relationship of the individual items, a 
regression of 𝜃!"# on 𝜃!"# shows positive and significant relationships (coefficient=0.723, 
t=4.32, p<0.001), that is, a person who is characterized by a low concern for morality 
according to our survey-based measures is more likely to lie self-servingly in the behavioral 
measure in the experiment. These generally positive relationships suggest that 𝜃!"#  and our 
measures of psychological traits capture similar individual characteristics.  
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We next consider the extent to which 𝜃!"#  also predicts participants’ behavior in the 
labor market experiment, and particularly in the immoral condition.41 Results from a linear 
regression of the employment rate on 𝜃!"# indicate that the participants with the lowest 
concerns for morality (that is, participants with 𝜃!"# = 0) are 43.9 percentage points more 
likely to be hired in immoral labor markets than the participants with the highest concerns for 
morality (that is, participants with 𝜃!"# = 1) and this difference is marginally statistically 
significant (p=0.057, see Appendix Table A8, column 1). A less noisy measure of subjects’ 
market behavior is their actual choices. Results from a hurdle model indicate that the subjects 
with the lowest concerns for morality are 52.1 percentage points more likely to participate in 
immoral labor markets by submitting a wage request than the individuals classified as having 
the highest concerns for morality (p=0.015, see Appendix Table A9). However, they do not 
have significantly lower reservation wages than the moral types in those markets (p=0.548). 
In the neutral treatment, as expected, we do not find a significant difference in employment 
rates or in labor market behavior between the two types.	
2.5.4 Do 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 and 𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑 predict stated real-world labor market preferences? 
Our study collects two measures of participants’ concern for morality (𝜃!"# and 
𝜃
!"#). Furthermore, the on-line survey elicits the same participants’ willingness to work for 
several firms and industries, without making any reference to morality. We also separately 
obtained independent ratings of the perceived immorality of these firms and industries, from 
the “clients.” In this section, we use all of this information to analyze how our measures of 
concern for morality connect to expectations about labor market outcomes outside the 
laboratory. 
We create a measure of perceived firm immorality in the same way as we created 
perceived industry immorality: by averaging the ratings and scaling them such that they lie 
between -1 (very moral) and +1 (very immoral), where 0 means neutral.42 We use these 
variables as noisy measures of the immorality of work, 𝐼(𝑗), in industry (or, firm) 𝑗, a key 
component of our theoretical model. The horizontal axes in Figures 9a and 9c plot the 
resulting normalized ratings for industries in our sample, the horizontal axes in Figures 9b 
and 9d plot the normalized ratings for firms (see also Appendix Tables A1 and A2).  
																																																								
41	Figure A7 in the Appendix displays the labor supply in a (simulated) labor market with only low-𝜃!"# or only 
high-𝜃!"#types. 
42 Remember that for firms, clients also had the option to choose “I don’t know this organization” instead of 
rating the firm. To calculate the perceived firm immorality, we exclude these observations. Alternatively, we 
could code these as neutral ratings. These two measures are highly correlated (corr=0.9854). Our results do not 
change substantially if we use the alternative measure (see Table A11). 
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Our focus in this section is to investigate whether these perceptions of immorality of 
industries and firms interact with our subjects’ measured concern for morality (either 𝜃!"# or 
𝜃
!"#) to produce differential labor market preferences. For this purpose, we normalized 
participants’ stated willingness to work for firms and industries, such that they take values 
between 0 (not at all willing) and 1 (very much willing).43  
The vertical axes of Figures 9a and 9c plot the difference in willingness to work for 
the industries between participants who were classified as moral or immoral, according to 
𝜃
!"#  (Figure 9a) or 𝜃!"#  (Figure 9c). The strong negative relationship indicates that 
participants classified as immoral are, on average, more willing to work for industries 
perceived as immoral.  
Table 7, columns (1) to (4) provide statistical evidence for the relationships in Figure 
9. While there is little evidence for a systematic difference in willingness to work for neutral 
industries between moral and immoral types, participants classified as immoral are 
significantly more willing to work in industries that are classified as immoral. This pattern is 
significant at least at the 5%-level, holds for both measures of individual moral concerns, 
𝜃
!"# and 𝜃!"#, and is robust to controlling for participants’ gender, age, Swiss nationality, 
area of study, mean industry wages, industry size (number of employees), and industry sales.  
We repeat the same analysis using data on individuals’ willingness to work for our 
selection of well-known firms in Switzerland. The vertical axis of Figures 9b and 9d plot the 
difference in willingness to work for the firms between participants who were classified as 
moral and immoral according to 𝜃!"# (Figure 9b) or Ө!"# (Figure 9d). Again, participants 
that are classified as immoral are, on average, more willing to work for firms perceived as 
immoral. This relationship is confirmed by Table 7, columns (5) to (8): immoral participants 
are more willing to work for firms that other people rate as more immoral (p<0.01), which is 
again true for both measures of concern for morality (𝜃!"# and 𝜃!"#). This finding indicates 
that firms that are perceived as immoral differentially attract applicants with a lower concern 
for morality.44  
																																																								
43 Incidentally, the list of industries accidentally omitted five industries for five participants that participated in 
the first lab session. So, we are missing data on willingness to work in these industries for these participants. 
Other than these cases, all subjects completed the full questionnaire. We exclude all these missing observations 
from the analysis. Regarding willingness to work for firms, participants also had the option to choose “I don’t 
know this organization.” This option was chosen in 17.8 percent of all answers. We also exclude these 
observations. We obtain similar results if we classify such observations as “indifferent” or if we restrict our 
analysis to subjects that know all firms (see Table A12).  
44	As we show in the Appendix, the differential willingness to work for immoral firms and industries by moral 
and immoral types does not depend on how we construct Ө!"# (Table A10) and how we deal with missing 
observations (Table A11, Table A12).	
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Figure 9. Correlation between the difference in willingness to work between moral and 
immoral types and perceived immorality of industries/firms. 
 
(a) Industries, 𝜃!"# 
 
(b) Firms, 𝜃!"# 
 
(c) Industries, 𝜃!"# 
 
(d) Firms, 𝜃!"# 
Source: Survey study (Perceived immorality), on-line survey (Willingness to work, 𝜃!"# ), Laboratory 
experiment (𝜃!"#). 
Notes: Differences in willingness to work: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models of the participants’ 
willingness to work for different industries (a and c) or firms (b and d) on 𝜃
!
!"#
 (a and b) or 𝜃!"# (c and d). 
Dependent variable: Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 
0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where subjects did not know the 
firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent 
variables: a and b use 𝜃!"# to classify participants, where 𝜃
!
!"#




theta types, while c and d use 𝜃!"# in [0,1] instead. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very 
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Table 7: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
perceived immorality and moral types.  
Dependent variable: Willingness to work for industry j Willingness to work for firm j 





































































N 4715 4715 4715 4715 5064 5064 5064 5064 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much 
willing to work. Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did 
not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent variables: (1), (2), (5) and (6) use 𝜃
!
!"#




=0 for low- theta types and 𝜃
!
!"#
=1 for high-theta types, while (3), (4), (7) and (8) use  
𝜃
!"# (in [0,1]) instead. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 
means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study, average wage industry 
2016 (SLFS; only for industries), industry size 2016 (STATENT; only for industries), industry sales 2015 (Value 
Added Tax Statistics; only for industries). Standard errors clustered at individual and industry/firm level 
(Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
The above analysis provides evidence supporting Proposition 2 in real labor markets. 
Those who are least concerned with morality are significantly more willing to work in firms 
that are perceived as less moral. A limitation of this survey evidence is that it is based on 
hypothetical future choices. However, Wiswall and Zafar (2018) provide evidence that such 
stated preferences are predictive of ultimate employment. To further validate subjects’ stated 
real-world labor market preferences, we can test whether the stated employment preferences 
correlate with individual employment rates in the immoral treatment of our laboratory 
experiment. Indeed, we find that people that are hired more often for the immoral job have a 
statistically significant higher willingness to work in immoral industries (see Table A13 in 
the Appendix). 
Finally, in the on-line survey, we also asked participants to rate how much they 
expect to earn when they reach the age of 40. We do not find any statistically significant 
correlation between participants’ type and their earnings’ expectations, although a regression 
of expected future wages on 𝜃!"# reveals a positive relationship such that the least moral 
types (𝜃!"# = 0) report expected income that is 30,272 CHF higher on average than the 
expected income of the most moral type (Ө!"# = 1, p=0.125). This relationship is consistent 
with Proposition 1. However, the earnings expectations measures for such a long time 
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horizon—on average 18 years—are perhaps less reliable than the more contemporaneous 
statements of willingness to work for different firms. 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
We investigate how individual heterogeneity in concerns for morality interact with 
heterogeneity in the perceived immorality of work to influence the types of jobs that 
individuals select and their earnings. Our study employs a combination of a laboratory 
experiment, surveys and empirical data to identify heterogeneity in concerns for morality and 
to measure (or, create) variation in the immorality of jobs. We use these different kinds of 
data to test two main hypotheses—first, that jobs that are generally perceived as immoral will 
yield an immorality wage premium and, second, that individuals less concerned with moral 
behavior will be more likely to be hired in such jobs. 
In a laboratory setting, we use a simple behavioral task to classify individuals into 
“moral” and “immoral” types. We then show that this characteristic predicts the outcomes 
that individuals obtain as we experimentally vary only the immorality of work. We find 
support for both our hypotheses. Immoral labor markets yield significantly higher wages. 
Moreover, immoral workers are significantly more likely to be hired in a labor market for 
immoral work than are moral workers; however, this difference disappears in a labor market 
for neutral work. We also find that a market for immoral work benefits the immoral types 
who are hired, particularly when there are many moral types in their market. 
We separately use survey responses to classify the immorality of real-world firms and 
industries and show that industries classified as immoral pay higher wages. We also use 
surveys to obtain a separate measure of workers’ moral types. This individual characteristic 
is correlated with the moral type measured in the laboratory and predicts subjects’ behaviors 
in the laboratory labor market. Moreover, both the survey-based measure and lab-based 
measure of morality also predict stated preferences for working in jobs and industries that 
vary in their morality. Workers who are less concerned with morality—in either the 
behavioral or survey-based measures—are more willing to work for firms that others regard 
as less moral. 
Despite widespread intuition, we know of no other evidence that makes the above 
connections. Given the significance of many social ills produced by immoral work practices, 
such as deceptive marketing or socially harmful products, our study sheds important new 
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light on the interaction between individual’s types, their willingness to do immoral work and 
the resulting labor-market outcomes.  
Our work also has several potentially important policy implications. For instance, in 
those jobs and industries with the greatest potential to do societal harm, social welfare will 
often be higher when workers in such industries voluntarily internalize the negative impacts 
of their actions and forgo potentially profitable opportunities. For instance, a weapons 
manufacturer may restrict sales to conflict areas if top management has a moral aversion to 
the social harm caused by such sales. However, our evidence suggests that it is the least 
moral types who will sort into these industries and that, therefore, labor market sorting will 
make it less likely that such internalization will occur.  
Another implication of our empirical findings is that the perception that a firm, 
industry or type of work is immoral may be self-reinforcing. If, as our results indicate, the 
perception that work involves immoral acts leads people less concerned with acting 
immorally to differentially opt into such work, then the end result of such sorting may be a 
workforce of people who are more likely to commit immoral acts. Even if some of the firms 
and industries that we study do not actually involve any inherently immoral activities in their 
line of work, the fact that they disproportionately attract people more willing to do immoral 
things may mean a greater prevalence for immoral behavior. Thus, firms and industries that 
regularly confront the perception that they involve immoral work—such as the banking 
sector—may need to be particularly attuned to such selection in their hiring. 
An additional implication of our study is that negative externalities that result from 
the immoral behavior of firms can be partly internalized by means of an increase in labor 
costs. That is, increasing the perception that a firm is immoral will lead it to face higher labor 
costs, thereby creating a partial internalization of the harm it produces. Thus, public 
discourse and narratives about the ills produced by different firms or industries may be 
valuable not only for producing change in policy and consumer behavior, but also for 
influencing outcomes through changes in labor market behavior. However, increasing the 
labor costs for immoral work in this manner may have the effect of further reducing the 
average morality of firms’ employees. As the work becomes perceived as more morally 
aversive, only the least moral types will opt into such work and, as we note above, those may 
also be the types least inclined to internalize any negative externalities.45  
																																																								
45	Relatedly, it has recently been suggested to use taxes to reallocate skilled labor from industries that produce 
negative externalities to industries important for society (Lockwood, Nathanson and Weyl, 2017; see also 
Murphey, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Rothschild and Scheuer, 2016). While such an intervention would 
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Finally, our model predicts—in line with our experimental data—that the least moral 
types are overcompensated by the immorality premium. This is in stark contrast to Mankiw’s 
(2010) “just deserts theory”—that is, everybody should receive his contribution to society. 
Our work suggests a perverse case in which those willing to do the most socially harmful 
acts may instead benefit from doing so, particularly as others find this work more aversive. 
Of course, our work leaves open many important questions regarding the precise 
characteristics that lead some kinds of work to be differentially perceived as immoral and the 
specific nature of the preference underlying workers’ market behavior. Nevertheless, as the 
above examples make clear, the differential sorting by people more or less concerned with 
immoral behavior into different lines of work has important implications for the extent of 
which market activity yields beneficial social outcomes. 
  
																																																																																																																																																																											
decrease the number of employees in immoral industries, the downside of such a policy is that, according to our 
theory, the average morality of employees in immoral industries would decrease further.	
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Major models of identity signaling and consumption postulate that consumers care about the 
characteristics of others that buy a product. This paper studies whether the type-composition 
of a product’s customer pool indeed influences the demand for the product. In two laboratory 
experiments, I vary, by treatment, whether the customer pool of a product consists of people 
with desirable or undesirable characteristics, in particular moral values. I do so in a setting 
where choices are publicly observable and, as a result, can serve as social-signals of moral 
types, and in a double blind setting. In both studies, I find that participants are willing to pay 
more for a product if its customer pool has desirable moral values.  
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A typical assumption in economics is that firms maximize their profits and that they 
do so by selling their products to everyone that is willing to pay their prices. However, firms’ 
reactions to product adaptations by alt-rights, neo-Nazis and Hooligans show that many firms 
want some types of customers not to buy their products. For example, after the neo-Nazi 
website Daily Stormer claimed Papa John’s to be the official pizza brand of the alt-right, the 
company stated that “we do not want these individuals or groups to buy our pizza” 
(Washington Post, 2017).46 Firms are willing to bear substantial costs to avoid right-wing 
extremists as customers. When the clothing brand Lonsdale purposely broke with their neo-
Nazi customers, they lost 35 percent of their sales volume in Germany (Handelsblatt, 2014). 
Why do firms try to avoid some customers? Firms striving for customers not to buy their 
products seems puzzling from the perspective of profit maximization. Moreover, firms spend 
substantial amounts of money to attract customers with desirable characteristics by celebrity 
endorsement and by hiring influencers. This paper gives a potential rationale for these firm 
behaviors by providing evidence that consumers care about the characteristics of others that 
buy a particular product. The evidence is consistent with models of identity signaling: 
consumers signal their desirable characteristics (or, “types”) to themselves and others by 
avoiding products popular among people with undesirable characteristics and by conforming 
to product choices of people with desirable characteristics. One important implication of this 
identity signaling motive is that firms have incentives to avoid (or, attract) customers, 
depending on the social desirability of their characteristics.  
Understanding such (non-)conformity is important beyond the context of firms 
managing the composition of their customer pool. A longstanding theoretical literature in 
economics, philosophy and sociology proposes that customers signal desirable characteristics 
through consumption choices (starting with Veblen, 1899/1994; Simmel, 1904/1957; 
																																																								
46 Wendy’s, New Balance and Depeche Mode reacted similarly after they were claimed to be the official 
burgers/shoes/band of the alt-right (Washington Post, 2017; Independent, 2017). In pre-emptive actions Nike 
and Ben & Jerry’s publicly announced that they commit to diversity, in order to prevent that their brands are 
adopted by hate groups (Washington Post, 2017). Burberry dropped baseball caps from sale and reduced the 
visibility of their brand pattern to avoid football hooligans as customers (BBC News, 2005). Designers refused 
to take orders from the finance industry (Bloomberg, 2019) and to dress first Lady Melania Trump (Glamour, 
2017). These example demonstrate that firms care about the moral values of their customer pool. Firms also try 
to avoid customer that have undesirable characteristics unrelated to moral values—although this seems to be 
less common. Abercrombie & Fitch did not produce XL or XXL sizes in women’s clothing to avoid that large 
women wear their products (Business Insider, 2013) and paid stars from MTV’s Jersey Shore to not wear their 
products (Dunn, White and Dahl 2012). Louis Roederer Champagne made a statement implying that he would 
prefer it if their products would not be publicly consumed by rappers (Economist, 2006). 
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Bourdieu, 1984). Because of this identity signaling motive, consumers care about the type-
composition of products’ customer pools. Models of identity signaling and consumption 
provide theoretical foundations for brand-image 47 , advertising and identity-based 
consumption (for example, Wernerfelt, 1990; Kuksov, 2007; Vikander, 2017), and have 
important implications for individual welfare and market outcomes. Identity signaling can 
result in distortions of consumption expenditures (Frank, 1985; Ireland, 1994), poverty traps 
(Moav and Neeman, 2010, 2012), Veblen goods (Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996) and fashion 
cycles (Karni and Schmeidler, 1990; Pesendorfer, 1995).48 However, the question whether 
consumers care about the types of others that consume a product as postulated in these 
models remains open.49  
In this paper, I provide evidence in favor of consumers caring about the type-
composition of products’ customer pools. My evidence comes from controlled experimental 
settings that allow me to manipulate the type-composition of products’ customer pools while 
keeping other aspects of the choice environment constant. 50  I investigate demand for 
products that do not have properties that connect them directly to specific moral values; 
potential signals about a consumers characteristics emerge only through the types-
composition of products’ customer pools.  
My work focuses on a specific hypothesis that arises from models of identity 
signaling. I introduce a simple model of identity signaling and consumption (based on 
Bernheim, 1994; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011) to make predictions in the environments studied 
in this paper and to guide my empirical investigation; I do not attempt to provide a 
substantial novel theoretical contribution. In the model, individuals have imperfect 
knowledge either of their own or of others’ characteristics and care about their (self- or 
social-) image. I show that consumers conform to the consumption patterns of people with 
desirable characteristics and avoid products popular among people with characteristics they 
perceive as undesirable. They do so as a way to assure themselves or others of their desirable 
																																																								
47 Brand images arise endogenously through the types of people that buy a particular product as part of their 
equilibrium strategy. 
48 Signaling models have also been proposed to explain how firms set (dynamic) prices (Rao and Schaefer, 
2013), product lines (Friedrichsen, 2018) and visibility of products (Carbajal, Hall and Li, 2016). 
49 There is evidence in line with other predictions made by these models of identity signaling, as discussed in 
Section 2.1. 
50 The hypothesis that consumers care about the type-composition of products’ customer pools is difficult to 
establish or reject in observational data. Changes in the type-composition of customer pools do typically not 
happen exogenously, but in reaction to events that might change many relevant choice aspects. Moreover, a 
product’s qualities may be tailored to the types of people that consume it, which then might make it less 
attractive to others. 
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type.51 I then test this hypotheses in two laboratory experiments. In the first study, I do so in 
a public setting in which subjects’ social-images are at stake. In the second study, I 
investigate (non-)conformity in a double-blind setting in which subjects’ self-images are at 
stake. 
In the first study, consumption choices are observed by others. I create a situation in 
which observers know that the customer pool of a product largely consists of either desirable 
or undesirable types. I vary the desirability of types by treatment. If a subject chooses the 
product, observers might confuse her with the typical consumer of the product, and attribute 
the typical consumer’s type to her. In this setting, product choices are informative signals 
about consumers’ types. This resembles, for example, the case of the clothing brand 
Lonsdale in the 1990s and early 2000s; it was public knowledge in Germany that neo-Nazis 
made up a large share of Lonsdale’s customers. A person wearing a Lonsdale sweater in 
public was likely perceived to have right-wing extremist attitudes. As for types, I use moral 
values. Moral values might be particularly important in real world applications, as the 
examples above indicate. In addition to moral values, I also use intelligence to classify 
people into desirable and undesirable types. Both moral values and intelligence are related to 
identity and haven been successfully used before to induce image concerns in laboratory 
experiments (for example, Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2017; Zimmermann, forthcoming).  
I find that consumers indeed care about the moral values of products’ customer pools: 
subjects willingness to pay for a product is statistically significant higher if its customer pool 
consists of individuals with desirable moral values than if its customer pool consists of 
individuals with undesirable moral values. The effect size is 14.9% of the average price of 
the product. Net retail margins for similar products are only about 5% (Damodaran, 2019), so 
product adoptions by individuals with undesirable characteristics could have sever 
consequences for the profitability of products and brands. There is no treatment effect for 
intelligence. This second result demonstrates that there are limits in the extent that customers 
care about the characteristics of products’ customer pools. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that subjects care more about the public perception of their moral values than about 
																																																								
51 As a result, brands and products convey identities that shape their consumers’ self- and social-images. These 
“brand-images” arise endogenously through the type of people that choose a particular good as part of their 
equilibrium strategy (as in Wernerfelt, 1990; Kuksov, 2007; Kuksov, Shachar and Wang, 2013; Kuksov and 
Wang, 2013, Vikander, 2017). 
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the public perception of their intelligence.52 This might explain why most examples for firms 
avoiding customers come from the domain of moral values.  
While consumption often happens in public, many products are also consumed in 
more private settings than the one investigated in my first study. Papa John’s, for example, 
does home delivery. According to the model, the type-composition of products’ customer 
pools might also matter in private settings due to self-image concerns. In a second study, I 
investigate consumption in such private settings. I apply a double blind procedure. In the 
experiment, a product is adopted by right-wing extremists. Conforming to the choices of 
right-wing extremists might constitute a negative signal about a subject’s moral values, in 
particular racism.  
To implement the second study, I collect novel consumption data from right-wing 
extremists. I recruit 10 neo-Nazis on German right-wing extremist online forums. The neo-
Nazis make multiple binary product choices in a short online survey. For the purpose of this 
study, it is essential that one product is adopted by most neo-Nazis. I achieve this 
requirement by connecting some products with hidden neo-Nazi symbols, thereby increasing 
their attractiveness. Some products have, for example, a 88 in their product numbers (a neo-
Nazi symbol for HH, “Heil Hitler”) while others have the word “milk” (a recent symbol of 
the alt-right) in their names.  
In the laboratory, participants first observe the choices of neo-Nazis in one binary 
choice situation, and then choose between the same two products. I vary, by treatment, 
whether neo-Nazis’ undesirable identities are revealed to subjects: some subjects are told that 
they observe neo-Nazis’ choices, while others only learn that they observe choices of 
individuals recruited on the internet. I find that subjects’ willingness to pay for the product is 
lower if it is perceived to be adopted by neo-Nazis then if it is perceived to be adopted by 
consumers with neutral moral values. The effect size is 9.7% of the price of the adopted 
product, a large effect in comparisons to retail net margins of 1.7% for similar products 
(Damodaran, 2019). 
In both experiments, I find that subjects care about the moral values of others that 
consume a product when they make consumption choices. While these findings confirm a 
key prediction of identity signaling models, they could also be explained by motives 
unrelated to identity signaling. First, the treatment might have changed the perception of the 
																																																								
52 This is in line with McManus and Rao (2015), who find that while subjects considered intelligence a 
desirable trait, they dislike signaling it to others. Unfortunately, I only learned about this study after I 
implemented my experiment.  
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products, for example through some form of social learning (e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer 
and Welch, 1998). Second, people might be more willing to conform to behaviors of others 
that have similar moral values than to others that have very different moral values. Third, 
associating a product with neo-Nazis, as done in Study 2, might result in feelings of disgust 
when consuming the product—in line with negative contagion (Rozin, Millman and 
Nemeroff, 1986). Finally, one might be worried about experimenter demand effects, in 
particular given my use of neo-Nazis as undesirable types in Study 2. My data, including 
answers to survey questions, allows me to shed some light on subjects’ motives. I find that 
all explanations except identity signaling fail to explain some aspects of the data.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses how this paper 
relates and contributes to the previous literature. Section 3 presents a simple model that 
demonstrates how identity-signaling can influence consumption choices. Next, I present the 
design and results from my first and my second study (Section 4 and Section 5, respectively). 
In Section 6, I discuss potential explanations for my results. I conclude in Section 7 by 
discussing policy implications of my work. 
3.2 Contribution to the literature 
My paper relates to several strands of literature, specifically to the literatures on 
signaling thorough consumption, on identity economics, on conformity and peer effects and 
on ideology and consumption. In the following, I discuss how my paper relates and 
contributes to these literatures. 
3.2.1 Signaling through consumption 
There is a substantial theoretical literature in economics on signaling and 
consumption, as discussed in the introduction. While most of the earlier work focused on 
signaling of social-status and wealth (conspicuous consumption), many recent papers take a 
more general approach and allow consumers to signal other aspects of their identities 
(Kuksov, 2007; Kuksov, Shachar and Wang, 2013; Kuksov and Wang, 2013; Carbajal, Hall 
and Li, 2016;  Friedrichsen, 2018). The key prediction for consumer behavior in signaling 
models is that consumers care about the type-composition of products’ customer pools.53  
																																																								
53 There are related models that assume that people care about the number (not types) of other consumers that 
buy a product (“bandwagon effects”; Leibenstein, 1950) and that people care about their relative consumption, 
that is, how their consumption levels compare to others (e.g., Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004). The latter motive 
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The empirical literature in economics has focused on wealth signaling through 
conspicuous consumption of expensive goods (Bloch, Rao and Desai, 2004; Charles et al., 
2009; Heffetz, 2011, 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2018; Clingingsmith and Sheremeta, 2018; 
Cosaerts, 2018) and on signaling of moral values through “moral goods” (Sexton and Sexton, 
2014; Delgado, Harriger and Khanna, 2015; Friedrichsen and Engelmann, 2018). None of 
these studies provide evidence that people care about the type-composition of products’ 
customer pools. The main contribution of this paper to the literature on identity signaling is 
to provide supportive evidence for this prediction. 
My investigation differs in two other important aspects from the earlier empirical 
literature. First, in the studies cited above, signaling is characterized by a direct link between 
properties of the product (its price or its “morality”) and the image to be signaled (being 
wealthy or being moral). In my studies, there is no link between properties of the product and 
a particular identity. Instead, signals only emerge through the types of people that consume 
particular products. Studying such environments seems important as many products do not 
exhibit properties that directly relate them to personal characteristics. Second, Study 2 differs 
from earlier work in that it investigates consumption in private settings. My studies provide 
evidence that identity signaling extends to private settings and to settings with no link 
between properties of products and identities, which suggests that identity signaling might be 
more prevalent in shaping consumer behavior than previously thought. 
There is a small literature in marketing that investigates whether consumers care 
about who else buys a particular product (White and Dahl, 2006, 2007; Berger and Heath, 
2007, 2008; and Berger and Rand, 2008). The validity of these studies, however, is limited 
because they either rely on hypothetical choice situations or suffer from low sample sizes 
with limited statistical power to detect effects. In addition, it often remains unclear what 
drives the results.54 Finally, none of this work investigates conformity to desirable or 
undesirable types.  
3.2.2 Identity Economics 
This paper also relates to identity economics. In the model of Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), people belong to a particular category (e.g., male or female). Each category is linked 
																																																																																																																																																																											
is sometimes also interpreted as status signaling. These models do not make the prediction that consumers care 
about the type-composition of products’ customer pools. 
54 White and Dahl (2006), for example, look at hypothetical choices between steaks of two different sizes. They 
either call the small steak “chef's cut” or “ladies’ cut,” and find that men avoid the “ladies’ cut.” In this setting, 
treatment differences could be the result of a difference in the perception of whether the small steak satisfies the 
participant’s appetite. 
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to appropriate behavior (e.g., women should not work as lawyers). If people do not chose an 
appropriate action, they face costs in terms of a lower self-image. Atkin, Colson-Sihra and 
Shayo (2019) apply the model of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) to food choices and provide 
evidence that identity concerns (religion and ethnicity) interact with group-salience and 
group-status to shape consumption choices, specifically demand for beef and pork in India.55  
Akerlof and Kranton propose that people’s self-images, or identities, can depend on 
the choices that other types of players make. They write that “a woman working in a ‘man’s’ 
job may make male colleagues feel less like ‘men’,” which then makes the job less attractive 
for men.56 My studies provide support for such effects in the domains of consumption and 
moral values. 
3.2.3 Conformity and peer effects 
My investigation also relates to the literature on conformity and peer effects (e.g., 
Krupka and Weber, 2009; Zafar, 2011; Bernheim and Exley, 2015; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 
2015; Gioia, 2017; Bigenho and Martinez, 2018). Bernheim (1994) and Andreoni and 
Bernheim (2009) study how image concerns can result in conformity to pro-social behavior. 
Fatas, Hargreaves Heap and Rojo Arjona (2018) and Dimant (2019) present some evidence 
that conformity to pro-social behavior can depend on similarity to peers. I add to this 
literature by studying whether people’s conformity decisions depend on the desirability of 
others’ types.  
3.2.4 Ideology and consumption  
Groups with different political ideologies consume different products and brands 
(e.g., Gebru, et al. 2017; Bertrand and Kamenica, 2018; Kapner and Chinni, 2019).57 A 
recent literature in political sciences, psychology and marketing investigates why ideology 
predicts consumption, focusing on differences in tastes and personality (Khan, Misra and 
Singh, 2013; Kidwell, Farmer and Hardesty, 2013; Roos and Shachar, 2014) and on firms’ 
moral values (McConnell, et al., 2018). My study contributes to this literature by 
demonstrating that consumers care about the moral values (or, ideology) of products’ 
																																																								
55  Atkin, Colson-Sihra and Shayo (2019) assume a exogenously given connection between types and 
appropriate consumption patterns. Signaling models differs in that “appropriate behavior” for different types of 
players arise endogenously through the type of people that choose a particular product.  
56 Akerlof and Kranton model this intuition by allowing the utility of the male decision maker to depend on the 
choice of the female worker. Models of identity signaling give a micro-foundation for such an assumption: an 
increase in the share of female workers in a job weakens the signal of workers’ masculinity, thereby threatening 
male workers’ self-images and decreasing their utility. 
57 Cambridge Analytica even used fashion preferences to identify right‑wing voters during 2016 presidential 
election (New York Times, 2018). 
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customer pools. Differences in consumption decisions between conservatives and liberals 
might be partly explained by consumers’ desire to signal their political positions, and to 
differentiate themselves from people with the opposite ideology. 
3.3 A simple model of consumption and identity signaling  
In this section, I introduce a simple model that illustrates how consumers can signal 
desirable characteristics through consumption choices. I build on the frameworks of 
Bernheim (1994) and Bénabou and Tirole (2011). The key prediction of the model is that 
customers care about the type-composition of products’ customer pools. I do not attempt to 
provide a novel theoretical contribution, but rather use simple economic analysis to make 
predictions in the environments studied in this paper and to guide my empirical investigation. 
Consider a population of consumers, normalized to [0,1], each of whom chooses 
between two products A and B. Each consumer i has a type 𝑡 ∈ 𝐴,𝐴! ,𝐵 . While 𝐴- and 𝐴!-
types receive more consumption utility, 𝑢! , from product A, 𝐵 -types derive more 
consumption utility from product B: 𝑢! 𝐴 − 𝑢! 𝐵 = 𝑢!! 𝐴 − 𝑢!! 𝐵 = 𝑢! 𝐵 −
𝑢
!
𝐴 = ∆𝑢 > 0.  The distribution of types is common knowledge and described by 
Pr 𝐴 = 𝛿, Pr 𝐴! = 𝛾 and Pr 𝐵 = 1− 𝛾 − 𝛿, with 𝛿, 𝛾 > 0 and 𝛿 + 𝛾 < 1. Consumers’ 
types are private information. 
Consumers have some characteristics, for example moral values, that shape their 
(self- or social-) image, 𝑣!, with 𝑣! = 𝑣! = 𝑣!! > 0. The focus of this analysis are the 
characteristics of the 𝐴!-types, c. In the following, I will compare a situation in which the 𝐴!-
types have desirable characteristics, c=g, to the situation in which the 𝐴! -types have 
undesirable characteristics, c=b. In the former case 𝑣! corresponds to 𝑣! > 𝑣!!, while in the 
latter case 𝑣! corresponds to 𝑣! < 𝑣!!. I will demonstrate that if consumers care about their 
image, the choices of the 𝐴- and 𝐵-types depend on the desirability of the 𝐴! -types’ 
characteristics: the product A is more popular among the 𝐴- and 𝐵-types if the 𝐴!-types have 
desirable characteristics than if the 𝐴!-types have undesirable characteristics. 
Consumers care about the public perception of their type (that is, their social-image), 
𝐸 𝑣 𝑥 . A consumer’s social-image is calculated using Bayes’ rule and depends on the 
consumer’s choice, the choices of all other consumers, and the distribution of types. The 








1−𝛿𝑥!− 1− 𝛾 − 𝛿 𝑥! − 𝛾𝑥!!
 
where 𝑥! is the probability that a consumer with type t chooses product A. A consumer’s 
social-image is then given by 𝐸 𝑣 𝑥 = 𝜌 𝑥 𝑣! + 1− 𝜌 𝑥 𝑣!!. 𝐴- and 𝐵-type consumers 
choose 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴,𝐵  that maximize the following utility function:   
𝑢
!
𝑥 + 𝛼𝐸 𝑣 𝑥 , 
where 𝛼 > 0 is the weight they put on their social-image. 𝐴!-types do not care about their 
social-image, that is 𝛼!! = 0,	 which implies that 𝑥!! = 1.58 
This model can also be interpreted as a self-signaling model, following Bénabou and 
Tirole (2011). For this alternative interpretation, players have imperfect knowledge of their 
own types. Consumers’ past choices are then signals about their own type. There are two 
periods. In period 0, the consumer “obtains a momentary insight into his true nature,” 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2011) and temporarily learns his type. Then, he makes his choice. In 
period 1, the consumer remembers his type 𝑡 with probability 1− 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), with probability 
𝛼 the consumer has no direct access to the motivation behind his behavior in period 0 (that is, 
his type), and only remembers his choice, x. In period 0, the consumer cares about his 
consumption utility and his expected self-image in period 1: he maximizes 𝑢! 𝑥 + (1−
𝛼)𝑣! + 𝛼𝐸(𝑣|𝑥). Note that this consumer problem corresponds to the consumer problem 
discussed before. 
In the following, I will study how the consumption decisions of the 𝐴- and 𝐵-types 
depend on the characteristics of the 𝐴!-types. Remember that the 𝐴!-types choose A. I 






on c. I refer to these shares as 𝑥!
!∪!  and 𝑥
!
!∪!  for c=g and c=b, respectively. I follow 
Bénabou and Tirole (2011) by restricting attention to monotonic	Perfect Bayesian equilibria. 
In a monotonic equilibrium, 𝑥! = 𝑥! = 𝑥!! = 1  implies 𝜌 𝐵 = 0 . I characterize all 
monotonic	equilibria in Appendix G. If c is a desirable characteristic (c=g), there is a unique 
monotonic equilibrium. If c is an undesirable characteristic (c=b), then there might exist up 
to three equilibria.  
																																																								
58 An alternative assumption with similar implications is	 to	 assume	 the	𝐴!-types receive substantially more 













The Proposition shows that, as long as the difference in consumption utility between 
the two goods (∆𝑢) is not too large, more consumers choose product A if it is popular among 
people with desirable characteristics than if it is popular among people with undesirable 
characteristics. Given that there can be multiple equilibria for c=b, the Proposition shows 
that 𝑥!
!∪! is (weakly) bigger than 𝑥
!
!∪! for all possible equilibria. To do so, I compare 𝑥!
!∪! 
with the equilibrium for c=b with the highest share of consumers that choose A, max(𝑥
!
!∪!).  
The intuition behind the Proposition is that if product A is popular among desirable 
types, then choosing product A increases the consumer’s image. This makes the product 
relatively more attractive than product B, and even 𝐵-types might choose product A. If 
product A is popular among consumers with undesirable types, then choosing product A 
decreases the consumer’s image, and even the 𝐴-types might avoid it. The Proposition also 
shows that the difference between the c=g and the c=b context is more pronounced when 
subjects care more about their image, that is, if 𝛼 is higher.  
 
Proposition. The relationship between 𝑥!
!∪! and 𝑥
!
!∪! is characterized by a threshold ∆𝑢 
such that 𝑥!
!∪!
 > max 𝑥
!







 if ∆𝑢 ≥ ∆𝑢 . 
Furthermore, ∆𝑢 is increasing in 𝛼. 
Proof: See Appendix G. 
 
The model demonstrates that consumers care about the type-composition of a 
product’s customer pool, but only if 𝛼 is high enough (in relation to ∆𝑢). In my laboratory 
experiments, I use characteristics c that are likely seen as very undesirable or very desirable 
byß many participants, and therefore should result in a high 𝛼. Study 2 looks at consumption 
choices in private settings. In such settings, consumption might serve as self-signals about 
consumers’ types. According to the model, the key requirement for self-signaling is that 
participants are insecure about their own types (that is, 𝛼 is not 0). As I will discuss in more 
detail later, I attempt to increase participants’ insecurity with means of an identity threat.  
3.4 Study 1: Consumption in public settings 
In Study 1, I investigate consumption in a setting where choices are observed by 
others. I create a situation in the laboratory in which it is public knowledge that the customer 
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pool of one product largely consists of people with either desirable or undesirable 
characteristic. Consumption choices are then informative signals about subjects’ 
characteristics; if a subject choses the product that is adopted by the desirable or undesirable 
types, she might be confused with the typical consumer of the product.59 To test whether 
consumers care about the type-composition of product’s customer pools, I vary, by treatment, 
whether the customer pool consists of people with desirable or with undesirable 
characteristics. 
3.4.1 Experimental design  
In the laboratory, I first elicit measures of participants’ intelligence and moral values. 
Next, I investigate how individuals’ consumption decisions respond to the potential that their 
choices signal information about either their intelligence or their moral values to observers. 
Depending on a subject’s consumption choice, observers might confuse the participant with 
another subject with desirable (desirable treatment) or undesirable characteristics 
(undesirable treatment). 
To decide on multiple aspects of the design, including which measure of moral values 
and which products to choose, I implemented a short online survey.60  I recruited 29 
participants drawn from the same subject pool from which I recruit participants for my 
laboratory experiment. I will refer to this sample as the online survey.  
3.4.1.1 Measuring intelligence 
I measure participants’ intelligence with a test consisting of 12 Raven’s matrices. 
Raven’s matrices have been successfully used in other studies to induce image concerns (for 
example, Zimmermann, forthcoming). Subjects see patterns in which one part is missing. For 
each pattern, they are given 8 possible suggestions for how to complete it. Subjects have 
twelve minutes time to complete the 12 patterns. For every correct pattern, they earn CHF 
0.50 (CHF 1 ≈ USD 1). Before subjects start with the test, they solve two training patterns. 
Subjects are told that Raven’s matrices are regularly used to measure general intelligence. 
They do not receive feedback about their performance in the test. 
																																																								
59 This resembles, for example, the case of the clothing brand Lonsdale in the 1990s and early 2000s; it was 
well known in Germany that neo-Nazis made up a large share of Lonsdale customers. A person that was 
wearing a Lonsdale sweater in public was likely perceived to have right-wing extremist attitudes. 
60 In the online survey, subjects repeatedly choose between pairs of products. I measure subjects’ preferences in 
the same way is described in paragraph 3.4.1.3. Next, subjects made choices in four choice situations designed 
to measure their moral values, including the one used in the laboratory (see paragraph 3.4.1.2). In all choice 
situations, people face tradeoffs between their own payoff, and a donation to an organization. Finally, subjects 
have to rate whether they like or dislike it if they would be publicly associated with these organizations. 
	 65
3.4.1.2 Measuring moral values 
To measure moral values, I give subjects the option to increase their payoff by 
authorizing the researchers to make a donation to Zukunft CH, a conservative Christian 
organization, on their behalf. They are told that the members of Zukunft CH fight “the 
sneaking introduction of the sharia” and marriage for same-sex couples, engage in 
demonstrations against abortions and advocate conversion therapies for homosexuals. 
Individuals dislike being publicly associated with Zukunft CH: participants in the online 
survey report that they would dislike it to be perceived as a donor of this organization (for 
details, see Figure F1 in the Appendix).  
Subjects receive an endowment of 6 CHF. Then, they have to choose one of the seven 
options shown in Table 8, each links a payment to the subject with a donation to Zukunft 
CH.  
Table 8. Choice situation to measure moral values 
Options In addition to the CHF 6.00 
endowment, the subject 
receives 
Donation to Zukunft CH 
on behalf of subject 
Option 1 +6.00 CHF +9.00 CHF 
Option 2 +4.00 CHF +6.00 CHF 
Option 3 +2.00 CHF +3.00 CHF 
Option 4 +0.00 CHF +0.00 CHF 
Option 5 -2.00 CHF -3.00 CHF 
Option 6 -4.00 CHF -6.00 CHF 
Option 7 -6.00 CHF -9.00 CHF 
 
I include both positive and negative donations to increase the perceived discrepancy 
between the “morally good” and the “morally bad” actions, and to avoid that most subjects 
choose options on the boundary (Option 1 or Option 7). Negative donations are explained as 
“preventing donations from other participants from being implemented.” To implement 
subjects’ choices, all individual donations are added up.61 Donations are anonymous and are 
not subtracted from the donors’ payments. Subjects are told that other study participants 
might receive some (incomplete) information about their choices.  
3.4.1.3 Consumers’ choices 
Next, subjects choose between two products. There are two rounds of product choice. 
Rounds differ in the choice sets subjects face. In one round, subjects choose between two 
																																																								
61 Note that this procedure does not preclude a negative total donation. Data from the subjects in the online 
survey suggested that this is not an issue. Indeed, the final experiment resulted in a total donation of CHF 237 to 
Zukunft CH. 
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packs of chocolate bars, one of them is produced by Camille Bloch and the other by Munz. 
Both packs consist of 5 chocolate bars, 23 grams each, and are priced at about CHF 3.50. In 
the other round, subjects choose between a cup and a 4GB USB stick. The market price of 
the cup and the 4GB USB stick is about CHF 8 and CHF 4, respectively.62 I randomize, at the 
session level, which choice set subjects face first.  
Instead of one binary choice, I elicit subjects’ willingness to pay to receive one 
product instead of the other product. To do so, participants make 13 decisions between 
bundles of products and money, as shown in Table 9 for the Munz and Camille Bloch 
chocolate. At the end of the experiment, one of the thirteen cases is randomly drawn for each 
round and might be implemented. 
 
Table 9. Consumption choices 
Decision Choice situation 
1 Munz + 3.00 CHF or Camille Bloch 
2 Munz + 2.50 CHF or Camille Bloch 
3 Munz + 2.00 CHF or Camille Bloch 
4 Munz + 1.50 CHF or Camille Bloch 
5 Munz + 1.00 CHF or Camille Bloch 
6 Munz + 0.50 CHF or Camille Bloch 
7 Munz or Camille Bloch 
8 Munz or Camille Bloch + 0.50 CHF 
9 Munz or Camille Bloch + 1.00 CHF 
10 Munz or Camille Bloch + 1.50 CHF 
11 Munz or Camille Bloch + 2.00 CHF 
12 Munz or Camille Bloch + 2.50 CHF 
13 Munz or Camille Bloch + 3.00 CHF 
 
3.4.1.4 Composition of products’ customer pool 
The following describes how I manipulates the type-composition of products’ 
customer pools, the key feature of my design. Participants’ consumption choices are revealed 
to a set of observers. To induce social-image concerns, their choices are linked to portrait 
pictures.63 In addition to information about the consumption choices of the participant (the 
consumer), observers also receive information about the consumption choice of another 
																																																								
62 I selected the 4GB USB stick and the cup, and the two chocolates, because the responses in the online survey 
suggested that the distribution of the willingness to pay to receive the 4GB USB stick instead of the cup, and 
the Munz chocolate instead the Camille Bloch chocolate is symmetric with a mean of zero. (However, as I will 
discuss later, in my actual study most subjects preferred the stick over the cup.) 
63 The picture is taken at the very beginning of the experiment, before subjects enter the lab. 
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subject, the target. The target is a participant that is selected due to his characteristics, either 
due to his intelligence-score or due to his moral values. Based on the consumer’s choices, the 
observers might confuse the consumer with the target, and attribute the target’s 
characteristics to her. I vary, by treatment, whether the target’s characteristics are desirable 
or undesirable. 
Targets and consumers: For each round of consumption choice, two participants are 
selected to play the role of the targets in this round. Targets differ between rounds. In one 
round, targets are selected due to their intelligence score. The subject with the lowest 
intelligence score among all subjects in the session is selected to be the target with 
undesirable characteristics and the subject with the highest intelligence score is selected to be 
the targets with the desirable characteristics.64 In the other round, targets are selected due to 
their donation to Zukunft CH. The subject that made the highest donation to Zukunft CH is 
selected to be the target with undesirable characteristics and  the subject that made the lowest 
donation to Zukunft CH is selected to be the target with the desirable characteristics. If 
multiple subjects qualify to play the role of a target, one subject is randomly selected. 
If a participant is not a target in a given round, she plays the role of a consumer in this 
round. Therefore, in a session with N participants, each round consists of two targets, and N-
2 consumers. 
Treatments: In each round, first the round’s targets choose between the round’s 
products. Targets make only a binary choice between the two products, none of them is 
bundled with money. Next, the consumers of this round learn the type and choice of one 
target. Which target they observe depends on the treatment: 
• Subjects in the undesirable treatment learn the type and choice of the target 
with undesirable characteristics. 
• Subjects in the desirable treatment learn the type and choice of the target with 
desirable characteristics 
The treatment is randomized within session. Subjects are assigned to the same treatment for 
both rounds. After consumers learned the type and choice of their target, they choose 
between the round’s products in the 13 cases, as described in paragraph 3.4.1.3. 
Suppose, for example, that the choice set in the first round is the two kinds of 
chocolates, and the targets are selected due to their intelligence score. The subject with the 
lowest intelligence score chose the Munz chocolate. Consumers in the undesirable treatment 
																																																								
64 To avoid negative effects on subjects’ self-images, the targets do not learn that the had the lowest, or highest 
intelligence score. They only learn that others might observe their choices. 
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are then told that the “participant with the lowest intelligence score chose the Munz 
chocolate bars,” and are then called upon making their own choices. 
Observers: At the end of the study, consumers’ choices and pictures are seen by up 
to 14 observers.65 Depending on a consumer’s choices, the observers might confuse the 
consumer with her target. The observers see either the product choice and picture of the 
consumer, or the product choice and picture of the consumer’s target, depending on the flip 
of a computerized fair coin. Importantly, observers do not learn the outcome of the coin flip 
and therefore do not directly learn whether they see the consumer or the target. However, 
observers are told the type and choice of the consumer’s target. Based on the choice of the 
target and the choice of the observed participant, the observers can draw conclusions about 
the likelihood that the observed participant is the target. 
Remember that the consumer makes choices for 13 cases. If the coin flip selects the 
consumer, the observer does not see the choices for all 13 cases, but he only sees which 
product the consumer chose for one randomly drawn case, the drawn case. He is not told the 
amount of money that was bundled with the two products for the drawn case.  
Figure 10 illustrates this procedure with an example. In the example, the consumer is 
paired with the target with the lowest intelligence score. The target chose the Munz 
chocolate. The consumer chose the Camille Bloch chocolate for the drawn case. Independent 
of the coin flip, the observer learns the type and the choice of the consumer’s target (“The 
participant with the lowest intelligence score chose the Munz chocolate.”). If heads is drawn, 
the observer sees to target’s picture and product choice. If tails is drawn, the observer sees 
the consumer’s picture and product choice. In the latter case, the observer can conclude that 
the person on the picture is the consumer, given that her choice differs from the target’s 
choice. If the consumer would have conformed to her target, the observer could not tell 
whether she is the consumer or the target.  
As a result of this procedure, observers should think that the customer pool of one 
product consists to a large share (≥ 50%) of customers with either desirable or undesirable 
characteristics. Figure H1 in the Appendix gives the observers’ instructions. 




65 The role of observers are played by other consumers. However, this is not announced. The exact number of 
observers depends on the size of the specific session and is in between 11 and 14 observers. As I discuss in the 
next paragraph, this number was chosen as part of the procedure to guarantee targets’ anonymity.  
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Note: The observer does not know whether tails or heads realized, and therefore does not know whether he 
observes the picture and choice of the consumer or of the target. This is illustrated by the dotted line. Note, 
however, if tails is drawn, he should conclude that the drawn participant is the consumer. 
 
Protecting targets’ privacy: To protect targets’ privacy, I implement a procedure 
that guarantees that targets are never revealed with certainty to observers. As a result of this 
procedure, each round only counts for 3 consumers in a session. For these 3 consumers, one 
of the 13 cases is randomly drawn to be implemented (the drawn case), and is potentially 
seen by two thirds of all consumers, depending on the coin flips.66 The choices of all other 
consumers are neither implemented nor seen by observers. Targets’ choices are always 
implemented.  
																																																								
66 For each round of product choice, each consumer plays the role of an observer for two other consumers. 
These two consumers might share the same target. If an observer sees the same picture twice, it would imply 
that the observed person is the target. The following procedure guarantees that no observer will see the same 
participant twice by introducing a correlation between the two coin flips: observers’ two coin flips are either 
tails-heads or heads-tails (but never heads-heads or tails-tails). Starting with round 1, all consumers of this 
round are randomly assigned to three groups of equal size (groups 1 – 3). Then, I randomly draw one member 
of each group. The choices of these three subjects count. The members of group 1 play the roles of observers 
for group 2 and group 3. Each member of group 1 either observes the drawn member of group 2 (=tails) and the 
target of the drawn member of group 3 (=heads), or the target of the drawn member of group 2 (=heads) and the 
drawn member of group 3 (=tails). In a similar manner, the members of group 2 play the role of observers for 
group 1 and group 3, and the members of group 3 play the role of observers for group 1 and group 2. The same 
procedure is then repeated for the second round. This procedure corresponds, from a subject’s perspective, to 
the procedure explained above. Note that each drawn member is observed by 2/3 of the consumers, resulting in 
between 11 and 14 observers. 
The participant with the lowest intelligence 




The person on the picture 





The participant with the lowest intelligence 




The person on the picture 








The observer sees the following: The observer sees the following: 
Computer flips a coin 
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Sequence: After participants’ intelligence and moral values are measured, the first 
round starts. The first rounds’ targets make their binary choices. At the same time, the first 
rounds’ consumers receive instructions that explain in detail all aspects of the first round, 
including their target’s type and that their choices will be seen by the observers. After 
consumers read the instructions, they answer understanding questions and then learn their 
targets’ choices. Next, they make their choices for the 13 cases. Before choices are revealed 
to observers, subjects do the second round. The second round comes as a surprise; subjects 
only know in advance that there will be another part in the experiment. The second rounds’ 
targets then make their choices, while the second round’s consumers read the instructions. 
Then, consumers learn their targets’ choices, and make their own choices for the 13 cases. 
Finally, consumers’ choices for both rounds are revealed to observers. 
3.4.1.5 Questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment, but before consumers’ choices are revealed to 
observers, subjects fill out a short questionnaire. In the questionnaire, I measure subjects’ 
perceptions of the four products used in the experiment. In addition, I elicit subjects’ 
willingness to pay to receive each of the products in private, and I measure how much 
subjects care about being perceived as intelligent and tolerant.  
3.4.1.6 Procedure 
I conducted eight sessions, each consisting of between 19 and 24 participants. In 
total, 170 subjects participated in the study, with 87 participants in the desirable treatment 
and 81 participants in the undesirable treatment.67 All sessions took place at the Laboratory 
for experimental and behavioral economics at the University of Zurich, in June 2019. 
Participants were recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge and Nicklisch, 2014) from the joint 
subject pool of the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
(ETH). The experiment was implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The Online 
Appendix supplies the instructions for the study. 
3.4.2 Results 
On average, subjects solved 8.41 out of 12 Raven’s matrices (std. dev. = 2.01). Only 
4.71% of subjects solved all 12 matrices, and the minimal number of matrices solved was 3. 
For moral values, the median (and modal) choice was the option that neither increased the 
																																																								
67 Two subjects were in the role of targets in both rounds. For these subjects, I do not have any observations 
about their behavior in the role of consumers and, as a result, they are not allocated to any of the two treatments.  
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subject’s payment nor the donation to Zukunft CH (Option 4). 32.35% of subjects chose the 
option that maximized their own payoff and the donation to Zukunft CH (Option 1), while 
14.12% of subjects chose the option that minimized the donation to Zukunft CH and their 
own payoff (Option 7). Figure F2 and F3 in the Appendix provides the full distribution for 
moral values and intelligence, and illustrates how the distributions of targets compares to the 
distributions of the consumers.  
Regarding targets’ behavior, 6 out of 16 targets chose Camille Bloch Torino 
chocolate over Munz chocolate, and 5 out of 16 targets chose the cup over the 4GB USB 
stick. Figure 11 shows that the targets’ choices are unbalanced between treatments.68 I will 
account for these differences in the analysis of consumer behavior. 
 
Figure 11. Targets’ choices in the two treatments 
 
Notes: “Cup” gives the share of targets in each treatment that chose the cup over the USB stick. “Camille 
Bloch Torino” gives the share of targets in each treatment that chose the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate over 
the Munz chocolate. 
 
In the following, I will focus on consumers’ behavior. Remember that consumers 
chose between bundles of products and money. Six subjects made product choices that are 
non-monotone in money,69 one subject did so in both rounds. These seven observations are 
																																																								
68 Neither the treatment difference in the share of targets that chose the cup nor the treatment difference in the 
share of targets that chose the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate is statistically significant different from zero 
(tests of proportions, z=0.54 (p=0.59) and z=1.03 (p=0.30), respectively). 
69 They chose (A, CHF X) over (B, CHF 0) but (B, CHF 0) over (A, CHF X-0.5), where A and B are either the 
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excluded from my analysis.70 The fact that most subjects exhibit monotone choice patterns 
can be seen as an indicator that subjects understood the choices they were facing.  
I will now turn to the question whether the targets’ characteristics affect the choices 
of the consumers, the focus of this paper. I start my analysis of consumer behavior by 
looking at the binary choice between the two products when none of them are bundled with a 
monetary payment; do subjects pick the option that was chosen by their target less often in 
the undesirable treatment than in the desirable treatment?71 Table 10, column (1) gives the 
estimated coefficients of a linear regression of the probability of choosing the same option as 
the target on a treatment dummy (1 = undesirable treatment). Column (2) adds session fixed 
effects to the specification. I find support for the hypothesis that consumers care about the 
type-compositions of products’ customer pools: a subject is estimated to be 16.8 percentage 
points less likely to chose the same product as her target in the undesirable treatment than in 
the desirable treatment (p=0.003). 
Remember that targets’ choices are unbalanced between treatments. This can 
introduce a bias in the estimation of the treatment effect.72 The first two specification likely 
underestimate the treatment effect because most subjects preferred the USB stick over the 
cup73 and more targets chose the USB stick in the undesirable treatment than in the desirable 
treatment. The specification in column (3) accounts for this issue by controlling for the 
targets’ choices. In specification (3), the estimated treatment effect increases to 20.9 
percentage points. Alternatively, this issue can be addressed by estimating treatment effects 
separately for each possible target choice. Figure F4 (a) in the Appendix shows that results 




70 Table F1 and F2 in the Appendix shows that results do not change if I keep these observations.  
71 I preregistered participants’ willingness to pay to receive the same product as their targets instead of receiving 
the other product as the main outcome variable (AEARCTR-0004268). I will discuss the willingness to pay 
next. Note that, while results are qualitatively similar for both outcome variables, there is a difference in terms 
of significance (see Table 10). 
72 Here is an example to illustrate how this can result in a bias. Suppose that 66% of subjects prefer the USB 
stick over the cup, and that there is no treatment effect. However, suppose that by chance 80% of targets in the 
desirable treatment choose the cup while 80% of the targets in the undesirable treatment choose the USB stick. 
The expected number of subject that choose the same product as their target is 40.4% in the desirable treatment 
and 59.6% in the undesirable treatment. The treatment difference is therefore (wrongly) estimated to be 19.2 
percentage points. If controls for the product choice of the target are added, however, the treatment effect is 
estimated correctly at zero. 
73 64.7 percent of subjects chose the cup over the USB stick when none of them are bundled with a monetary 
payment. In the survey, subjects report a on average CHF 0.43 (t=-2.56, p=0.011) higher willingness to pay for 
the USB stick than for the cup in private. Also, 67.6 percent of subjects that have a strict preference between the 
two products have a higher willingness to pay for the USB stick than for the cup. 
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Table 10. Treatment effects 
Dependent 
variable: 
Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















































N 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Session FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
Notes: (1)-(3): Linear regressions of probability to choose the same product as the target when none of the two 
products are connected with any payment on a treatment dummy, a constant and, depending on the 
specification, session fixed effects and controls for the targets’ choices. (4)-(6): Tobit regressions (left-censored 
at CHF -3, n=17; right-censored at CHF +3, n=10) of willingness to pay to receive the same product as the 
target instead of the other product on the same set of variables. t-statistics in parentheses; standard errors are 
clustered at subject level (168 clusters); * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
 
The choice data collected allows me to calculate participants’ willingness to pay to 
receive the same product as their targets instead of receiving the other product.74 This is the 
main outcome variable of this analysis. Note that it is left-censored at CHF -3 (10 
observations) and right-censored at CHF 3 (17 observations). Figure 12 shows the 
cumulative distributions of the willingness to pay in both treatments. In both treatments, the 




74 Note that my data is discrete due to use of the list method. Hence, for a subject, who choses Camille Bloch in 
the choice situation “(Camille Bloch, CHF 1.50) or (Munz, CHF 0)”, but choses Munz in the choice situation 
“(Camille Bloch, CHF 1) or (Munz, CHF 0)”, the difference in monetary value must be in [CHF 1, CHF 1.5]. I 
set this difference to CHF 1.25. 
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Figure 12. Distribution willingness to pay 
	
Notes: Cumulative distributions of subjects willingness to pay to receive the product chosen by the target 
instead of the other product. (Figure F5 in the Appendix shows the distributions of willingness to pay after 
controlling for session fixed effects and targets’ choices.) 
 
Table 10, column (4) gives the estimates from a Tobit regression of the willingness to 
pay on a treatment dummy. The specifications in column (5) adds fixed effects, and the 
specification in column (6) controls for targets’ choices. The estimates supports my 
hypothesis in that the coefficient are negative in all three specifications. That is, consumers 
willingness to pay is lower for a product that is popular among people with undesirable 
characteristics than for a product that is popular among people with desirable characteristics. 
However, the effect is only significant (at the 5% level) in the specification that controls for 
targets’ choices. Results are qualitatively similar (and statistically significant) if treatment 
effects are estimated separately for each possible target choice (see Figure F4 (b) in the 
Appendix).  
Next, I will investigate whether treatment effects differ for moral values and 
intelligence. Table 11 replicates the previous analysis, but estimates treatment effects 
separately for moral values (TE-M) and intelligence (TE-I). While there is a significant 
treatment effect for moral values in all six specifications, none of the specifications yields a 
significant treatment effect for intelligence. For the willingness to pay measure, I can reject 
the hypothesis that there is no difference between treatment effects for moral values and 
intelligence. Results are qualitatively similar if treatment effects are estimated separately for 
the target choices (see Figure F4, (c) – (f) in the Appendix).75  
																																																								
75 I also pre-registered that I will look at potential differences between choice sets. Participants’ decisions do 
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Table 11. Treatment effects for intelligence and moral values 
Dependent variable: Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 = undesirable treatment  













1 = undesirable treatment  








































p-value TE-M==TE-I 0.055 0.065 0.161 0.020 0.024 0.040 
N 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Session FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Target choice controls No No Yes No No Yes 
 
Notes: (1)-(3): Linear regressions of probability to choose the same product as the target when none of the two 
products are connected with any payment on the interaction between a treatment dummy and a dummy for 
being in the moral values round (TE-M), the interaction between a treatment dummy and a dummy for being in 
the intelligence round (TE-I), a dummy for being in the intelligence round, (1=intelligence round), a constant 
and, depending on the specification, session fixed effects and controls for the targets’ choices. (4)-(6): Tobit 
regressions (left-censored at CHF -3, n=17; right-censored at CHF +3, n=10) of willingness to pay to receive 
the same product as the target instead of the other product on the same set of independent variables. t-statistics 
in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at subject level (168 clusters); * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p 
< 0.01. 
 
Figure 13 gives the cumulative distribution functions of subjects willingness to pay 
conditional on treatment and round (intelligence or moral values). The figure confirms the 
results in Table 11. For moral values, the treatment shifted the entire distribution, while there 




replicate Table 11 with 1=pair of chocolates and the corresponding interactions, I do not find any evidence for 
differences in treatment effects between the chocolate round and the cup and UBS stick round (p-values>0.80 
for all specifications). 
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Notes: Cumulative distributions of subjects willingness to pay to receive the product chosen by the target 
instead of the other product. (a) use only data from the moral values round and (b) uses only data from the 
intelligence round. (Figure F5 in the Appendix shows the distributions of willingness to pay after controlling 
for session fixed effects and targets’ choices.) 
 
These findings suggest that subjects care more about the public perception of their 
moral values than the public perception of their intelligence. In terms of the model, this 
means that 𝛼!"#$% !"#$%& is bigger than 𝛼!"#$%%!&$"'$. This is in line with McManus and Rao 
(2015), who find that while subjects considered intelligence a desirable trait, they dislike 
signaling it to others.  
How should the effect sizes found in this study be interpreted? The average price of 
the product adopted by the target is CHF 4.39.76 In the pooled data, subjects’ willingness to 
pay is estimated to be CHF 0.329 lower if the product is adopted by the targets with 
undesirable identities—a decrease of 7.5% of the average product price. For moral values, 
the treatment effect is even estimated to be CHF -0.652—a decrease of 14.8% of the average 
product price. Given that European net margins for food processing, food retail, general 
retail, and electronics are only 6.76%, 1.67%, -0.48% and 11.83%, respectively (Damodaran, 
2019),77 product adoptions by customers with undesirable characteristics could have sever 
consequences for the profitability of products and brands.  
This first study investigates consumption in a setting where choices are observed by 
others. While it is important to study such settings because consumption often happens in 
																																																								
76 The Camille Bloch chocolate, the Munz chocolate, the cup and the USB stick served as the target’s choice for 
62 consumers, 89 consumers, 48 consumers and 102 consumers, respectively. The average price of the product 
adopted by the target is therefore 62/301*3.5+89/301*3.5+48/301*8+102/301*4=4.39. 
77 To calculate an average net retail margins for products similar to the ones used in this study, I use the food 
retail margins (1.67%) for Camille Bloch and Munz, general retail margins (-0.48%) for the cup and electronics 
margins (11.83%) for the USB stick. These margins are then weighted by the frequency in which each product 
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public and has the potential to signal characteristics to others, many products are also 
consumed in more private settings. Do the moral values of a product’s customer pool also 
matter in such contexts? I address this question in a second study. 
3.5 Study 2: Consumption in private settings 
In the second study, I investigate whether people care about the moral values of a 
product’s customer pool in anonymous settings. While consumption can not signal desirable 
characteristics to others, it might serve as self-signal.  
According to the model, self-signaling motives can influence consumption choices in 
such settings if two conditions are satisfied. First, subjects must be insecure about their own 
moral values. Second, subjects must believe that a substantial share of a product’s customers 
pool consists of people with certain characteristics in order for consumption to be 
informative about types. Observing the choice of only one consumer with a desirable or 
undesirable type, as done in Study 1, might not alter the perceived composition of a product’s 
customers pool in they eves of consumers.78 To accommodate both features, Study 2 asks for 
a substantially different design than Study 1. In Study 2, a product is adopted by many 
members of an undesirable group, likely altering the consumers’ perceptions of the 
composition of the product’s customer pool. To induce strong signaling motives, I opt for a 
group that is perceived as very undesirable, neo-Nazis. Conforming to the choices of neo-
Nazis might constitute a bad signal about a subject’s moral values, in particular racism. To 
increase subjects’ uncertainty about their own racism, I threaten subjects’ identities in the 
context of race before they make the product choices. 
3.5.1 Experimental design  
In the experiment, subjects choose between two products. Before they make their 
choices, I inform them about the choices made by others. I will refer to these other 
consumers as the targets, following the notation of Study 1. I randomly vary whether the 
targets are perceived to have neutral moral values (neutral treatment) or undesirable moral 
values (undesirable treatment). If subjects are concerned with their self-image, they might be 
relatively more attracted towards a product if its customer pool is perceived to consist of 
																																																								
78 Remember that Study 1 was designed to create a strong correlation between types and choices in the eyes of 
the observers, not in the eyes of the consumers.  
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neutral types.  Subjects  make their choices in a  double-blind seting to eliminate  possible 
image concerns towards the experimenter. 
 
3.5.1.1 The targets: a sample of neo-Nazis  
To implement this study, I colected  novel consumption  data from  neo-Nazis.  The 
neo-Nazis  play the role  of targets in  my experiment. I recruited 10 neo-Nazis on far-right 
extremist internet forums to  participate in a short  online survey. I convinced  neo-Nazis to 
participate  by  paying  high  participation fees (20  Euros for  5  minutes) and  ofering an 
anonymous shipping option.79 The survey consisted of eight binary product choices. One of 
the eight choice situations was randomly drawn, and participants received the product they 
chose in this choice situation.  Subjects also filed  out a short  demographics  questionnaire 
asking for gender, age, nationality, education and income.  
 
Figure 14. Presentation of product choices to neo-Nazis 
Pack Camile Bloch Torino 
5 x 23g (Art. Nr. 3000652) 
 
Pack Munz Praliné-Prügeli Milch 
5 x 23g (Art. Nr. 3928213) 
 
 
Notes: The colors show the symbols that  might  make  a  product  more (red)  or less (blue)  atractive for  neo-
Nazis. “Bloch” is a common Jewish family name, “Milch,” German for milk, is a symbol of the alt-right, and 
“Prügeli” is translated  as “smal  baton,” which  describes the shape  of the chocolate  bars,  but can also be 
understood as aggressive language. 
 
For the purpose of my study, it is essential that one product is adopted by most neo-
Nazis. To achieve this requirement, I linked some products  with hidden symbols liked  or 
disliked  by  neo-Nazis to increase  or  decrease, respectively, the atractiveness  of these 
																												
79 Hermes, a German postal service company, alows to send a packet to a pick-up point instead of a specific 
address. I also  gave  participants the  option to send their  payment to an address  of their choice. I  promised 
participants that al their information wil be kept confidential, and that addresses wil be deleted directly after 
their payment is shipped. 
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products. Some products had a 88 in their product numbers (a neo-Nazi symbol for HH, 
“Heil Hitler”), while others had the word “milk” (a recent symbol of the alt-right) or 
“rainbow” (a symbol for cultural diversity) in their names. One product, Camille Bloch 
Torino, is produced by a firm with Jewish background. I succeeded in that 9 out of 10 neo-
Nazis preferred “Munz Praliné-Prügeli” milk chocolate over “Camille Bloch Torino” 
chocolate. Figure 14 shows how this choice situation was presented to neo-Nazis, and 
highlights all symbols that possibly make Munz more attractive than Camille Bloch. Table 
H2 in the Appendix gives all other choice situations and the corresponding neo-Nazi choices. 
3.5.1.2 The products: two kinds of chocolates 
In the laboratory, I investigate how the product adaptations of the neo-Nazis affect 
participants consumption choices. For products, I use the Munz chocolate and the Camille 
Bloch chocolate (see Figure 14). Using these products has multiple advantages. First, as 
discussed in the last paragraph, the Munz chocolate was very popular among neo-Nazis.  
Second, there is no pre-existing association between the chocolate products and neo-
Nazis, or any other specific political view. To provide evidence for this, I implemented a 
short online survey with 22 participants, drawn from the same subject pool that I use for my 
experiment. In the online survey, participants had to rate how useful and how popular 
different products, including the two chocolates, are for different groups of people, including 
neo-Nazis and students. I also asked participants whether they associate the consumers of 
these goods with a particular political position (left-wing extremist, left-wing, center, right-
wing, right-wing extremist, no relation to political position). Participants neither associate 
Munz (or, Camille Bloch) with right-extremism, nor do they think that Munz is more useful 
for or more popular among neo-Nazis than Camille Bloch (see Figure F6 in the Appendix for 
details). Any connection between products and types therefore emerges through the type-
composition of products’ customer pools created in the laboratory. 
A final advantage is that chocolate can be consumed in private. It is therefore unlikely 
that subjects avoid a product due to social-image concerns. 
3.5.1.3 Laboratory experiment 
In the laboratory, I first threaten subjects’ identities. Next, subjects learn the choices 
of the targets. I manipulate the perception of the type-composition of products’ customer 
pools by revealing the targets’ moral values to some subjects, which is the key aspect of the 
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second experiment. Then, subjects make their product choice, fill out a survey and get paid in 
private. 
Identity threat: I threaten subjects personal identities in the context of race to 
increase subjects’ uncertainty about their own types. To do so, subjects complete an implicit 
association test (IAT)—a popular test in psychology to measure implicit racism—before they 
make their decision. I use the skin-tone IAT (Nosek, et al, 2007). Subjects learn their result 
in the IAT. The IAT very often reveals racism (65-82% of the population are implicit racists, 
according to Project Implicit80), and thereby threatens subjects’ identities.81 To avoid any 
social-signaling motives, IAT scores are not saved, and, as a result, neither the experimenter 
nor any other person sees the scores. To strengthen the identity threat, subjects receive 
detailed information about the interpretation of the results from the IAT at the beginning of 
the experiment. 
Treatments: Next, subjects observe the choices of the 10 targets. Subjects are 
randomly assigned either to the undesirable or to the neutral treatment. The treatment is 
randomized within session. In both treatments, participants observe the choices of the neo-
Nazis. However, the political ideology of targets is only revealed to the subjects in the 
undesirable treatment. In the neutral treatment, participants are only told that the targets were 
recruited on the internet. To keep the perception of the targets somewhat similar between 
treatments (in domains unrelated to moral values), participants in both treatments receive 
demographic information about the targets (distribution of gender, age and education). Figure 
H3 in the Appendix illustrates how this information is shown to subjects in both treatments. 
Consumers’ choices: Next, subjects choose between the two kinds of chocolate. As 
in Study 1, participants make 13 decisions between bundles of products and money (see 
Table 9). Unlike the first study, however, the choices are elicited in two stages. First, subjects 
make a binary choice between the two products. In this choice situation, none of the products 
is bundled with money. Then, they make the 13 decisions, where the choice between (Munz, 
CHF 0) and (Camille Bloch, CHF 0) is set to subjects’ first-stage choices (but can be 
changed). At the end of the experiment, one of the 13 second-stage choices is randomly 
chosen to be implemented. (Unlike Study 1, there is only one round of consumption choice.) 
Anonymity: To guarantee participants’ anonymity, one participant is randomly 
selected to be the “monitor” at the beginning of each session. The monitor pays out 
																																																								
80 https://implicit.harvard.edu/ 
81 45.23% of subjects reported in the survey at the end of the experiment that the IAT at least somewhat 
threatened their identity. 
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participants at the end of the study and does not participate in the experiment. The remaining 
participants each receive a random ID number hidden in an envelope. The experimenter 
cannot match the ID number to the participant. Each subject opens the envelope in private 
and enters this ID number in the computer terminal at which they sit. At the end of the study, 
each participant’s monetary payoff and chosen product is placed in an envelope labeled only 
with the anonymous ID number. The monitor, who does not know the content in any of the 
envelopes, distributes the envelopes to the participants based one their ID numbers at the end 
of the study. 
Survey: Before participants receive their payment, they fill out a survey. Given that it 
takes 20 to 30 minutes to fill the payment envelops after subjects made their product choices, 
the survey is very long to keep subjects occupied. Most importantly, I elicit subjects 
perception of the products, and test for experimenter demand effects.82 I will give additional 
details on the survey in Section 6 when I discuss different explanations for my findings.  
Sequence: First, subjects receive instructions explaining the entire experiment. While 
the instructions explain that they have to choose between two products (“product A” and 
“product B”) in the 13 cases, it is not revealed what products A and B are. Instructions 
announce that participants will observe the choices of “10 participants from a previous 
study,” but do not give any information about the types or choices of the targets. To 
strengthen the identity threat, instructions contain detailed information about the IAT. After 
reading the instructions, subjects answer a set of comprehension questions. Then, depending 
on the treatment they are told that the 10 other participants are either neo-Nazis or 
participants recruited on the internet. Next, it is revealed that the products correspond to 
Camille Bloch chocolate and Munz chocolate. At the same time, subjects learn that 9 out of 
10 targets chose the Munz chocolate. This procedure avoids that subjects evaluate the 
products before they learn the preferences of targets. Next, subjects choose between the two 
products. Finally, participants fill out a survey and then receive their payment from the 
monitor.  
Procedure: I conducted eleven sessions, each consisting of between 19 and 23 
participants, resulting in a total of 243 participants (113 in the neutral treatment, 119 in the 
immoral treatment and 11 monitors). All sessions took place at the Laboratory for 
																																																								
82  I added many questions to keep subjects occupied and to potentially inform future research. The 
questionnaire contains question about the popularity of the products among different groups of people, beliefs 
about the behavior of the other participants, political attitudes, expected use of the chocolate, familiarity with 
the chocolates, willingness to pay for a different chocolate, familiarity with the IAT and whether the IAT 
threatened subjects identities, image concerns, how prone subjects are to disgust, attitudes towards products 
popular among neo-Nazis and demographics. The complete questionnaire is in the Online Appendix. 
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experimental and behavioral economics at the University of Zurich, in December 2018. 
Participants were recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge and Nicklisch, 2014) from the joint 
subject pool of the University of Zurich and the ETH. The experiment was implemented 
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and, for the IAT, Minno.js (Zlotnick, Dzikiewicz and Bar-
Anan, 2015). The Online Appendix supplies the instructions for the study. 
3.5.2 Results 
Do participants care about the moral values of the products’ customers when they 
make consumption choices in this private setting? As in the analysis of Study 1, I will first 
look at the probability that subjects choose the Munz chocolate (the product popular among 
the targets) if none of the products are bundled with money. 83 Table 12, column (1) gives the 
estimates of a linear regression on the probability of choosing Munz over Camille Bloch 
when none of the chocolates are bundled with money on a treatment dummy (1 = undesirable 
treatment). In the neutral treatment, 56.4% of subjects chose Munz. In the undesirable 
treatment, however, only 43.1% of subjects chose Munz, a significant lower share (p=0.047). 
Table 12, column (2) demonstrates that this finding is robust to adding session fixed effects.  
 
Table 12. Treatment effects 
Dependent variable: Pr(Munz) WTP Munz 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 = undesirable 
treatment 

















N 226 226 226 226 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: (1) and (2): Linear regressions of probability to choose Munz chocolate when none of the two products 
are connected with any payment on a treatment dummy. Robust standard errors are used. (3) and (4): Tobit 
regressions (left-censored at CHF -3, n=5; right-censored at CHF +3, n=9) of willingness to pay to receive the 
Munz chocolate instead of the Camille Bloch chocolate on a treatment dummy. t-statistics in parentheses; * - p 
< 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
 
																																																								
83 Six participants made product choices that are non-monotone in money. These individuals are excluded from 
the analysis. Table F3 in the Appendix shows that results do not change if these observations are kept.  
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The data allows me to calculate subjects’ willingness to pay to receive the Munz 
chocolate instead of the Camille Bloch chocolate.84 Note that this variable is left-censored at 
CHF -3 (5 observations) and right-censored at CHF 3 (9 observations). Figure 15 shows the 
cumulative distribution of the willingness to pay for both treatments. Most participants have 
a willingness to pay in between CHF -1 and CHF 1. The figure indicates that the treatment 
shifted the willingness to pay distribution.  
 
Figure 15. Distribution willingness to pay, Study 2 
 
Notes: Cumulative distributions of subjects willingness to pay to receive Munz product for both treatments.  
 
Table 12, columns (3) gives the estimates of a Tobit regression on the willingness to 
pay on a treatment dummy. Subjects in the undesirable treatment are willing to pay CHF 
0.325 less for the product popular among the targets than subjects in the neutral treatment 
(p=0.038). Column (4) demonstrates that this finding is robust to adding session fixed 
effects. Note that the effect size is about 10 percent of the price of the chocolates. 85 This is a 
substantial effect given that European net margins for food processing and food retail are 
6.76% and 1.67%, respectively (Damodaran, 2019). 
																																																								
84 My data is discrete due to use of the list method. For a subject, who choses Camille Bloch in the choice 
situation “(Camille Bloch, CHF 1.50) or (Munz, CHF 0)”, but choses Munz in the choice situation “(Camille 
Bloch, CHF 1) or (Munz, CHF 0)”, the difference in monetary value must be in [CHF 1, CHF 1.5]. I set this 
difference to CHF 1.25. 
85 When I hired subjects, I ask students to not sign up for this study in case they are allergic to chocolate. I did 
so because a chocolate choice of a participant that can not eat chocolate does not reveal information about the 
participant’s type to herself. Nevertheless, 15 students indicated in the survey that they neither can eat the Munz 
nor the Camille Bloch chocolate. If I exclude these subjects from the analysis, treatment effects increase; 
treatment effects in Table 12 are then -0.166 (t=-2.43, p=0.016) for (1), 0.160 (t=-2.38, p=0.018) for (2), -0.415 























-4 -2 0 2 4
WTP to receive Munz
undesirable treatment neutral treatment
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In this second study, I find that the type-composition of customer pools also matter 
for private consumption. In the following, I will discuss different motives that potentially 
could explain the behaviors documented in the two studies. 
3.6 Alternative explanations 
In both studies, I find that consumers care about the moral values of others that chose 
a product, as predicated by models of identity signaling. In the following, I discuss whether 
an explanation other than identity signaling could produce my findings. Understanding the 
motives of consumer behavior is potentially important for policy implications of my work; 
identity signaling, for example, often results in suboptimal consumption behaviors (Frank, 
1985; Ireland, 1994; Moav and Neeman, 2010, 2012).  
Perception of the products: Changing the type-composition of a product’s customer 
pool might change the perception of the product’s qualities or the producer’s qualities, for 
example through forms of social learning (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998). Such 
treatment differences in the perception of products might then be reflected in the 
consumption choices.  
To investigate whether there are treatment differences in such perceptions, I 
complement my studies with survey questions. I elicit participants’ product perceptions on 
different quality dimensions (including price, processing quality, and quality of raw 
materials) and of the moral values of the producers. I do not find treatment differences in 
most dimensions of product quality (see Table F6 and Table F7 in the Appendix). Moreover, 
there are no treatment differences in the perception of the producers’ moral values: in Study 
1, subjects do not think that the producer of the product that is adopted by the target with 
undesirable moral values promotes conservative Christian values (Wilcoxon rank-sum, 
p=0.611; see Table F6). In Study 2, subjects in the undesirable treatment do not think that 
Munz, the product adopted by neo-Nazis, promotes right-wing extremism or discriminates 
against minorities (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p=0.800, p=0.406, respectively; see Table F7). 
Disgust: Associating a product with neo-Nazis, as done in Study 2, might remind the 
buyer unpleasantly Nazis and their actions, resulting in feelings of disgust when consuming 
the product—in line with negative contagion (Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff, 1986; 
Nemeroff and Rozin, 1994)—thereby devaluating the product.  
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In the survey, I ask subjects whether they feel disgusted when they think about eating 
the product chosen by their target. There are no treatment differences in subjects’ responses 
in both Study 1 and Study 2 (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p=0.967, p=0.422, respectively; see Table 
F6 and F7).86 
Similarity to the target: People might be more willing to conform to behaviors of 
others that have similar personality traits, values or group affiliations than to others that are 
different in these dimensions. There is some evidence for such an effect for moral behavior 
(Dimant, 2019; Fatas, Hargreaves Heap and Rojo Arjona, 2018). Treatment differences in the 
similarity between consumers and targets could therefore potentially explain the treatment 
differences in consumer behavior. 
My data allows me to measure the similarity between the moral values of consumers 
and targets. For Study 1, I look at the similarity in donations to Zukunft CH.87 Consumers in 
the undesirable treatment are on average more similar to their targets than the consumers in 
the desirable treatment (t=2.99; p=0.003).88 Therefore, if participants are more willing to 
conform to more similar targets, conformity should be more common in the undesirable 
treatment than in the desirable treatment. I find the opposite pattern. For Study 2, I use 
subjects’ political position, racism and views on right-wing and left-wing extremism to 
measure similarity: subject that are right-wing and hold racist views are more similar to the 
neo-Nazis than subjects that are left-wing and opposed to racism. In both studies, the 
similarity measures can not account for the treatment differences; if anything, controlling for 
similarity increases treatment effects (see Tables F4 and F5 in the Appendix).  
Experimenter Demand Effects: One may be worried about experimenter demand 
effects, in particular given my use of neo-Nazis as undesirable types in Study 2. However, 
experimenter demand effects can hardly explain why there is a treatment effect for moral 
values, but not for intelligence; if experimenter demand effects were present, they likely 
would occur in both the moral values round and the intelligence round. In Study 2, I attempt 
to test for experimenter demand effects, building on the method developed by de Quidt, 
Haushofer and Roth (2018). In the survey, subjects are asked to submit an offer (in [0 CHF, 
																																																								
86 In the survey, I also ask subjects how they plan to use the chocolates in case they receive them: whether they 
eat it, whether they give it to someone else, and whether they throw the chocolate away. If disgust plays an 
important role, subjects might be less likely to eat the Munz chocolate, but more likely to give it away or throw 
it away. I do not find a treatment difference in any of the three variables (linear probability model; t=0.25 
(p=0.801), t=1.54 (p=0.126), t=-0.94 (p=0.346), respectively). 
87 Note that in the moral values round, targets in the desirable and undesirable treatment only differ in their 
donation to Zukunft CH. 
88 I calculated the similarity as 1 − |donation –  target’s donation|/6 and regressed this variable on a treatment 
dummy. The coefficient estimate is 0.16. 
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6.05 CHF]) to buy an USB stick, incentivized by the BDM. Half of the subjects are assigned 
to a demand treatment. In the demand treatment, I add the sentence “We expect that 
participants who are shown these instructions will specify a lower maximum price than they 
normally would.” As de Quidt, Haushofer and Roth (2018) argue, such a sentence induces 
experimenter demand effects and allows to test whether subjects are prone to experimenter 
demand effects in a particular setting. I do not find a treatment differences in the willingness 
to pay for the USB stick (Tobit regression, coeff.=-0.034, t=-0.11, p=0.916). Given that this 
setting is similar to the consumption decisions in the main part of my experiment, it seems 
unlikely that experimenter demand effects drive my results.  
Unlike all other explanation, identity signaling can explain all aspects of behaviors 
observed in the experiments.  
3.7 Conclusion and discussion 
This paper studies whether consumers care about the characteristics of others that buy 
a product when the make consumption choices. In laboratory experiments, I vary, by 
treatment, whether the customer pool of a product consists of people with desirable or 
undesirable characteristics. I find that participants are willing to pay more for a product if it 
is popular among people with desirable moral values than if it is popular among people with 
undesirable moral values. I show this in a setting where choices are observed by others, and 
in a double blind setting.  
In addition to moral values, I investigate whether consumers care about the 
intelligence of others that buy a product. In contrast to moral values, I do not find evidence 
for such an effect. These findings suggest that, at least in in the contexts studied in this paper, 
subjects care more about the public perception of their moral values than about the public 
perception of their intelligence.  
These findings can explain why many firms want customers with undesirable moral 
values—for example, alt-rights, neo-Nazis and Hooligans—not to buy their products. 
Adaptations by such customers can decrease other customers’ willingness to pay for the 
firms’ products. As a result, it can be rational for firms to forgo profits generated through 
customers with undesirable moral values in order to make more profit with other customers.  
One contribution of this paper is to deliver important evidence in support of major 
models of identity signaling and consumption. These models predict that consumers want to 
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signal that they have desirable characteristics (or, “types”) by avoiding products popular 
among people with undesirable characteristics and by conforming to the product choices of 
people with desirable characteristics. I present evidence that consumers indeed care about the 
types of others that consume a product as postulated in these models. From a theoretical 
point of view, my work also provides evidence for a violation of a fundamental assumption 
in consumer theory, that is, that consumers do not care about the consumption bundles of 
others. Contrary to this assumption, subjects in my studies avoid consumption choices 
popular among people with undesirable moral values. 
My work also has potentially important policy implications. For instance, some social 
groups have adopted suboptimal consumption behaviors, such as unhealthy products 
(Guendelman, Cheryan, and Monin, 2011), food with low caloric intake consumption (Atkin, 
2016) or products that harm the environment (Minton, Johnson and Liu, 2019). I present 
evidence that consumers are attracted towards products that are popular among people with 
desirable characteristics. Policies that target members of groups that are seen as having very 
desirable (or, very undesirable) characteristics might therefore be successful in changing 
suboptimal consumption pattern of the entire group.  
While I focus my investigation on consumer behavior, understanding how people’s 
choices depend on the choice of other types is also important for other applications, for 
example, for the literature on acting white.89 This literature suggests that studying hard is 
seen as a “white action” by black students, and avoided to signal group-attachment (e.g., 
Fordham and Ogbu, 1986). Existing studies on acting white are limited to correlations in 
field-data and are the subject of controversial discussion (e.g., Austen-Smith and Fryer, 
2005).90 My investigation provides a empirical framework to study how people’s choices are 
affected by the choices of types that vary along several dimensions and enhances our general 
understanding of the psychological forces behind conformity and disconformity in such 
contexts.   
																																																								
89 There is also related evidence that women avoid educational choices that are associated with men (Cheryan et 
al., 2009) and that low-income groups and ethnic minorities in the U.S. associate health concerns with white, 
middle-class Americans and adopt unhealthy behaviors (Oyserman, Fryberg and Yoder, 2007). 
90  Bursztyn, Egorov and Jensen (2019) provide causal evidence on how social-image concerns affect 
educational activities in different school environments. They do not study how people’s choices depend on the 
choice of other types of people. 
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Chapter 4: On self-serving strategic beliefs 





We experimentally study whether individuals adopt negative beliefs about others’ intentions 
to justify egoistic behavior. In contrast with Di Tella, et al. (2015), our first study finds no 
evidence that individuals engage in “strategic cynicism.” We reconcile the discrepancy, using 
Di Tella, et al.’s, data, a simple model of belief manipulation and a novel experiment that 
replicates and extends Di Tella, et al. Across three datasets, we find no evidence of 
negatively biased beliefs. However, Di Tella, et al.’s, results and our data indicate that those 
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Considerable evidence indicates that decision makers confronted with tradeoffs 
between egoistic and social considerations, such as fairness and equality, will rely on 
justifications to prioritize the former while avoiding the impression that they are acting 
selfishly (Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2007; Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber, 2010; Gino, 
Norton and Weber, 2016; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017). This includes engaging in 
self-serving belief manipulation, whereby actions that are personally beneficial can be 
justified by changing one’s beliefs or perceptions of what is fair (Babcock and Loewenstein, 
1997; Konow, 2000), a product’s quality (Chen & Gesche, 2017; Gneezy, Saccardo, Serra-
Garcia, and van Veldhuizen, 2018) or the likely outcomes of a random process (Haisley and 
Weber, 2010; Exley, 2016).91 
One important, but largely unexplored, context for self-serving belief manipulation is 
in strategic settings where individuals form beliefs about an opponent’s likely behavior. It 
has long been recognized that beliefs about other players’ actions and intentions can play a 
central role in prosocial behavior, with a positive relationship between the belief that others 
will act unkindly and one’s own egoistic behavior (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; 
Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001). Strategic beliefs are typically assumed to be 
determined by the structure of the game and beliefs about others’ preferences or rationality. 
However, in light of the apparent ease with which people bias their beliefs in self-serving 
ways in other contexts, it seems plausible that they may similarly bias their beliefs about 
others’ actions when doing so can justify acting in a selfish way that harms others.92 Indeed, 
a recent paper by Di Tella, Perez-Truglia, Babino and Sigman (2015) provides evidence 
consistent with the idea that people engage in such “strategic cynicism.” Specifically, they 
																																																								
91 Such self-serving interpretations are related to the concept of “motivated reasoning” from psychology 
(Kunda, 1990). Models introducing self-deception and self-image concerns to economics include Akerlof and 
Dickens (1982), Rabin (1994), Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Bénabou and Tirole (2006, 2011), Bénabou (2013). 
There is also evidence for self-serving belief manipulation about other desired qualities, like one’s abilities 
(Möbius, Niederle, Niehaus and Rosenblat, 2017; Zimmerman, 2018), beauty (Eil and Rao, 2011), honesty 
(Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, and Ayal, 2015) and about desired future life events 
(Irwin, 1953; Mayraz, 2013). 
92 There are many contexts in which adopting cynical beliefs about others’ likely actions may be strategically 
desirable for an individual constrained to act morally. For instance, an employer who can benefit by laying off a 
worker may find it easier to do so if she adopts the belief that the employee is likely committing acts that merit 
firing. A national leader intent on seizing land from a neighboring country may find this easier to justify under 
the belief that the other country intends to act aggressively. A US President may find it easier to justify firing a 
special counsel investigating him for misconduct if he convinces himself that the investigation is a WITCH 
HUNT! Trivers (2011) discusses an alternative motive to engage in self-deception in strategic situations: 
deceiving oneself about one’s own qualities, such as ability, might be an effective strategy to deceive others 
(see also Schwardmann and van der Weele (2016), for related experimental evidence). 
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demonstrate that people with a greater opportunity to take from another person believe that 
this opponent is more likely to act in a greedy and harmful manner. 
 Our study investigates the phenomenon of strategic self-deception, although we 
initially approach this question in a different manner from Di Tella, et al. Rather than testing 
whether people with a greater incentive to take from others adopt relatively more negative 
beliefs about these opponents, as they do, our focus is on whether people with the 
opportunity to take from others adopt beliefs that are biased in comparison to two reasonable 
objective standards: the actual empirical behavioral frequency of opponents’ behavior and 
the beliefs of neutral outsiders with no incentive to view others self-servingly. That is, we 
test the extent to which individuals with an incentive to engage in strategic cynicism adopt 
beliefs that are negatively biased in absolute terms. In contrast, Di Tella, et al., study a 
relative form of this bias, investigating whether one group’s beliefs are more negative—or, 
critically, less positive—than those of another group. 
Our results show that this distinction is important. We find evidence consistent with 
the relative bias documented by Di Tella, et al. However, we also show in two novel studies 
and in Di Tella, et al.’s, own data that there is no evidence of negatively biased strategic 
beliefs in absolute terms. In fact, across all three studies, individuals with an incentive to take 
from others—and, therefore, with an incentive to engage in strategic cynicism—actually hold 
highly accurate beliefs that are close to both the actual behavior of their counterparts and to 
the beliefs of neutral observers. The only bias, relative to these objective and neutral 
standards, in all three data sets lies in the beliefs of individuals in Di Tella, et al.’s, design 
with a low ability to take from their counterpart; these people exhibit overly positive beliefs 
about their counterpart’s likely action. Thus, to the extent that absolute bias exists in people’s 
beliefs about a counterpart’s actions, it appears to be one of positivity rather than cynicism. 
Our first study, which we conducted prior to knowing about Di Tella, et al.’s, related 
work, uses a game that we refer to as the “pre-emptive taking game.” In this game, a pair of 
players—say, “Ann” and “Bob”—both start off with the same wealth endowment. Ann first 
decides how much to take from Bob. Bob then decides how much to take from Ann. A key 
feature is that Bob’s ability to take from Ann increases in the amount of money he has 
remaining after Ann’s taking decision. That is, by taking from Bob, Ann both increases her 
earnings and reduces his opportunity to act in a selfish and harmful manner. Thus, Ann’s 
taking decision may naturally be influenced by whether or not she thinks Bob will use his 
remaining money to harm Ann. But, if Ann feels constrained to act “fairly,” the game also 
	 98
creates an incentive for Ann to manipulate her beliefs about Bob’s likely action, since this 
gives her a justification for taking more under the guise of self-protection.  
Our main purpose in this study is to test for a bias in the beliefs of subjects in the role 
of Ann. Therefore, we directly elicit such beliefs about the amount that Bob will take if given 
the opportunity. We compare this to beliefs elicited from neutral third parties who have no 
incentive to engage in strategic cynicism. Our hypothesis is that Ann’s incentive to justify 
taking by adopting a cynical belief about Bob’s likely behavior will lead her to self-servingly 
negatively bias these beliefs. Surprisingly, however, in light of other instances in which 
people seem to engage in self-deception in non-strategic contexts, we find no difference 
between the two sets of beliefs. The two beliefs are virtually identical and very close to the 
true empirical frequencies. This suggests, at the least, that there are limitations in people’s 
ability to manipulate their beliefs about a strategic opponent. 
This finding also contrasts with those of Di Tella, et al., who argue that their 
experimental evidence shows that individuals form biased beliefs and convince themselves 
that their counterparts are more likely act egoistically than they actually are.93 Di Tella, et al., 
support this conclusion with an experiment using a game, labeled the “corruption game,” that 
shares features with our pre-emptive taking game. In this game, Ann and Bob again start with 
an identical number of tokens and Ann similarly decides how many tokens to take from Bob. 
In the corruption game, however, Bob simultaneously makes a binary decision whether to act 
“corruptly,” by taking a side payment that increases Bob’s wealth while lowering the value 
of the tokens. Thus, Ann can justify taking more tokens from Bob as a fair action if she 
thinks that he will act corruptly. The experiment manipulates Ann’s ability to take tokens 
from Bob and finds that subjects in the role of Ann adopt more pessimistic beliefs when they 
have the ability to take more tokens. Thus, individuals seem to respond to the incentive to 
take more from their counterpart by engaging in strategic cynicism.  
At first, these two results seem to offer conflicting evidence. Our first study finds no 
evidence of strategic cynicism. In contrast, Di Tella, et al., conclude that people engage in 
self-serving belief manipulation. We reconcile this apparent inconsistency using the data 
from Di Tella, et al.’s, experiment, a simple model of strategic self-deception and an 
additional novel experiment. We show that the two sets of results are actually highly 
																																																								
93 Specifically, in a context where the actual proportion of egoistic counterparts is 𝑝!, Di Tella, et al., argue that 
a self-servingly biased decision maker “may form a biased belief [...] instead of correctly remembering a 
proportion of 𝑝! of low-type, the individual may try to convince herself that the proportion was actually 𝑝 >
𝑝!” (p. 3437).	
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consistent and, in doing so, provide important evidence on the nature of strategic self-
deception. 
First, we show that a closer inspection of Di Tella, et al.’s, data reveals that their 
results, like ours, do not actually show any absolute cynicism or bias on the part of 
individuals with an incentive to act egoistically. In fact, the subjects in their experiment with 
the greater incentive to engage in strategic self-deception provide belief estimates very close 
to the actual frequency of egoistic behavior by their counterparts. In contrast, those subjects 
with a low incentive to engage in strategic cynicism exhibit the most bias, but in the direction 
of believing that their opponents will be less egoistic than they actually are. Thus, to the 
extent that an empirical bias exists in Di Tella, et al.’s, data, it seems not to be one of 
cynicism, but rather one of optimism and positivity that arises only among those with little 
ability to take from their opponent.  
 We next show that, theoretically, this positivity bias can be explained by a simple 
model that serves as a stylized representation of the games in both ours and Di Tella, et al.’s, 
experiments. In the model, Ann derives utility from her own and Bob’s payoffs and this 
utility is increasing in Bob’s kindness. When Ann has the opportunity to take from Bob, she 
has an incentive to reduce her belief regarding Bob’s kindness; this diminishes the loss in 
utility she experiences by taking from him. However, in this setting individuals also have an 
incentive to form another kind of motivated belief—to convince themselves that the other 
player is kind and deserves any payoff she receives. The net result of these two opposing 
tendencies is an absolute bias in the direction of positivity, which is consistent with a general 
tendency for distorted beliefs to lie in the direction of positivity and optimism, rather than the 
opposite (Bénabou and Tirole, 2016). This simple theoretical analysis provides a basis for 
two phenomena we observe in our first experiment and in Di Tella, et al.’s, data. First, in 
absolute terms, biases about others’ actions will lie in the direction of positivity rather than 
cynicism.94 Second, consistent with Di Tella, et al.’s, interpretation of their findings, the 
relative positivity of Ann’s beliefs about Bob’s behavior will be lower as Ann has a greater 
opportunity to take money from Bob. Thus, viewed jointly, these predictions suggest that, at 
least in many settings, strategic cynicism may be a relative rather than an absolute 
phenomenon. 
The above analysis yields a straightforward interpretation for the absence of absolute 
strategic cynicism in our first experiment and the presence of relative strategic cynicism in 
																																																								
94 This prediction also arises under the model that Di Tella, et al., use to motivate their experiment, though their 
analysis does not investigate this property. 
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the study by Di Tella, et al. However, existing empirical support for the above two 
predictions involves comparisons across studies, in which changing populations or incidental 
factors may yield varying results. Therefore, in a third step, we test the two predictions in a 
novel experiment. We conduct a replication of Di Tella, et al.’s, study, but also elicit the 
beliefs of neutral observers regarding the behavior of subjects in the role of Bob.95 
In this new experiment, we replicate Di Tella, et al.’s, main finding—a comparative 
static result that individuals with a greater opportunity to take from their counterparts hold 
less positive beliefs about these opponents. This replication itself is noteworthy, as we have a 
substantially larger sample size and find qualitatively similar findings in a different 
population, in Switzerland rather than Argentina, in a society that differs in general levels of 
corruption, trust and trustworthiness. However, we also once more document a lack of 
strategic cynicism in absolute terms. The beliefs of individuals in the role of Ann with a 
strong incentive to engage in strategic cynicism are no more cynical about Bob’s behavior 
than either the empirical frequency of actual choices or the beliefs of neutral third parties 
without any incentive to adopt a negative view of Bob’s likely actions.  
 Our results should not be interpreted as questioning Di Tella, et al.’s, findings. In fact, 
we provide a direct replication of their main result of relative strategic cynicism. However, 
we additionally provide clear evidence—across both of our studies and in Di Tella, et al.’s, 
original data—that there is no strategic cynicism in absolute terms. Instead, we find that 
strategic beliefs are positively biased. Our contribution thus expands our understanding of the 
psychological forces behind self-serving belief manipulation, by noting that strategic 
cynicism may compete with a tendency towards positivity in determining individuals’ 
beliefs. Such a tendency towards positivity is consistent with overwhelming evidence of a 
general “positivity illusion” (Taylor and Brown, 1988) from psychological studies: people 
hold overoptimistic beliefs about future life events (Weinstein 1980, 1989), are too optimistic 
about the degree of personal control (Langer, 1975), hold too positive perceptions of 
themselves (Svenson, 1981; Quattrone and Tversky, 1984), engage in wishful thinking 
(Irwin, 1953), and hold beliefs that the world is just (Lerner, 1980).96 This positivity bias can 
also explain why, in contrast to our study, many other studies found strong evidence for 
																																																								
95 Di Tella, et al., argue that one of their experimental treatments provides an estimate of unbiased beliefs. 
However, as we discuss in detail below (see footnote 107), there are a few reasons why these estimates are 
unlikely to correspond to the unbiased beliefs of subjects in their main experiment. 
96 In economics, Haisley and Weber (2010) document a tendency to believe that the impacts of one’s choices on 
others are more positive than they actually are, while Andreoni and Sanchez (2014) find that subjects are too 
optimistic about other players’ trust and trustworthiness compared to actual behavior. 
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motivated reasoning (in non-strategic settings). We therefore contribute to a better 
understanding of the specific contexts, in which we should expect biased beliefs to arise.97 
The next section provides a detailed description of our first study using the pre-
emptive taking game. In Section 3, we discuss the study by Di Tella, et al., show that their 
findings do not provide evidence of strategic cynicism in absolute terms and present a 
stylized model that can provide an interpretation of behavior in both experiments. Section 4 
presents our second experiment, intended to test this model more directly and reconcile the 
earlier results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
4.2 Study 1: An experimental test of strategic cynicism 
We first introduce the pre-emptive taking game, which allows us to test for absolute 
bias in strategic beliefs. Then, we discuss the experimental implementation of the game and 
present our results. 
4.2.1 The pre-emptive taking game 
There are two players, Ann and Bob. Both players start with an endowment of 10. 
They play a sequential game. In Stage 1, Ann decides how much to take from Bob’s initial 
endowment. She can take any amount, 𝑎 ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . . , 10}. After Stage 1, Ann’s wealth 
equals 10+ 𝑎, while Bob’s equals 10− 𝑎.  
In Stage 2, after observing 𝑎, Bob decides how much to take from Ann’s current 
endowment, 𝑏, once again in increments of two. The amount that Bob can take is constrained 
by Bob’s remaining wealth. Specifically, in order to take 𝑏 units from Ann, Bob has to spend 
0.5𝑏 from his remaining wealth and cannot spend more than the amount he has at the 
beginning of Stage 2. Furthermore, Bob cannot take more than Ann’s wealth at the beginning 
of Stage 2. Thus, Bob’s ability to take is given by, 𝑏 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑏}, where 𝑏 = min 2 10−
𝑎 , 10+ 𝑎 . Hence, in the case in which Ann took everything in Stage 1 (i.e., 𝑎 = 10), Bob 
cannot take anything in Stage 2.  
After Stage 2, the game concludes. The two players’ payoffs are determined as 
follows:  
																																																								
97 Other studies that demonstrate limits in the extent to which motivated reasoning and justifications facilitate 
egoistic behavior are van der Weele, Kulisa, Kosfeld and Friebel (2014) who find that people do not use “moral 
wiggle room” (see Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2007) in the context of reciprocity and Bartling and Özdemir 
(2017) who find that people do not employ the “replacement logic” (“if I don’t do it, someone else will”) in 
contexts with a strong social norm. 
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𝜋! = 10+ 𝑎 − 𝑏 
𝜋! = 10− 𝑎 + 𝑏 − 0.5𝑏 
As an example, suppose Ann decides to take 6 in Stage 1 such that 𝑎 = 6. At the beginning 
of Stage 2, Ann has 16 and Bob has 4. In this case, in Stage 2, Bob can spend up to 4 to take 
up to 8 from Ann; doing so would leave both Ann and Bob with final payoffs of 8. Under 
standard egoistic preferences, in the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium to the game 
both Ann and Bob take as much as they can, i.e., 𝑎 = 10 and, consequently, 𝑏 = 𝑏 = 0. 
The key feature in the pre-emptive taking game is that Bob’s ability to take from Ann 
is limited by how much he has left at the end of Stage 1. Ann can thus protect herself from 
Bob’s potentially egoistic behavior by taking all his tokens. Therefore, suppose Ann wants to 
obtain as high a payoff as possible, but also feels obligated to be fair to Bob in the case he 
does not intend to take from her. In such a case, Ann may justify taking by convincing 
herself that Bob intends to act greedily—i.e., by engaging in strategic cynicism. The critical 
measure of strategic cynicism in studying this game is thus Ann’s beliefs about Bob’s 
behavior. In particular, eliciting these beliefs and comparing them to neutral and objective 
standards—the actual amount of taking by Bob and neutral observers’ beliefs about Bob’s 
taking—allows us to test whether they exhibit a systematic bias toward negativity. 
4.2.2 Experimental design 
At the beginning of each session, participants are randomly assigned to one of three 
roles: Player A (Ann), Player B (Bob) and Player C (neutral observer). Subjects are informed 
of their own role. Next, all subjects receive the same set of instructions. The instructions 
describe all decisions made by Player A, Player B and the neutral observer in detail and 
subjects are provided with a detailed table showing all the possible combinations of payoffs 
resulting from the two strategic players’ actions.98 After hearing the instructions read aloud, 
all participants answer questions about the decisions available to Players A and B and the 
consequences of these decisions.  
For the pre-emptive taking game, Players A and B each start with an initial 
endowment of 10 chips, with each chip worth CHF 2 (≈ $2). In each pair, Player A selects 
how much to take from Player B (𝑎). Player B’s choices are elicited using the strategy 
method—Player B selects an amount to take (𝑏!) for every possible choice made by Player 
A. After both Player A and Player B have made their decisions, but before they learn about 
																																																								
98 The instructions are available in the Appendix. 
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the payoffs, we elicit their beliefs concerning their counterpart’s behavior. Player B guesses 
which value of 𝑎 Player A selected (𝑎!). Player A guesses a value of 𝑏 for every possible 
value of 𝑎, or 𝑏!
!; at the end of the experiment one value of 𝑎 is randomly selected to count 
for Player A’s guess. Each subject earns an additional CHF 4 if they accurately guess the 
choice made by their opponent.99 
Individuals in the role of Player C are not matched with any pair and are not directly 
affected by the choices made by any specific Player A or B. Hence, they act as neutral 
participants, who have no incentive to bias their beliefs about other participants’ actions. For 
our purposes, they provide a measure of unbiased beliefs about the actions of Player As and 
Bs. Specifically, each neutral observer guesses the choice of a randomly selected Player A 
(𝑎!) and the conditional choices of a randomly selected Player B (𝑏!
!). Similarly to the other 
participants, each Player C gains CHF 4 for correctly guessing the behavior of a Player A and 
CHF 4 for correctly guessing one randomly selected option for a Player B.  
After making all choices, participants are informed about their payoffs. They then 
answer several socio-demographic questions before they are paid in private.  
We conducted seven sessions with between 30 and 36 participants, resulting in a total 
of 240 participants, 80 in each role.100 All sessions took place at the Decision Sciences Lab 
(DeSciL) at the Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich in 2015. Participants were 
recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge and Nicklisch, 2014) from the joint subject pool of the 
University of Zurich and the ETH. The experiment was implemented using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
4.2.3 Results 
On average, Player A took 8.0 tokens (std. dev. = 3.6) from Player B, with 50 of 80, 
or 62.5 percent, taking the full amount, 𝑎 = 10. Figure I1 in the Appendix provides the full 
distribution of amounts taken.  
Taking by Player A is related to beliefs about how much Player B will take. Figure 16 
shows the average belief of Player A regarding how much Player B will take, in response to 
every possible action by Player A. The figure presents these mean beliefs separately for those 
																																																								
99 The amount of CHF 4 as an incentive for accurate guesses was the same for all sessions, except of the first 
session. In this session, the incentive for accurate guesses was CHF 2. We raised the incentive subsequently to 
provide subjects with more earnings opportunity. We find no differences in accuracy of guesses due to different 
incentives. 
100 We conducted two waves: the first four sessions were in Wave 1 while the remaining three sessions were in 
Wave 2. The second wave included elements intended to better ensure comprehension. We pool the data, as 
there is no difference in behavior between the two waves. The appendix provides instructions for both waves. 	
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who took less than 10 (“a < 10”) and those who took everything (“a = 10”). Those subjects in 
the role of Player A who took everything hold more cynical beliefs about Player B. For 
instance, for the hypothetical case where Player A takes nothing (𝑎 = 0), those who actually 
took all 10 have mean beliefs that are much more cynical (8.16) than those who took less 
than 10 (4.2), and this difference is highly statistically significant (t78 = 4.44, p < 0.001). 
Comparisons of mean beliefs for the cases in which Player A takes 𝑎 = 2 or 𝑎 = 4 similarly 
reveal differential cynicism between those who took 10 and those who took less 
(respectively, t78 = 4.72, p < 0.001 and t78 = 2.85, p < 0.01). This positive relationship 
between taking by Player A and negative beliefs about Player B’s behavior is consistent with 
strategic cynicism but does not demonstrate it. Indeed, the more straightforward 
interpretation is that subjects in the role of Player A might simply be responding to their 
beliefs—taking more preemptively if they fear that B will also take more.101 
 
Figure 16. Player A beliefs about Player B’s actions by Player A type 
 
Note: The figure displays mean predictions by A of how much B will take, conditional on how much they took 
themselves. The category “a<10” represents Player As who took less than 10 from Player B, while the category 
“a=10” represents Player As who took the maximum possible from their counterparts. Dotted lines indicate the 
maximum possible amount B could take. Bars indicate standard errors. 
																																																								
101 This is in line with results in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) who find, using a public good game, a positive 
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To investigate strategic cynicism, our main focus, we next compare the beliefs of 
subjects in the role of Player A with two standards corresponding to unbiased beliefs. 
Strategic cynicism would imply that the beliefs of Player A about B’s action predict more 
taking than the actual amount taken by Player B (𝑏!
!
> 𝑏!) and than the corresponding 
predictions by Player C (𝑏!
!
> 𝑏!
!). Figure 17 shows, for each possible action by Player A, 
how much Player B actually took on average and the corresponding mean beliefs by subjects 
in the roles of Player A and Player C. 
Looking first at the actual behavior of subjects in the role of Player B, we observe 
that the amount they take depends on Player A’s choice. For instance, when Player A takes 
nothing, then the average amount taken, 𝑏!!!, equals 5.63, even though Player B could take 
anywhere between 0 and 10 tokens. As Player A takes more, Player B also seizes a larger 
proportion of the available tokens. For instance, when Player A takes either 2 or 4 tokens, 
meaning that Player B can take anywhere between 0 and 12, then 𝑏!!! = 8.53 and 𝑏!!! = 
9.65, on average. Finally, when A takes most of B’s endowment, B takes, on average, very 
close to the maximum possible amounts (𝑏!!! = 7.53 and 𝑏!!! = 3.90).102  
 
Figure 17. Actual conditional taking by B and corresponding predictions by A and C 
 
Note: Actual choices by Player Bs and predicted choices about Player B’s behavior by Player As and the 
neutral observers (Player Cs), respectively. Dotted lines indicate the maximum possible amount B could take. 
Bars indicate standard errors. 
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Perhaps the most striking finding in Figure 17 is how little evidence we find of 
strategic cynicism. For every possible amount taken by Player A, the beliefs of Player A and 
Player C regarding Player B’s choice are very close to each other and to the actual behavior 
of Player B. Table 13 presents statistical tests of the relationships between Player A’s beliefs 
and the actual choices by Player B and the beliefs of Player C. There are no statistically 
significant differences between the beliefs of Player A (𝑏!
!) and the actual behavior of Player 
B (𝑏!) or the beliefs of Player C (𝑏!
!) for any amount taken by A between 0 and 6. In the case 
where A takes 8, the differences are at least marginally statistically significant, but in these 
comparisons A underestimates B’s taking, both relative to the actual amount and to the 
beliefs provided by C.103  
 
Table 13. Statistical tests of strategic cynicism 
 
Mean taking 








! vs. 𝑏! 𝑏!
! vs. 𝑏!
!  







𝑡!"# = 1.510 
p = 0.133 
𝑡!"# = 0.678 
p = 0.531 







𝑡!"# = 0.433 
p = 0.666 
𝑡!"# = 0.416 
p = 0.678 







𝑡!"# = 0.247 
p = 0.805 
𝑡!"# = 0.368 
p = 0.713 







𝑡!"# = 0.889 
p = 0.375 
𝑡!"# = 1.031 
p = 0.304 







𝑡!"# = 1.800 
p = 0.074 
𝑡!"# = 2.130 
p = 0.035 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
4.2.4 Discussion 
To summarize, we find a positive relationship between cynicism about one’s 
opponent and the number of tokens taken by subjects in the role of Player A. That is, subjects 
who hold cynical beliefs about their opponents take more from them. However, our data 
reveal very little evidence of self-serving belief manipulation by subjects in the role of Player 
																																																								
103 The statistical tests in Table 1 are t-tests. Non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests yield very similar results; 
all p-values for 𝑎 = 0 through 𝑎 = 6 are greater than 0.188 and the p-values for 𝑎 = 8 are 0.071 (𝑏!





A, neither relative to objective behavioral standards nor to the beliefs of unbiased 
observers.104  
While our results rule out significant levels of strategic cynicism in our data, they 
stand in contrast to Di Tella, et al. (2015), who conclude from their experimental evidence 
that people engage in self-serving manipulation of their strategic beliefs. We next describe 
this evidence and attempt to reconcile our seemingly conflicting results. 
4.3 Reconciling our results with Di Tella, et al. (2015) 
Di Tella, et al. (2015), study strategic cynicism using a “corruption game.” In contrast 
with our findings, they conclude that decision makers bias their beliefs about a counterpart’s 
egoism in response to incentives. In this section, we first describe their study and findings in 
detail and then offer evidence that our two sets of results are similar in that neither yields 
evidence of an absolute bias in individuals’ beliefs. 
4.3.1 Di Tella, et al.’s, corruption game 
The study by Di Tella, et al., is based on the idea that a greater opportunity to act 
egoistically at the expense of a counterpart creates stronger incentives to engage in strategic 
cynicism. Hence, their main prediction is that those with greater opportunities to act 
egoistically should end up with a more pessimistic belief about the counterpart’s kindness.  
Di Tella, et al., test this comparative-static prediction in a “corruption game.”105 In 
the game, an “Allocator” and a “Seller” each start with 10 tokens. The Allocator decides how 
to redistribute the combined 20 tokens between herself and the Seller. Simultaneously, the 
Seller sets the “price” at which all the tokens are sold to the experimenter. He can either 
choose a price of 1.50 Argentine pesos ($) or a price of $0.50. If the Seller chooses the latter, 
he additionally receives a fixed side payment of $5. Setting a lower price while taking the 
side payment is labeled as a “corrupt” act by the Seller, akin to accepting a bribe. 
In addition to deciding upon the distribution of tokens, the Allocator also provides 
beliefs (𝑝) about the likelihood that her paired Seller takes the corrupt action and about the 
share of Sellers in the experimental session that does so. The Allocator receives $5 for each 
																																																								
104 The beliefs of Player Bs and Cs about A’s actions are similarly unbiased (see Figure I3 in the Appendix). 
Recall that the mean amount taken by A is 8.0 (std. dev. = 0.358). Player Bs and C report mean beliefs that are 
slightly higher (𝑎! = 8.35 (0.280), 𝑎!  = 8.53 (0.258)) but these differences are not statistically significant—all 
comparisons using t-tests or rank-sum tests yield p > 0.23. 
105 Di Tella, et al., present the results of two different corruption games. We describe the game used in their 
preferred study, the modified corruption game. The formal games only differ in their payoffs. 
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correct guess. These beliefs—the key measure in Di Tella, et al.’s, experiment—provide 
estimates of the (possibly biased) beliefs that the Allocator has about Sellers’ behavior.  
Di Tella, et al., identify strategic cynicism with a treatment distinction that varies 
constraints on Allocators’ ability to redistribute tokens. In the “Able = 2” treatment, the 
Allocator can move up to two tokens; that is, she can implement one of the following five 
payoff distributions: (8, 12), (9, 11), (10, 10), (11, 9), (12, 8). In the “Able = 8” treatment, the 
Allocator can move up to eight tokens, meaning that the allocations, (2, 18), (3, 17), …, (17, 
3), (18, 2), are all possible. Hence, the treatment manipulation endows some Allocators with 
the ability to appropriate up to eight of the Sellers’ tokens and other Allocators with the 
ability to appropriate only up to two tokens. Importantly, however, a Seller is not informed of 
whether his paired Allocator can move two or eight tokens, meaning that Allocators, who are 
aware of Sellers’ ignorance regarding the treatment, should form beliefs about Sellers’ 
behavior that are independent of the treatment.106 Instead, Di Tella, et al., argue that the 
treatment manipulation affects the value of engaging in self-deception, as “allocators who 
can take more tokens from the seller (i.e., Able = 8 instead of Able = 2) have more incentives 
to convince themselves that the seller is unkind” (p. 3417), that is, 𝑝!"#$!! < 𝑝!"#$!!.  
Di Tella, et al.’s, experimental results are consistent with this prediction. Individuals 
who have a greater ability to take from their counterpart take more and, more importantly, 
reveal more pessimistic beliefs about their counterpart’s corruption. This appears to contrast 
with the findings of our first experiment, which reveal no strategic cynicism. 
4.3.2 Relative or absolute cynicism? 
 To reconcile the apparent discrepancy, first note that our first study sought to identify 
strategic cynicism through the observation that individuals bias their beliefs about a 
counterpart’s actions relative to the objective reality or to the beliefs of unbiased observers. 
Specifically, suppose there is some measure of an opponent’s (expected) kindness, 𝑑—where 
unkindness, or 1− 𝑑, corresponds to 𝑏 in the pre-emptive taking game or 𝑝 in the corruption 
game. If 𝑑 represents a decision maker’s beliefs about the opponent’s kindness, then our 
strategic cynicism hypothesis is that a decision maker who can take from the opponent will 
perceive the opponent to be less kind than he actually is, or 𝑑 < 𝑑. In the case of Di Tella et 
al.’s experiment, for instance, this corresponds to the belief that 𝑝 is higher than it actually is 
																																																								
106 This design leaves open the possibility that Allocators’ differential beliefs are the result of the “curse of 
knowledge” or information projection (Camerer, Loewenstein & Weber, 1989; Madarasz, 2012), whereby 
decision makers find it difficult to ignore their private information when guessing others’ beliefs. 
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(see footnote 93). Instead, our first study finds that 𝑑 ≈ 𝑑, both when we measure 𝑑 using 
empirical behavior as the benchmark or the beliefs of unbiased observers. 
Di Tella, et al.’s, experiment and findings, however, demonstrate something different. 
Specifically, they test whether a decision maker with a greater incentive to take from the 
opponent will perceive the opponent to be less kind than will a decision maker with a 
reduced incentive to take. That is, if we let 𝑑′ represent the beliefs of a decision maker with a 
restricted taking opportunity—as with Allocators in the Able = 2 condition—then Di Tella, et 
al.’s, findings demonstrate that those who are constrained to take less adopt relatively more 
positive beliefs of their opponent’s kindness, 𝑑! > 𝑑. Indeed, this relative comparison is also 
the basis of the main theoretical proposition with which they motivate their study.  
The discrepancy in our findings is straightforward to reconcile if one recognizes that 
a relative bias and an absolute bias may not coincide. That is, if subjects in Di Tella, et al.’s, 
study do not exhibit an absolute bias in the direction predicted by strategic cynicism—that is, 
if 𝑑! > 𝑑 ≥ 𝑑—then the two sets of results are entirely consistent.  
Di Tella, et al., do not explicitly collect a measure of the unbiased beliefs of neutral 
observers.107 However, we can compare Allocators’ guesses to the empirical frequency of 
Sellers’ corruption. In Di Tella, et al.’s, first experiment, the actual proportion of Sellers who 
chose the corrupt option was 75 percent. Using the more precise measure of Allocators’ 
estimates, and the only one that was incentivized, we see that those Allocators with a greater 
ability to take money (Able = 8) provided estimates (69 percent) that were fairly close to the 
empirical benchmark and, if anything, underestimated Sellers’ corruption. On the other hand, 
the Allocators who had a reduced ability to take (Able = 2) provided estimates (49 percent) 
that were much farther from the true percentage. Similarly, in the second experiment, the 
frequency of corrupt behavior by Sellers was 66 percent. The estimates provided by those 
who could take more (Able = 8) tended to exhibit very little bias (64 percent), while the 
estimates from those who could take less (Able = 2) were again biased in the direction of 
believing too little corruption on the part of Sellers (48 percent).  
																																																								
107 Di Tella, et al., argue that an additional treatment in which Allocators are forced to take a pre-specified 
amount from the Seller, and in which the mean estimate is 56 percent, provides “a rough estimate of what the 
average [estimate] would have been in the Modified Game if Allocators had not incurred in self-deception.” 
However, these are not the estimates of unbiased observers, but of individuals interacting with the counterpart. 
In the simple model we develop below, such individuals have an incentive to view the opponent kindly. In 
addition, eliminating the Allocator’s choice altogether substantively changes the game—e.g., Sellers now 
confront a unilateral decision problem rather than a strategic game. Therefore, the beliefs of the Allocators in 
this game can only very cautiously be interpreted as corresponding to Allocators’ (unbiased) beliefs in the 
corruption game. Finally, there are very few observations in this treatment (15 if one uses the same rules for 
excluding subjects as in other treatments—see footnote 25 in Di Tella, et al., 2015). 
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Our observations—based on our data and that of Di Tella, et al.—suggest that, to the 
extent a bias exists, it is one of positivity and the belief that opponents will be kinder than 
they actually are. While Di Tella’s, et al.’s, evidence points to greater relative strategic 
cynicism on the part of those with more opportunity to take—i.e., 𝑑! > 𝑑—there is very little 
evidence of strategic cynicism on an absolute level—instead, it appears that 𝑑! > 𝑑 ≥ 𝑑. We 
next demonstrate how a very simple model can provide an interpretation for these patterns. 
4.3.3 A simple model of strategic cynicism 
In this section, we introduce a simple model that can account for the above patterns. 
We do not attempt to derive a general model of belief formation or self-deception. Instead, 
we study a simple and highly stylized representation of a decision in a non-strategic context, 
where an individual decides on a wealth allocation between herself and a counterpart and 
cares about this counterpart’s perceived kindness or unkindness. It shares many features with 
the model used by Di Tella, et al., to motivate their experiment—indeed, the main 
predictions of our analysis can also be generated using their model.108 We acknowledge that 
alternative modeling approaches may yield different predictions; however, we present this 
model merely as an example of the kind of model that can provide an interpretation for the 
above patterns we observe in our first experiment and in the study by Di Tella, et al., and that 
we can further test in a novel experiment. 
Ann decides how to split an amount of money, normalized to 1, with Bob. Ann can 
take at most 𝐾 ∈ 0,1  for herself. Bob has one of two possible types, which represent the 
extent to which he is a “good” or “bad” person and is therefore perceived by Ann to deserve 
greater or less wealth: with probability, 𝑝 ∈ (0,1), Bob is a low-deservingness type (𝐿) and 
with probability, 1− 𝑝, Bob is a high-deservingness type (𝐻). Ann is altruistic, but she cares 
less for the welfare of the low type. Specifically, she puts weight 𝑑! > 0 on the low type’s 
payoff and weight 𝑑! > 𝑑!  on the payoff of the high type. To incorporate motivated 
reasoning and self-deception, Ann can bias her belief, 𝑝, about the share of low types. 
However, this incurs a psychological cost, 𝐶 𝑝 − 𝑝 .109 In addition, as in our experiments 
and those of Di Tella, et al., Ann is incentivized to hold unbiased beliefs by a monetary 
																																																								
108 Our model differs in important points (e.g., we formally incorporate the restriction 𝐾). Di Tella, et al., 
discuss a result related to Proposition 2, but no result related to Proposition 1. 
109 We capture motivated reasoning similarly to Rabin (1994) and Konow (2000). For other examples of models 
with motivated beliefs, see Bénabou and Tirole (2006, 2011), Bénabou (2013), Brunnermeier and Parker 
(2008), and Bodner and Prelec (2002, 2003). 
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payoff function 𝑃 𝑝 − 𝑝 . Since Ann does not know Bob’s actual type, the weight she 
assigns to Bob’s payoff equals its expected value, 𝐸! 𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑! + (1− 𝑝)𝑑!. 
Ann’s behavior is then captured by the following maximization problem: 
max!∈ !,! ,!∈ !,!  U 𝑥,𝑝 = 𝑣(𝑥)+ 𝐸! 𝑑 𝑣 1− 𝑥 + 𝑃 𝑝 − 𝑝 − 𝐶 𝑝 − 𝑝 ,  (1) 
where 𝑥 represents the share that Ann takes for herself. The function 𝑣: 0,1 → ℝ!! is a C
1 
function with 𝑣′ > 0 , 𝑃: 0,1 → ℝ!!   is a C
2 function with 𝑃′ < 0  and 𝑃′′ ≤ 0 , and 
𝐶: 0,1 → ℝ!! is a C
2 function with 𝐶′ > 0 and 𝐶′′ > 0.110 
This model generates two predictions that are consistent with the above empirical 
observations (all proofs are in Appendix J). First, Proposition 1 shows that Ann is, if 
anything, too positive regarding Bob’s deservingness.  
Proposition 1: For any (𝑥,𝑝) in 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!∈ !,! ,!∈ !,!  U 𝑥,𝑝 , 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝.  
This result is due to the fact that her utility increases in Bob’s deservingness; that is, Ann 
prefers to think of Bob as being the more deserving type. Thus, in absolute terms, Ann’s bias 
will always be to think of Bob as kinder than he actually is. 
Proposition 2 states that, in relative terms, Ann will be more cynical—or less 
positive—when she has the opportunity to take more from Bob.  
Proposition 2: Take 𝐾,𝐾′ in (0,1] with 𝐾! < 𝐾 and suppose that there is a 
unique solution to (1) for both 𝐾 and 𝐾′, then 𝑝′ ≤ 𝑝. 
Thus, Proposition 2 provides a basis for the differences in relative beliefs between subjects 
who could take varying amounts from their opponent in Di Tella, et al.’s, experiment. In 
summary, this model predicts a (motivated) bias in belief formation that provides a basis for 
the absence of absolute levels of cynicism: as Ann shares a positive amount with Bob, she 
likes to think of him as a deserving type and this motivation is stronger as she is constrained 
to take less money from him.  
Next, we illustrate the choice problem for a neutral observer with no stake in the 
outcome of game. This individual reports his beliefs, 𝑝!, about the deservingness of a 
random person in the role of Bob and faces incentives for accuracy: he receives a payoff 
																																																								
110 Note that there exists a solution to (1) as U 𝑥, 𝑝  is continuous and the feasible set is compact.	
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𝑃 𝑝 − 𝑝! . The observer can also adopt biased beliefs about 𝑝 , but faces the cost, 
𝐶 𝑝 − 𝑝! , for doing so. The observer thus solves the following maximization problem: 
 
max!!∈ !,!  𝑈 𝑝
!
= 𝑃 𝑝 − 𝑝! − 𝐶 𝑝 − 𝑝!        (2) 
 
where again 𝐶′ > 0 and 𝑃′ < 0. The observer maximizes his utility by having accurate 
beliefs: 
 
Proposition 3: 𝑝! = 𝑝 is the unique solution to max!!∈ !,!  𝑈 𝑝
! . 
 
Therefore, neutral observers report beliefs that correspond to the unbiased beliefs 𝑝.111  
Note that this simple model can account for the pattern observed in the above 
laboratory results. Our results in Study 1 are consistent with Propositions 2 and 3: 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝 =
𝑝!. In the case of Di Tella, et al.’s, experiment, if we allow Able = 2 to correspond to 𝐾! and 
Able = 8 to correspond to 𝐾, the patterns in the data are consistent with both Propositions 1 
and 2: 𝑝! ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝. We next test these predictions jointly—specifically, that 𝑝! ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝! =
𝑝—in a novel experiment.    
4.4 Study 2: Jointly testing absolute and relative strategic cynicism 
As we state above, the data from our first experiment and that of Di Tella, et al., 
provide, separately, support for all three of the above propositions. However, since we 
developed the model as a way to account for these observations, this is not particularly 
surprising. We next report a novel study that jointly tests all three predictions. The new 
experiment replicates Di Tella, et al.’s, experiment and further elicits the beliefs of neutral 
observers. 
4.4.1 Experimental design 
We began with a replication of Di Tella, et al.’s, corruption game, conducted in 
Switzerland. We used their instructions and replaced the monetary payoff of 1 Argentine 
peso with 1.20 Swiss Francs (CHF).112 This meant, for instance, that the payment for each 
																																																								
111 See Konow (2000) for a very similar result, in the case of “Benevolent Dictators.” 
112 Note that we substantially increased real incentives; in 2016, CHF 1 corresponded to 7.48 Argentine pesos 
(PPP adjusted; OECD, 2018). 
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correct guess by an Allocator was CHF 6. In addition, we paid a participation fee of CHF 
15.113 We made two further substantive changes to bring their classroom experiment into a 
laboratory setting. First, while their experiment was fully paper based, we implemented it via 
computers, using the z-Tree program (Fischbacher, 2007). Second, we used a slightly 
different procedure to guarantee participants’ anonymity.114 We conducted nine sessions, 
each with between 22 and 24 participants, resulting in a total of 212 participants (106 
Allocators and 106 Sellers).  
We also conducted an additional variant of the experiment—which we refer to as the 
“neutral” treatment—to elicit the unbiased beliefs of neutral observers. In these sessions, 
participants received “instructions provided to a participant in a previous experiment.” 
Specifically, each participant saw either the instructions given to an Able = 2 or an Able = 8 
Allocator, determined at random. Since the Allocators’ instructions include the instructions 
given to Sellers, participants also read the Sellers’ instructions and had knowledge of the 
entire game. We made explicit to participants that, first, these were not their instructions and 
that, second, at the end of the experiment they could earn money by providing accurate 
guesses about something that happened in the previous experiment. Therefore, participants 
had no incentives to engage in self-deception, but still had incentives to closely attend to the 
instructions and understand the corruption game. 
After reading the instructions, participants in the neutral treatment first had to answer 
the same comprehension questions as in the design of Di Tella, et al., and in our replication, 
to make sure that they understood the game. Subsequently, they made two guesses identical 
to those made by Allocators in Di Tella, et al.’s, design and in our replication: they guessed 
the choice made by a randomly chosen Seller in the previous experiment and they guessed 
what percentage of Sellers in a previous session chose the corrupt option. As in the 
replication, they received CHF 6 for correct guesses, as well as a CHF 15 participation fee. 
We conducted two such neutral sessions, with a total of 55 participants. 
All sessions took place at the Decision Sciences Laboratory at the Federal Institute of 
Technology (ETH) in Zurich, in 2016. Participants were recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge 
																																																								
113 Our first session paid only a participation fee of CHF 10. We adjusted this payment upward to reflect the 
longer duration of the study than we originally expected. 
114 At the beginning of each session, one participant was randomly selected to be the “monitor.” The remaining 
participants each received a random ID number hidden in an envelope, so that the experimenter could not match 
the ID to the participant. Subjects entered their ID numbers in their respective computer terminals. At the end of 
the study, we placed the amount of money earned by each participant in an envelope labeled only with the 
anonymous ID number and placed all envelopes on a table that participants passed on their way out of the 
laboratory. The monitor, who did not know the amount contained in any of the envelopes, controlled that each 
participant took only the correct envelope.	
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and Nicklisch, 2014) from the joint subject pool of the University of Zurich and the ETH. All 
instructions for the replication and the neutral treatment are in the Appendix. 
4.4.2 Results 
Table 14 compares the behavior and guesses of Allocators in Di Tella, et al.’s, 
experiment and in our replication.115 The mean tokens taken (Tokens Taken) by the Allocator 
is slightly lower in our replication. More importantly, the share of Allocators who think that 
their paired Seller chooses the “corrupt” side payment (Is Corrupt) differs significantly 
between the Able = 2 and Able = 8 treatment groups in both the original experiment and our 
replication. The same holds for the average stated belief of Allocators regarding the share of 
Sellers who choose the side payment (%-Corrupt). Thus, despite the differences between the 
two studies—e.g., lab vs. field, Switzerland vs. Argentina—we replicate Di Tella, et al.’s, 
findings of relative strategic cynicism (𝑝! ≤ 𝑝).	116  
 
Table 14. Allocator behavior in Di Tella, et al., and our replication 
 
 Modified Game (Di Tella, et al.) Replication 



































N 31 34  53 53  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. P-value: t-test of the null hypothesis that the means under Able = 2 
and Able = 8 are equal. 
 
We next compare the beliefs provided by Allocators with those of neutral observers, 
to see whether 𝑝! ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝! holds in our new study. Table 15 compares the estimates of 
unbiased beliefs we obtained in our neutral treatment with the estimates provided by both 
																																																								
115 Following Di Tella, et al., we conduct randomization tests with respect to demographic measures (gender, 
age and socioeconomic class). We find no significant differences between the Able = 2, Able = 8 and Neutral 
treatments.  
116 The statistical tests in Table 2 are t-tests. Non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests yield very similar results; 
p-values for Tokens Taken, Is Corrupt and %-Corrupt are smaller than 0.01.	
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Able = 2 and Able = 8 Allocators in our replication. The final two columns report statistical 
tests of the differences between neutral observers’ beliefs and those of the two types of 
Allocators. The neutral and unbiased estimate is 44 percent for Is Corrupt and 46 percent for 
%-Corrupt.117  Both of these are close to—and statistically indistinguishable from—the 
beliefs provided by Allocators with the high opportunity to take (Able = 8), again suggesting 
that these allocators exhibit no bias (i.e., 𝑝 = 𝑝!). Moreover, the estimates of 44 and 46 
percent are very close to the actual frequency of corrupt choices by Sellers (42 percent). 
Thus, similarly to our first experiment, neutral observers provide fairly accurate estimates of 
behavior. In contrast, the mean beliefs provided by Allocators in the Able = 2 treatment are 
considerably more positive than the beliefs provided by neutral observers and these 
differences are statistically significant.118   
 
Table 15. Allocator and neutral observer beliefs 
 
 Replication Neutral Treatment 
 Able = 2 Able = 8 Neutral 
p-value 
vs.  
Able = 2 
p-value 
vs.  

















N 53 53 55   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. P-value: t-test of the null hypothesis that the means under neutral 
and the corresponding replication (Able = 2 or Able = 8) mean are equal. 
 
The results of this study provide support for our interpretation of a key distinction 
between relative versus absolute strategic cynicism in our study and in the one of Di Tella, et 
al., and for the theoretical model we used to account for these observations. Comparing the 
behavior of Allocators with a high and low taking opportunity, we observe that the former 
hold relatively more cynical beliefs—i.e., that 𝑝! ≤ 𝑝, as in Proposition 2. We also observe 
																																																								
117 There is no significant difference between the beliefs of neutral subjects who received the instructions of an 
Able=2 Allocator and those who received instructions of an Able=8 Allocator. 
118 Non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests yield very similar results; p-values for Is Corrupt are 0.006 for the 
comparison between the neutral and the Able=2 Treatment and 0.574 for the comparison between the neutral 
and the Able=8 Treatment; p-values for %-Corrupt are 0.019 for the comparison between the neutral and the 
Able=2 Treatment and 0.835 for the comparison between the neutral and the Able=8 Treatment.	
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that, in absolute terms, the estimates provided by Allocators do not exhibit a tendency toward 
cynicism, relative to the unbiased estimates of neutral observers—i.e., 𝑝! ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝!, as in 
Propositions 1 and 3. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This paper studies whether the tendency to manipulate one’s beliefs self-servingly 
extends to strategic cynicism, whereby an individual views her opponents’ likely actions 
negatively when doing so can justify acting in a self-interested manner. We begin with a 
laboratory experiment that compares the beliefs of strategic players motivated to engage in 
strategic cynicism with the beliefs of neutral observers not incentivized to engage in any 
belief manipulation. We find no evidence that strategic actors manipulate their beliefs 
regarding opponents’ behavior, thus seemingly contradicting the hypothesis of strategic 
cynicism, at least in absolute terms.  
We then attempt to reconcile this observation with the results from Di Tella, et al. 
(2015), who find evidence of strategic belief manipulation, whereby subjects with greater 
opportunity to take money from another person are more cynical about the counterpart’s 
likely behavior. This provides evidence of relative strategic cynicism, meaning that 
individuals become comparatively more cynical about their opponents when doing so 
justifies more self-interested behavior. However, Di Tella, et al.’s, data reveal very little 
evidence of strategic cynicism in absolute terms. Thus, one possible interpretation of the 
apparent discrepancy is that individuals exhibit relatively more pessimistic beliefs regarding 
the behavior of their counterparts when they stand to gain more from doing so, but that, in 
absolute terms, their beliefs will tend toward positivity rather than cynicism.  
We show that this interpretation is consistent with a simple model—similar to the one 
that Di Tella, et al., use to motivate their study—in which individuals enjoy giving more if 
they believe that the beneficiaries are nicer. If we allow individuals to manipulate their 
beliefs with some cost for doing so, then the model can explain both of the above patterns. 
People benefit from thinking that they are acting toward kind others, but will believe these 
others to be less kind when greater cynicism lowers the costs of acting self-interestedly. 
Admittedly, this model is not general, but it provides a useful framework for reconciling the 
results of the two studies. 
	 117	
To investigate this interpretation, we conducted a novel experimental test. 
Specifically, we first replicated Di Tella, et al.’s, experiment and then extended it to obtain 
new measures of unbiased beliefs from neutral observers. Our replication confirms Di Tella, 
et al.’s, observation of relative strategic cynicism. Nevertheless, we also find that any 
absolute bias in beliefs seems to lie in the direction of too much positivity, rather than 
cynicism, about counterparts’ behavior, especially by those with a limited opportunity to act 
self-interestedly.  
We thus find no evidence—across many comparisons—that decision makers justify 
treating another person unfairly by self-servingly adopting the belief that the counterpart 
herself intends to act more egoistically than is actually the case. Instead, in terms of an 
absolute level of bias, we find evidence for another form of motivated belief; namely, in the 
kinds of interactions we study here, individuals seem motivated to convince themselves of 
the deservingness of the counterpart, and end up with beliefs that are often too positive. The 
finding that people are too positive about other players’ kindness supports a general tendency 
for distorted beliefs to lie in the direction of positivity and optimism rather than the opposite. 
In fact, a broad view of the literature suggests that there is little evidence that people 
systematically bias their beliefs in a negative direction. While it is certainly unreasonable to 
rule out the possibility that there are contexts in which people may also engage in such 
cynical self-deception—and that, in absolute terms, this may even occur in strategic 
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Appendix A – Additional results Chapter 2 
Figure A1: Labor supply for neutral and immoral work in the laboratory, last 5 periods  
	
Figure A2: Labor supply for immoral work in the laboratory for different types (Ө𝐄𝐱𝐩) 
 
Notes: Labor supplies conditional on types are calculated with a simulation: 6 labor market decisions (first and 
second wage request) of high-theta (or, low-theta) types are randomly drawn (without replacement) from our 
sample. We then calculate the labor supply for this group of people. We repeat this 1000 times (with 
replacement) and take the average of these 1000 individual labor supplies. This approach differs from the one 
we use in Figure 4 and Figure A1, where we take the average of the actual labor supplies in the different 
market groups and periods. Figure 4 does not change substantially if we simulate market composition instead 






















































Figure A3: Market quantities in laboratory labor markets 
 





























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period




























Figure A5: Income inequalities across treatments 
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Figure A7: Labor supply for immoral work in the laboratory for different types (Ө𝐒𝐮𝐫) 
 
Notes: High-theta survey is 1 if 𝜃!"# is lower than the median of  𝜃!"#. Labor supplies are calculated with 
simulations: 6 labor market decisions (first and second wage request) of high-theta survey (or, low-theta 
survey) types are randomly drawn (without replacement) from our sample. We then calculate the labor supply 
for this group of people. We repeat this 1000 times (with replacement) and take the average of these 1000 









































































































































































































All industries 32,638 41.00 3.59 42.25 0.57 0.58 0.35 0.51 0.64 9.56 0.87 0.17 106.46 0.94 -0.18 
(20.11) (0.54) (11.16) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (9.21) (0.24) (0.37) (87.54) (1.27) (0.22) 
Processing of tea and 
coffee 
138 
38.88 3.60 41.29 0.66 0.67 0.24 0.59 0.55 8.78 0.93 0.10 3.10 0.22 -0.11 
(14.00) (0.35) (10.34) (0.47) (0.47) (0.43) (0.49) (0.50) (8.94) (0.20) (0.30) (0.43) (0.02) (-0.41) 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products 
162 
51.01 3.85 39.42 0.59 0.59 0.45 0.41 0.52 9.63 0.92 0.03 2.24 11.79 0.47 
(20.20) (0.44) (8.26) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (8.84) (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.97) (-0.42) 
Manufacture of paper and 
paperboard 
96 
42.33 3.69 46.00 0.78 0.77 0.35 0.50 0.57 16.80 0.96 0.09 1.58 2.11 -0.06 
(16.25) (0.33) (10.77) (0.42) (0.42) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (13.32) (0.10) (0.29) (0.22) (1.11) (-0.37) 
Manufacture of weapons 
and ammunitions 
104 
53.26 3.91 48.53 0.95 0.58 0.57 0.37 0.83 16.36 0.96 0.10 1.44 0.46 0.71 
(20.66) (0.37) (10.85) (0.22) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.38) (13.49) (0.06) (0.31) (0.10) (0.05) (-0.40) 
Manufacture of electronic 
components 
1,133 
44.79 3.72 43.27 0.68 0.61 0.51 0.37 0.53 10.47 0.93 0.06 22.08 0.66 -0.01 
(18.21) (0.41) (10.59) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (9.64) (0.14) (0.24) (0.76) (0.16) (-0.42) 
Construction of buildings 3,600 
37.87 3.57 43.21 0.91 0.70 0.21 0.48 0.48 11.16 0.95 0.14 82.97 0.43 -0.28 
(13.18) (0.40) (10.73) (0.28) (0.46) (0.41) (0.50) (0.50) (9.89) (0.15) (0.34) (0.79) (0.01) (-0.39) 
Maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles 
2,664 
34.64 3.48 41.38 0.82 0.61 0.19 0.71 0.66 11.47 0.92 0.26 58.65 0.54 -0.28 
(12.89) (0.38) (12.08) (0.38) (0.49) (0.40) (0.45) (0.47) (10.47) (0.21) (0.44) (0.33) (0.01) (-0.40) 
Wholesale of tobacco 
products 
87 
58.75 3.96 45.10 0.55 0.70 0.51 0.49 0.65 11.05 0.93 0.13 1.72 1.49 0.44 
(27.28) (0.48) (9.98) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (7.86) (0.15) (0.33) (0.07) (0.19) (-0.38) 
Wholesale of clothing and 
footwear 
306 
38.92 3.54 40.21 0.31 0.45 0.38 0.53 0.52 7.16 0.84 0.16 6.08 1.80 0.10 
(18.97) (0.51) (10.73) (0.46) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (6.70) (0.24) (0.37) (0.18) (0.22) (-0.46) 
Wholesale of perfume and 
cosmetics 
353 
53.47 3.84 39.78 0.34 0.60 0.58 0.36 0.40 7.80 0.89 0.15 6.19 1.89 0.12 
(28.01) (0.54) (10.03) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (6.48) (0.19) (0.35) (0.26) (0.22) (-0.37) 












































































































































































Wholesale of watches and 
jewelry 
158 
44.16 3.71 43.89 0.42 0.58 0.46 0.48 0.55 8.09 0.88 0.20 2.65 2.13 0.04 
(19.05) (0.40) (10.68) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (8.04) (0.19) (0.40) (0.17) (0.30) (-0.41) 
Hotels and similar 
accommodation 
2,658 
27.06 3.22 40.69 0.40 0.55 0.19 0.55 0.40 7.16 0.85 0.16 59.16 0.16 -0.34 
(10.58) (0.48) (11.24) (0.49) (0.50) (0.39) (0.50) (0.49) (7.59) (0.26) (0.36) (0.75) (0.00) (-0.37) 
Restaurants and mobile food 
activities 
5,560 
25.12 3.14 40.55 0.43 0.56 0.14 0.57 0.46 6.58 0.79 0.21 94.45 0.15 -0.33 
(9.96) (0.47) (11.92) (0.49) (0.50) (0.34) (0.50) (0.50) (7.35) (0.29) (0.41) (1.03) (0.00) (-0.37) 
Monetary intermediations 7,286 
56.00 3.94 42.00 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.42 0.73 10.65 0.91 0.19 109.31 2.26 0.11 
(21.87) (0.44) (10.37) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.44) (9.42) (0.18) (0.40) (2.05) (0.88) (-0.40) 
Credit granting 79 
53.62 3.90 40.00 0.46 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.67 5.45 0.89 0.11 1.23 1.50 0.15 
(22.28) (0.39) (8.59) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (5.73) (0.17) (0.31) (0.03) (0.83) (-0.41) 
Non-life insurance 2,637 
49.20 3.82 42.09 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.80 9.91 0.89 0.09 40.52 1.76 -0.13 
(18.82) (0.39) (11.02) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.40) (9.07) (0.20) (0.29) (0.97) (0.76) (-0.44) 
General public administration 
activities 
4,563 
44.42 3.70 45.36 0.48 0.60 0.42 0.52 0.91 10.71 0.80 0.14 311.69 0.02 -0.41 
(17.24) (0.52) (10.74) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.29) (9.53) (0.28) (0.35) (6.54) (0.00) (-0.36) 
Gambling and betting 
activities 
153 
38.96 3.59 41.83 0.61 0.50 0.31 0.52 0.45 7.51 0.89 0.12 2.69 0.77 0.42 
(16.01) (0.40) (10.35) (0.49) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (5.41) (0.20) (0.33) (0.06) (0.05) (-0.41) 
Organization and operation of 
sport facilities for indoor and 
outdoor sports events 
502 
34.03 3.40 44.03 0.50 0.53 0.27 0.57 0.70 7.63 0.72 0.11 3.69 0.24 -0.49 
(15.83) (0.66) (12.42) (0.50) (0.50) (0.44) (0.50) (0.46) (8.20) (0.34) (0.32) (0.13) (0.01) (-0.40) 
Fitness facilities 399 
30.76 3.29 40.82 0.28 0.58 0.28 0.62 0.67 6.06 0.54 0.19 4.61 0.15 -0.35 
(16.32) (0.56) (11.22) (0.45) (0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.47) (6.72) (0.34) (0.39) (0.38) (0.00) (-0.38) 
Source: Weighed data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage and demographics), STATENT, years 2011-2016 (industry size, industry sales), Value Added Tax Statistics, years 2010-2016 (industry sales) 
and our own survey (perceived industry immorality). Notes: N=number of observations per industry in the SLFS dataset, Male in {0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, Education high: higher vocational education 
and training or university/college, Education middle: apprenticeship, full-time vocational school, matura or pedagogical training, Education low (reference category): compulsory schooling or pre-
vocational education, Swiss in {0, 1}, Experience = number of years in the firm, Full-time equivalent = (working hours /42), set to 1 for working hours >= 42, managerial duties in {0, 1}, Industry size = 
number employees in this industry / 1000 (2010 data is not available, we substitute it with 2011 data), Industry sales = Industry sales/number employees in this industry, Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] 











Marlboro 0.54 Swisscom -0.07 
Monsanto 0.52 Firmenich -0.09 
Glencore 0.46 Winterthur Assurance -0.1 
Philip Morris 0.46 Swiss Life -0.13 
Nestlé 0.39 Swatch -0.17 
Tamoil 0.37 Adecco -0.18 
Syngenta 0.23 ABB -0.2 
UBS 0.19 Migros -0.38 
Novartis 0.18 WWF -0.66 
Credit Suisse 0.17 Pro Juventute -0.66 
Roche 0.13 Pro Natura -0.67 
Holcim 0.03 UNICEF -0.72 
Ernst and Young -0.05 Red cross -0.81 
Source: own survey. 






Table A3: Distribution of behavior regarding the behavioral measure of concern for 
morality 
Number of lies 
Reported number
for state r: 
Expected 
payoff lying 
Frequency Share Classification 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 (Honest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 161 0.671 High-theta 
1 
6 2 3 4 5 6 0.83 6 
0.038 Low-theta 
2 2 3 4 5 6 0.17 3 
2 
6 6 3 4 5 6 1.5 12 
0.104 Low-theta 
1 2 3 6 6 6 0.5 2 
1 3 3 5 5 6 0.33 1 
1 4 4 4 5 6 0.5 1 
5 6 3 4 5 6 1.33 2 
6 5 3 4 5 6 1.33 1 
3 2 3 5 5 6 0.5 1 
3 3 3 4 5 6 0.5 5 
3 
6 6 6 4 5 6 2 11 
0.050 Low-theta 
4 2 3 6 6 6 1 1 
4 
6 6 6 6 5 6 2.33 3 
0.017 Low-theta 
6 5 5 5 5 6 1.83 1 
5 
6 6 6 6 6 6 2.5 15 
0.067 Low-theta 
2 3 4 5 6 6 0.83 1 
Lied in a self-
harmful manner 
1 2 3 4 3 3 -0.83 1 
0.054 High-theta 
1 2 3 4 4 4 -0.5 1 
1 2 3 4 5 5 -0.17 1 
1 3 2 5 4 6 0 1 
1 4 2 4 5 6 0.17 1 
1 4 6 3 5 6 0.67 1 
2 1 3 4 5 6 0 1 
3 4 5 4 6 2 0.5 1 
5 1 3 6 4 2 0 1 
5 2 3 4 1 6 0 1 
5 4 6 4 6 5 1.5 1 
6 2 5 5 1 3 0.17 1 
6 6 6 6 6 5 2.33 1 





!!! , where 𝑚!" is the number that individual 𝑖 reports if the 



















0.925*** -0.362 -0.060 
(4.64) (-0.99) (-0.39) 
Period 
-0.019** -0.047 -0.050*** 





0.012 -0.015 0.005 
(1.14) (-0.40) (0.54) 
Constant 
0.449*** 4.425*** 3.312*** 
(3.86) (14.76) (25.63) 
Sigma 
 2.630*** 0.571*** 
 (7.69) (10.58) 
Market Immoral Immoral Neutral 
N 2520 1755 1077 
LL (pseudo) -1424.0 -4187.4 -924.3 





0.422 0.001 0.0000 
	
Notes: Estimates from Craggs double-hurdle model: (1) is a probit models; (2) and (3) are truncated linear 
regressions (truncated from above at 50 CHF). Models (1) and (2) use only data from the immoral markets; 
model (3) uses only data from the neutral markets. For neutral markets, we do not report the regression of 
market participation as we have only 3 incidences where a subject did not participate. Independent variables: 
Low-theta in {0, 1}, Period between 1 and 15. Standard errors clustered at market level; z-statistics in 







Table A5: Relationship between the behavioral measures of concern for morality and 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of lies         
     1 lie 
0.201 0.128   0.004 -0.008   
(1.05) (0.53)   (0.11) (-0.12)      
     2 lies 
0.220** 0.182   -0.011 -0.049   
(2.17) (1.39)   (-0.21) (-0.84)      
     3 lies 
0.398*** 0.351***   -0.296*** -0.326***   
(5.29) (3.57)   (-12.89) (-15.52)      
     4 lies 
0.392*** 0.279**   0.171*** 0.167***   
(4.94) (2.61)   (7.43) (7.18)   
     5 lies 
0.286*** 0.233**   0.037 0.018   
(3.26) (2.48)   (0.49) (0.17)   
     self-harmful 
     lies 
0.252** 0.182   -0.0516 -0.001   














0.475*** 0.517*** 0.510*** 0.512*** 0.829*** 0.806*** 0.824*** 0.801*** 
(11.6) (32.97) (13.79) (37.01) (36.11) (35.35) (35.65) (36.06) 
Market Immoral Immoral Immoral Immoral Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral 
N 168 168 168 168 72 72 72 72 
R
2
 0.121 0.263 0.0752 0.238 0.085 0.250 0.001 0.162 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Models (1)-(4) use only data from the immoral 






(∈ −2.5,2.5 ), where 𝑚!" is the number that individual 𝑖 reports if the actual die roll is 𝑟.  Standard errors 





Table A6: Relationship between 𝜽𝐄𝐱𝐩 and market income, depending on the behavior of 
other market participants.	



























 * Many 𝜽H types=0 
0.0002 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Low-theta in {0, 1}, Many 𝜃H types: 0=number of 
(other) low-theta type workers is lower than 2, 1=number of (other) low-theta type workers is 2 or more. 
Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01.  
	














1 = the person finds that the behavior of a banker who recommends 
sub-optimal assets to his clients because he has larger margins on 
them is: very outrageous, very blameworthy, very immoral, not at all 




















































1 = the person’s attitude towards charities is very positive.	
Notes: Each subscale is constructed by taking averages over all items of the scale, and then normalized such 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type survey 
(𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓) 
-0.008 0.036 0.104 0.150 0.0103 0.015 
(-0.06) (0.22) (0.45) (0.75) (0.06) (0.06) 
Immoral 
market (Im) 
-0.046  0.013  0.133  
(-0.37)  (0.07)   (0.59)  
𝜽
𝑺𝒖𝒓 * Im 
-0.431 -0.366 -0.558 -0.537 -0.648* -0.505 
















N 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R
2





𝑺𝒖𝒓*Im = 0 
0.0569 0.237 0.0924 0.311 0.0708 0.252 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Models differ in how we construct 𝜃!"#  from the nine 
psychological survey measures. Columns (1) and (2) report our main results, using factor analysis to aggregate 
the psychological measures. Columns (3) and (4) give the result if equal weight is given to each measure 
instead. Columns (5) and (6) give the results if weights are determined by a regression of the survey measures 
on 𝜃!"#. Other independent variables: Immoral market is in {0, 1}, 𝜃!"# is in [0,1], where 0 means immoral 
and 1 means moral. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 




Table A9: Relationship between participation decision/reservation wage and 𝜽𝐒𝐮𝐫 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type survey 
(𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓) 
-1.614** 0.432 -1.971** 0.571 -2.177** 0.373 
(-2.44) (0.60) (-2.08) (0.61) (-2.13) (0.33) 
Constant 
1.326*** 3.674*** 1.806*** 3.515*** 1.841*** 3.657*** 
(3.98) (10.39) (2.99) (6.12) (3.01) (5.25) 
Sigma 
 2.679***  2.679***  2.680*** 















N 2475 1711 2475 1711 2475 1711 
LL (pseudo) -1478.3 -4114.1 -1488.2 -4114.2 -1490.9 -4114.6 
Notes: Estimates from Craggs double-hurdle model: Regressions (1), (3) and (5) are probit models, 
regressions (2), (4) and (6) are truncated linear regressions (truncated from above at 50 CHF). Regressions 
differ in how 𝜃!"# is constructed from the nine psychological survey measures. Columns (1) and (2) report 
our main results, using factor analysis to aggregate the psychological measures. Columns (3) and (4) give the 
result if equal weight is given to each measure instead. Columns (5) and (6) give the results if weights are 
determined by a regression of the survey measures on 𝜃!"#. 𝜃!"# is in [0,1], where 0 means immoral and 1 
means moral. Standard errors clustered at market level; z-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; 






Table A10: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
perceived immorality and moral types, robustness checks aggregation 𝜽𝐒𝐮𝐫 
	
Dependent variable: Willingness to work for industry j Willingness to work for firm j 







































































N 4715 4715 4715 4715 5064 5064 5064 5064 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
	
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I 
don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent variables: Models 
differ in how we construct 𝜃!"#  from the nine psychological survey measures. Column (1), (2), (5) and (6) give 
the result if equal weight is given to each measure. Column (3), (4), (7) and (8) give the results if weights are 
determined by a regression of the survey measures on 𝜃
!
!"#
. 𝜃!"# is in [0,1] where 0 means immoral and 1 
means moral, willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 
means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means 
very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, 
subject of study, average wage industry 2016 (SLFS; only for industries), industry size 2016 (STATENT; only 
for industries), industry sales 2015 (Value Added Tax Statistics; only for industries). Standard errors clustered 
at individual and industry/firm level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 
0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Table A11: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
perceived immorality and moral types, robustness checks classification firms 
immorality 
Dependent variable: Willingness to work for firm j 





































N 5064 5064 5064 5064 
Control variables No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Perceived immorality is calculated different then in 
our main analysis: Clients that choose “I don’t know this organization” are classified as giving neutral ratings. 
Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 
0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where subjects did not know the 
firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent 
variables: (1) and (2) use  𝜃!"# (in [0,1]), while (3) and (4) use 𝜃!"# to classify participants, where 𝜃!"#=0 for 
low- theta types and 𝜃!"#=1 for high-theta types. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 
0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study. 
Standard errors clustered at individual and industry/firm level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-





Table A12: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
perceived immorality and moral types, robustness checks “I don’t know this 
organization” 
Dependent variable: Willingness to work for firm j 




























    
𝜽
𝑺𝒖𝒓









    
Type experiment 
(𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑) 



















N 6162 6162 1352 1352 6162 6162 1352 1352 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much 
willing to work. Observations where subjects did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Columns (1), (2), 
(5) and (6): Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) are classified 
as having willingness to work of 0.5. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8): only participants that did know all firms 
(N=52) are included. Independent variables: (1) - (4) use  𝜃!"# (in [0,1]), while (5) - (8) use 𝜃!"# to classify 
participants, where 𝜃!"#=0 for low- theta types and 𝜃!"#=1 for high-theta types. Perceived immorality is in [-
1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, 
Swiss nationality, subject of study. Standard errors clustered at individual and industry/firm level (Cameron, 
Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table A13: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
employment rate in the immoral market  
Dependent variable: Willingness to 
work for industry j 
Willingness to 
work for firm j 





























N 3275 3275 3561 3561 
Control variables No Yes No Yes 
	
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Sample incudes only subjects from the immoral market 
treatment. Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing 
to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where subjects did not 
know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent 
variables: Employment rate is the share of market periods in which the worker was employed. Perceived 
immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control 
variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study, average wage industry 2016 (SLFS; only for 
industries), industry size 2016 (STATENT; only for industries), industry sales 2015 (Value Added Tax Statistics; 
only for industries). Standard errors clustered at individual and industry/firm level (Cameron, Gelbach and 




Appendix B – Robustness checks Swiss Labor Force Survey 
A potential critique of our analysis of the Swiss Labor Force Survey in Section 3 is that we 
selected the potential immoral industries and the control industries ourselves. In this 
Appendix, we report results from two robustness checks that address this issue.  
 
1) We use all industries in the Swiss Labor Force survey as control industries 
In a first robustness check, we use all non-immoral industries in the Swiss Labor Force 
survey as control industries. We do not have a measure of the perceived industry immorality, 
I(j), for most industries. Instead of relying on such a measure, we define a set of industries as 
“immoral industries,” and calculate wage premiums (or, wage discounts) for these industries, 
controlling for workers’, jobs’ and industries’ characteristics. This approach is commonly 
used in the literature that studies stock returns for “sin industries” (e.g., Fabozzi, Ma and 
Oliphant, 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017; Colonnello, Curatola 
and Gioffré, 2019). We expect immoral industries to pay a positive wage premium, a 
compensating differential for the immoral nature of the work. 
Set of immoral industries: We select the set of immoral industries based on the 
industry ratings. Most participants that rated the immorality of the industries agreed that it is 
immoral to work in the following four industries: manufacture of weapons and ammunitions, 
manufacture of tobacco products, wholesale of tobacco products and gambling and betting 
activities (see Table A1). These four industries are also typically considered to be “sin 
industries” in the literature on sin stocks. We focus on these four industries.
119
 Given that we 
use the industry ratings to select the immoral industries, this robustness check still depends 
on our selection of immoral industries in Section 3. Note, however, that we use the entire 
dataset as control industries and therefore do not rely on our selection of control industries.  
Results: Table B1 reports regressions of the natural logarithm of real gross hourly 
wages on the dummies for working in each of the four immoral industry, along with several 
additional control variables (Model 1, 2 and 3). All four immoral industries pay substantial 
wage premiums, in line with an immorality premium for immoral work. According to Model 
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 In Section 3, we discuss that two other industries, monetary intermediations and credit granting, might 
potentially be perceived as immoral. These two industries are not rated as substantially immoral (see Table A1). 
We therefore do not include them in the set of immoral industries. Note, however, that both industries pay 
substantial wage premiums. If we add dummies for working in these industries to Model 3, coefficients are 




3, individuals working in the immoral industries have (geometric) mean hourly earnings of in 
between 12 percent and 29 percent higher than people working in other industries. 
 
2) We elicited perceived industry immorality for a second set of industries 
As a second robustness check, we elicit the perceived industry immorality for a second set of 
industries. We then provide evidence for an immorality premium in this second set of 
industries. Unlike Section 3, we did not select any of the industries ourselves.  
Set of industries: We created a list with all industries that had at least 50 observations 
in the Swiss Labor Force. This resulted in a list of 394 industries. We then asked five 
research assistants to select up to ten industries in which they think it is the most immoral to 
work and up to ten industries in which they think it is the most moral to work. They ranked 
the selected industries from most immoral (moral) to least immoral (moral). The research 
assistants were unaware of our research question. We then selected the five industries that the 
research assistants thought to be the most immoral and the five industries that they thought to 
be the most moral.
120
 In addition to these ten industries, we randomly selected a set of 40 
other industries that had at least 50 observations in the Swiss Labor Force Survey. Table B2 
gives all selected industries. 
Industry ratings: We elicited a measure of perceived immorality for the set of 50 
industries. We recruited 45 participants drawn from the same subject pool from which we 
recruit participants for our laboratory experiment (but that did not participate in our 
experiment). These participants rated how immoral they think it is to work for each of the 50 
industries on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from very immoral to very moral. We re-scaled 
the responses to lie on the -1 to 1 interval. Table B2 gives the ratings for all industries. 
Results: Table B1 reports regressions of the natural logarithm of real gross hourly 
wages on the new collected measure of perceived industry immorality, along with several 
additional control variables (Model 4 to 6).
 121
 We find a substantial and statistically 
significant immorality premium. According to Model 6, individuals working in an industry as 
immoral as manufacture of weapons and ammunition (i.e., Perceived immorality = 0.47) have 
																																																								
120
 We calculated the average rank of each industry as follows. We first allocated points to each industry 
according to its rank: if an in industry was rated the most immoral industries, it received 10 points. The second 
most immoral industry received 9 points, etc.  We then added up points for every industry and selected the five 
immoral and the five moral industries with the highest number of points. 
121
 Numbers of observations differ substantially between industries. If we weight observations by industry size 
(instead of using survey weights), estimates for perceived immorality are similar (Model 4: 0.342, Model 5: 




(geometric) mean hourly earnings approximately 17 percent higher than people working in an 





 We obtain this number by doing the following calculation: e
0.209*0.74




Table B1: Relationship between wages and industry immorality, robustness 
Dependent variable: ln of real gross hourly wage (in 2010 CHF) 
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N 239,313 236,625 236,625 47,935 47,935 47,935 
Adjusted R
2
 0.001 0.206 0.221 0.041 0.248 0.263 
Year and Region FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Source: Weighed data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage and demographics), STATENT, years 2011-2016 (industry 
size, industry sales), Value Added Tax Statistics, years 2010-2016 (industry sales) and our own online-survey (perceived 
industry immorality). Notes: Manufacture weapons and ammunitions, Manufacture tobacco, Wholesale tobacco and 
Gambling and betting are binary variables where 1 means that the individual works in the respective industry. Perceived 
immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: Male in 
{0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, Education high: higher vocational education and training or university/college, Education middle: 
apprenticeship, full-time vocational school, matura or pedagogical training, Education low (reference category): 
compulsory schooling or pre-vocational education, Swiss in {0, 1}, Experience = number of years in the firm, Full-time 
equivalent = (working hours /42), set to 1 for working hours >= 42, managerial duties in {0, 1}, Industry size = number 
employees in this industry / 1000 (2010 data is not available, we substitute it with 2011 data), Industry sales = Industry 
sales/number employees in this industry. Model 3 and 6 control for company region fixed effects (26 Swiss cantons) and year 
fixed effects (2010-2016). Standard errors clustered at the industry level, t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; 












Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 0.60 
Wholesale of tobacco products 0.54 
Processing and preserving of meat (except poultry meat) 0.24 
Credit granting 0.23 
Processing and preserving of poultry meat 0.24 
 
Moral industries 
Social work activities without accommodation for the elderly and 
disabled 
-0.46 
Residential care activities for the elderly and disabled -0.70 
Fire service activities -0.73 
Primary education -0.78 
Hospital activities -0.64 
 
Other Industries 
Manufacture of prepared meals and dishes -0.03 
Wholesale of office machinery and equipment, except computers and 
computer peripheral equipment 
-0.09 
Publishing of newspapers -0.25 
Monetary intermediation (cantonal banks, commercial banks, stock 
exchange banks, private bankers; banks with a special field of 
business; regional banks; Raiffeisen banks; Foreign-controlled banks) 
0.14 
Passenger rail transport -0.36 
Support activities for crop production (preparation of fields; 
establishing a crop; treatment of crops; crop spraying; trimming of 
fruit trees and vines; transplanting of rice; thinning of beets; 
harvesting; pest control; provision of agricultural machinery with 
operators and crew) 
-0.26 
Driving school -0.21 
Security and commodity contracts brokerage -0.01 
Printing of newspapers -0.2 
Growing of other non-perennial crops (growing of swedes, mangolds, 
fodder roots, clover, alfalfa, sainfoin, fodder maize and other grasses; 
buckwheat; potted and bedding plants; beet seeds (excluding sugar 
beet seeds); seeds of forage plants and flower seeds; forage kale and 
similar forage products; production of cut flowers) 
-0.26 
Plant propagation -0.24 
Packaging activities (bottling of liquids; packaging of solids; security 
packaging of pharmaceutical preparations; labelling, stamping and 
imprinting; parcel-packing and gift-wrapping) 
-0.03 
Manufacture of fasteners and screw machine products -0.14 
Construction of residential and non-residential buildings -0.15 
Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production 0.06 
General medical practice activities -0.58 
Activities of holding companies 0.11 











Retail sale of electrical household appliances in specialised stores -0.19 
Wholesale trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories -0.01 
Wholesale of flowers and plants -0.24 
Dispensing chemist in specialised stores -0.19 
Administration of financial markets 0.10 
Manufacture of other food products (soups and broths; artificial 
honey and caramel; perishable prepared foods; food supplements; 
yeast; extracts and juices; non-dairy milk and cheese substitutes; egg 
products; artificial concentrates) 
-0.16 
Other personal service activities (astrological and spiritualists' 
activities; social activities; pet care services; genealogical 
organisations; tattooing and piercing studios; shoe shiners; porters; 
valet car parkers; concession operation of coin-operated personal 
service machines) 
-0.18 
Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment -0.07 
Joinery installation -0.19 
Wholesale of beverages -0.08 
Camping grounds, recreational vehicle parks and trailer parks -0.28 
Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment -0.21 
Renting and leasing of cars and light motor vehicles -0.04 
Wholesale of other machinery and equipment (transport equipment 
except motor vehicles; production-line robots; wires and switches; 
other electrical material; machinery for use in trade, navigation and  
industry [except mining, construction, civil engineering and textile 
industry]; measuring instruments and equipment) 
-0.10 
Non-specialised wholesale trade -0.09 
Mixed Farming -0.17 
Manufacture of electric domestic appliances -0.07 
Life insurance 0.06 
Manufacture and processing of other glass, including technical 
glassware (laboratory, hygienic or pharmaceutical glassware; clock 
or watch glasses, optical glass and optical elements not optically 
worked; glassware used in imitation jewellery; glass insulators and 
glass insulating fittings; glass envelopes for lamps; glass figurines; 
glass paving blocks; glass in rods or tubes) 
-0.17 
Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods 0.01 
Taxi operation -0.14 
Child day-care activities -0.69 
Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved pastry 
goods and cakes 
-0.11 
Notes: Immoral (Moral) industries are the industries that the research assistants selected as the most immoral 
(moral) industries. Other industries are 40 randomly selected industries that have at least 50 observations in the 




Appendix C – Welfare measure 
In our model, accepting an immoral job has psychological costs, 𝜃! ∗ 𝐼(𝑗). According 
to Proposition 3, the least moral types benefit from an increase in immorality because the 
increase of the market wage exceeds the increase of the psychological costs. In the analysis in 
Section 4, we focused on subjects’ market incomes, ignoring the psychological costs. The 
market mechanism that we apply allows us to measure subjects’ psychological costs. In the 
following, we account for psychological costs and reconsider whether the predictions of our 
model (Proposition 3 and 4) are in line with the data. 
In the experimental labor markets, subjects submit reservation wages. The differences 
between reservation wages and induced costs measure individuals’ psychological costs 
(together with potential real effort costs). The difference between the market wage and the 
reservation wage is then a subject’s benefits from market participation. Based on this 
reasoning, we calculate the following welfare measure for each participant i:  
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒! = 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 ∗ (𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 − 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 )
!"
!!!




where 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟  is the market wage in round r in the market of individual i, 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟  is 
individual i’s wage request for the doing a first job in round r, 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟  is individual i’s wage 
request for doing the second job in round r and 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟  measures whether 
individual i is hired for job j (first or second job) in round r. 
Table C1, columns (1) and (2) presents evidence in support of Proposition 3: in the 
immoral treatment, the low-theta types have a CHF 7.05 higher welfare than the high-theta 
types (p=0.007). In the neutral treatment, the difference between types is very small (and 
even in the opposite direction).  
However, this welfare measure has two potential shortcomings:  
i) In the uniform-price sealed-offer auction, workers have incentives to submit 
their true reservation wage for the first job (Smith et al., 1982). For the second 
job, however, participants can have incentives to overstate their wage request. 




subjects’ true reservation wages, and, as a result, the welfare measures should 
be interpreted as a lower bound of the “true” welfare. 
ii) If some subjects do not understand the market mechanism, they might make 
errors in reporting their reservation wages.  
We address this issue in Table C1, columns (3) – (6). First, we replicate the analysis 
for the welfare generated trough the first job only, that is 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 ∗
!"
!!!
(𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 − 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 ). This measure only relies on the first wage request, which elicitation is 
incentive compatible. Table C1, columns (3) and (4) provide the estimates for this second 
welfare measure. Again, we find support for Proposition 3. In columns (5) and (6), we look at 
the welfare generated in the last five market periods only, that is, 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 <
!"
!!!!
𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 ∗ (𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 − 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 )+ 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 ∗ (𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 − 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 )
!"
!!!! . 
Subjects already participated in 10 market rounds, which gave them time to learn how the 
market works. We again find support for Proposition 3. (Note that the dependent variable 
aggregates welfare from 5 periods only; if anything, effect sizes are bigger than in the other 
specifications.) 
We also have a second welfare measure: subjects’ self-report happiness, which we 
elicit after the final market period. We do not find a statistically significant difference in 
happiness between the types in both treatments (see Table C1, columns (7) and (8)). 
 
Table C1: Relationship between 𝜽𝐄𝐱𝐩 and welfare	
Dependent 
variable: 
Welfare Welfare, first job 



























































N 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
R
2









0.007 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.719 0.670 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Independent variables: Low-theta in {0, 1}, Immoral 
market in {0, 1}. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 
0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
	
	
According to Proposition 4, the least moral types benefit from the presence of more 




welfare measures. We find support for Proposition 4. However, there is no effect of the type-
composition of the market on self-reported happiness.   
	
	
Table C2: Relationship between 𝜽𝐄𝐱𝐩 and welfare, depending on the behavior of other 
market participants.	



















































N 168 168 168 168 
R
2
 0.072 0.090 0.077 0.007 




 * Many 
𝜽H types=0 
0.0068 0.0086 0.0221 0.2969 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Low-theta in {0, 1}, Many θH types: 0=number of 
(other) low-theta type workers is lower than 2, 1=number of (other) low-theta type workers is 2 or more. 






Appendix D – Proofs Chapter 2 
Lemma. For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!", 𝑤∗(𝑗) exists, is unique and is in (𝑢 + 𝑐,∞). For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ∖ 𝐽!", 
𝑤
∗(𝑗) = 𝑢 + 𝑐. 
Proof. Suppose 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!" . Existence: Define 𝑓 𝑤, 𝑗 = 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 − 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗). Note that 𝑓 𝑢 +
𝑐, 𝑗 = 0− + < 0, 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑓 𝑤, 𝑗 = 1− 0 = 1 and 𝑓 𝑤, 𝑗  is continuous in 𝑤. By the 
intermediate value theorem there exists 𝑤∗(𝑗) ∈ (𝑢 + 𝑐,∞) such that 𝑓 𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗 = 0.  
Uniqueness: Follows from 𝑓 𝑤, 𝑗  being strictly increasing in 𝑤  on [0,∞) .  
Suppose 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ∖ 𝐽!".  Then, 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 =
0, 𝑤 < 𝑢 + 𝑐
0,1 , 𝑤 = 𝑢 + 𝑐
1, 𝑤 > 𝑢 + 𝑐
. Note that for any 𝑤 < 𝑢 + 𝑐 , we 
have 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗 > 0  but 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 = 0 , and for any 𝑤 > 𝑢 + 𝑐  we have 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗 < 1 , but 
𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 = 1. For 𝑤 = 𝑢 + 𝑐, 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 = 0,1  and 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗 ∈ 0,1 , so 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 .  
 
Proposition 1. For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽 with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!), 𝑤∗(𝑗) < 𝑤∗(𝑗′). 
Proof. 𝑤∗(𝑗) < 𝑤∗(𝑗′) : Suppose 𝐼 𝑗 = 0 . Then, 𝑤∗ 𝑗 = 𝑢 + 𝑐  and 𝑤∗ 𝑗! > 𝑢 + 𝑐  (see 
Lemma). Suppose 𝐼 𝑗 > 0. Suppose that 𝑤∗(𝑗) ≥ 𝑤∗(𝑗′). Then 𝑆 𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗 > 𝑆 𝑤∗(𝑗′), 𝑗′  
and 𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗 , 𝑗 ≤ 𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗! , 𝑗  because 𝐹  and −𝐷  are strictly increasing in  𝑤  on [0,∞) , 
I(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!)  and therefore 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗!) ≥ 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗)  for all 𝑤 . So 𝑆 𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗 − 𝑆 𝑤∗ 𝑗! , 𝑗! +
𝐷 𝑤
∗ 𝑗! , 𝑗′ − 𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗 , 𝑗 > 0, a contradiction to the definition of 𝑤∗(𝑗) and 𝑤∗(𝑗′).  
 
Corollary. For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽  with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!)  and 𝜀 > 0 , there exists 𝐺 ∈ ℱ!  such that  
𝑤
∗ 𝑗!,𝐺 − 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐺) ≤ 𝜀. 




 = 𝐷 𝑤
∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗 . 
Then, w∗ j,G = u+ c+ ε. The Lemma and Proposition 1 then imply that w∗ j!,G ∈ [u+




To proof that such a 𝐺 ∈ ℱ! exist, take any 𝐻 ∈ ℱ! and construct 𝐺 as follows: 
𝐺 x =










∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗 + 1− 𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗 𝐻(𝑥 −
𝜀
𝐼 𝑗




The assumptions on 𝐷 imply that 𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗 = 𝐷(u+ c+ ε, j) ∈ (0,1). Note that 𝐺  is 
continuous, strictly increasing on [0,∞), and with 𝐹(0) = 0. Therefore 𝐺 ∈ ℱ!. 
 




≡ 𝜃 𝑗 > 0. 









𝜃(𝑗) > 0: Follows from 𝑤∗(𝑗) > 𝑢 + 𝑐 (see Lemma). 
 
Proposition 3. For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽  with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!) , there exists 𝜃(𝑗, 𝑗′) ∈ ℝ!!  such that 
𝑣!(𝑗′,𝑤
∗(𝑗′)) > 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤
∗(𝑗)) iff 𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗, 𝑗′).  
Proof. Suppose 𝐼 𝑗 = 0 . Then 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤








= 𝜃(𝑗′), so 𝑣! 𝑗
!,𝑤∗ 𝑗!  = 𝑢
!
!""#$%
(𝑗′,𝑤∗ 𝑗! ) >
𝑢 = 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤
∗(𝑗)) iff  𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗′) ≡ 𝜃(𝑗, 𝑗′). Note that 𝜃 𝑗, 𝑗
!
> 0 by Proposition 2.  
Suppose 𝐼 𝑗 > 0 . Note that 𝑣! 𝑗
!,𝑤∗ 𝑗! > 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤
∗ 𝑗 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑢
!
!""#$%
(𝑗,𝑤∗ 𝑗 ),𝑢  if 




(𝑗′,𝑤∗ 𝑗! ) > 𝑢
!
!""#$%




(𝑗′,𝑤∗ 𝑗! ) > 𝑢 




 and inequality ii) holds iff 𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗′). Therefore, we 




,𝜃(𝑗′) . Note that 𝜃 𝑗, 𝑗! > 0  (see Proposition 1 and 





Proposition 4. For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!" and 𝐹,𝐺 ∈ ℱ! with F(𝑥) < 𝐺(𝑥) for all 𝑥 > 0, there exists 
𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 > 0 such that 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤
∗(𝑗,𝐹)) > 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤
∗(𝑗,𝐺))  iff 𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗,𝐹).	
Proof. First, we will proof that 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐺) ≤ 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐹). Suppose not, then 𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 > 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐹). 
But then 𝑆(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗,𝐺) > 𝑆(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 , 𝑗,𝐹) and 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗) < 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 , 𝑗) because 𝐹, 
𝐺 and −𝐷 are strictly increasing in 𝑤 on [0,∞), and 𝐹 first-order stochastically dominates 𝐺. 
But then 𝑆(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗,𝐺)− 𝑆(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 , 𝑗,𝐹)+ 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 , 𝑗)− 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗) > 0,  a 
contradiction to the definition of 𝑤∗.  




≡ 𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 , and note that under this definition 𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 −
𝑐 − 𝑆 𝑗 ∗ 𝜃! > 𝑢 iff 𝜃! < 𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 .  (𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 > 0 follows from Proposition 2.) 
To finish the proof, note that 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤
∗ 𝑗,𝐹 = 𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 − 𝑐 − 𝐼 𝑗 ∗ 𝜃! > max 𝑢,𝑤
∗ 𝑗,𝐺 −
𝑐 − 𝐼 𝑗 ∗ 𝜃! = 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤
∗ 𝑗,𝐺  for all 𝜃! < 𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 ,  and 
𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤
∗ 𝑗,𝐹 = 𝑢 = 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤




Appendix E – Alternative model interpretation  
The results in Section 3 also apply for a context with 2 jobs, a neutral job 𝑗! 
(𝐼 𝑗! = 0) and an immoral job 𝑗!" ∈ 𝐽!" (𝐼(𝑗!") > 0). In the following, we show that, 
under some assumptions, labor demand and labor supply correspond to their counterparts in 
Section 3. Therefore, all results derived in Section 3 also hold in the context with 2 jobs.  
Labor supply: Labor supply consists of an interval of workers, 𝑖 ∈ [0,1]. As in 
Section 3, we assume that the utility of accepting job 𝑗 of a worker of type 𝑖 is given by: 
𝑢! 𝑗,𝑤 𝑗 = 𝑤 𝑗 − 𝑐 − 𝜃! ∗ 𝐼(𝑗), 
where the parameter 𝜃! is distributed according to a distribution with cdf 𝐹 ∈ ℱ!. For all	
𝐹 ∈ ℱ! , 𝐹 is continuous, strictly increasing on [0,1), and with 𝐹(0) = 0. Workers choose 








 ) , where 𝑤 = 𝑤(𝑗!")− 𝑤(𝑗!)  is the immorality premium. Note that the labor 
supply for the immoral job corresponds to the labor supply in Section 3 with 𝑢 = 𝑐 = 0.  
Labor demand: Labor demand consists of an interval of firms, 𝑘 ∈ [0,1]. Each firm 
can either produce a neutral product or an immoral product. Firms that produce immoral 
products offer immoral jobs; firms that produce neutral products offer neutral jobs. Firms’ 
profits are: 
𝜋! 𝑗,𝑤 = 𝑎! 𝑗 − 𝑤 𝑗 , 
where 𝑎!(𝑗) measures firm 𝑘’s earnings when producing good 𝑗. Firms choose to produce the 
immoral product if ∆𝑎!(𝑗





!") is distributed according to 
a distribution with cdf 𝐺!!". An increase in immorality of the job does not decrease firms 
earnings,
123
 that is, i) 𝐺!(0) = 0 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽
!", and ii) for all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽!" with  𝐼 𝑗′ > 𝐼(𝑗), 
𝐺!!(𝑥) ≤ 𝐺!(𝑥)  for all 𝑥 ∈ ℝ . In addition, 𝐺!!"  is continuous and strictly increasing on 
[0,∞). The labor demand for the immoral job is then given by 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗!" = 1− 𝐺!!"(𝑤). 





 One interpretation is, for example, that 𝐼 𝑗  measures negative externalities in production. Avoiding these 




0  and 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗!" = 1 for 𝑤 ≤ 0. In addition, 𝐼 𝑗′ > 𝐼(𝑗) implies 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗′) ≥ 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗) for all 
𝑤 ∈ ℝ. Note that the labor demand corresponds to the labor demand in Section 3.  
The equilibrium wage, 𝑤∗ 𝑗!" ,  is implicitly defined by 𝑆(𝑤∗(𝑗!"), 𝑗!")−
𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗!" , 𝑗!") = 0 . 124  As both labor demand and labor supply correspond to their 
counterparts in Section 3, the Lemma and Proposition 1 to 4 apply (with 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!" ). In 
particular, 𝑤∗(𝑗!") is strictly positive (Lemma), so there is an immorality premium, and this 
immorality premium is increasing in the immorality of 𝑗!" , 𝐼(𝑗!") (Proposition 1). The 
immoral types sort into accepting the immoral jobs, while the moral types sort into accepting 





 Note that market clearance in the immoral job market implies market clearance in the neutral job market, 
1 − 𝑆 𝑤




Appendix F – Additional results Chapter 3 
Figure F1: Desirability of public association with Zukunft CH 
 
 
(a) increase the donation the most  (b) reduced the donation the most 
Notes: Answers to an online survey with 29 participants. Subjects are drawn from the same subjects pool that is 
used for Study 1. Subjects are asked to rate how much they would like it (from 1=	dislike a great deal to 7=	like 
a great deal) if other participants in a hypothetical laboratory experiment would receive information that makes 
them believe that “you are the participant who increased the donation to Zukunft CH the most,” or information 
that make them believe that “you are the participant who reduced the donation to Zukunft CH the most.” Figure 
(a) shows the distribution the first question, while Figure (b) shows the distribution to the second question. I can 
reject the hypothesis that both distributions are similar (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, z=-3.702, p=0.0002). 
 
Figure F2: Distribution intelligence score, Study 1 
 















































































Figure F3: Distribution moral values, Study 1 
 
Notes: (+6, +9) means that the subjects chose the option that increases her payoff by CHF 6, and increased the 






















Figure F4: Treatment effects conditional on target choice, Study 1 
 
(a) pooled, probability to chose same product as 
the target (p joint test = 0.002) 
 
 (b) pooled, WTP to receive same product as the 
target (p joint test = 0.011) 
 
(c) intelligence, probability to chose same product 
as the target (p joint test = 0.128) 
 
(d) intelligence, WTP to receive same product as 
the target (p joint test = 0.117) 
 
(e) moral values, probability to chose same product 
as the target (p joint test = 0.006) 
 
(f) moral values, WTP to receive same product as 
the target (p joint test = 0.044) 
Notes: Bars in figure (a), (c) and (e) show estimated treatment effects from linear regressions of the probability 
to choose the same product as the target when none of the two products are connected with any payment on the 
interaction between the treatment dummy (1=undesirable treatment) and the choice of the target (1=Camille 
Bloch; 1=Munz; 1=Cup; 1=USB stick), “treatment x target choice.” Bars in figure (b), (d) and (f) show 
estimated treatment effects from Tobit regressions of the willingness to pay to receive the product that was 
chosen by the target instead of the other product on “treatment x target choice.” While figures (a) and (b) show 
effects if the intelligence data and moral values data is pooled, figures (c) to (f) show effects for intelligence and 
moral values separately. Coefficients for figure (c) and (e) and coefficients for figure (d) and (f) are estimated 
jointly by interacting “treatment x target choice” with an intelligence data dummy (1=intelligence), controlling 
for the intelligence data dummy. The numbers in brackets indicate the number of observations in this category. 
“p joint test” reports the p-value of a joint test that all for coefficients (“bars”) are equal to zero. All 
regressions control for the choice of the target and session fixed effects. Bars indicate 95%-confidence 
































































































































































































































(b) data on intelligence, residuals	
 
(c) data on moral values, residuals	
Notes: Cumulative distributions of subjects willingness to pay to receive the product chosen by the target 
instead of the other product. Figures control for differences in targets’ choices and session fixed effects by 
plotting residuals from a regression of willingness to pay on targets product choice and session fixed effects. (a) 
uses data from both rounds, (b) uses only data from the round related to intelligence and (c) use only data from 
























-4 -2 0 2 4
WTP to receive product chosen by first mover, residual























-4 -2 0 2 4
WTP to receive product chosen by first mover, residual
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WTP to receive product chosen by first mover, residual




Figure F6: Associations of chocolates with students and neo-Nazis 






































































































(e) With which political position would you associate a person that consumes the product? 





Notes: Answers to an online survey with 21 participants. Subjects are drawn from the same subjects pool that is 
used for Study 2. In figures (e), “No association” was labeled as “I would not associate the product with a 







































































Table F1: Treatment effects, robustness 
Dependent 
variable: 
Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























N 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Session FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Notes: (1)-(3): Linear regressions of probability to choose the same product as the target when none of the two products are 
connected with any payment on a treatment dummy. These specifications include the 7 observations in which subjects made 
choices that are not monotone in money. (4)-(6): Tobit regressions (left-censored at -3CHF, n=17; right-censored at 
+3CHF, n=10) of willingness to pay to receive the same product as the target instead of the other product (WTP for target’s 
product) on a treatment dummy. These specifications include the 7 observations in which subjects made choices that are not 
monotone in money. Given that these observations have multiple switching points, it is unclear how to construct the WTP. I 
take the average of the WTPs calculated based on the first and on the last switching point. t-statistics in parentheses; 
standard errors are clustered at subject level (168 clusters); * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
 
Table F2: Treatment effects for intelligence and moral values, robustness 
Dependent variable: Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















































p-value (undesirable) + 
(undesirable*intelligence) 
= 0 
0.531 0.473 0.150 0.565 0.703 0.969 
N 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Session FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Target choice controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: (1)-(3): Linear regressions of probability to choose the same product as the target when none of the two products are 
connected with any payment on a treatment dummy. These specifications include the 7 observations in which subjects made 
choices that are not monotone in money. (4)-(6): Tobit regressions (left-censored at -3CHF, n=17; right-censored at 
+3CHF, n=10) of willingness to pay to receive the same product as the target instead of the other product on a treatment 
dummy. These specifications include the 7 observations in which subjects made choices that are not monotone in money. 
Given that these observations have multiple switching points, it is unclear how to construct the WTP. I take the average of 
the WTPs calculated based on the first and on the last switching point. t-statistics in parentheses; standard errors are 




Table F3: Treatment effects, robustness checks 
Dependent 
variable: 
Pr(Munz) WTP Munz 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  



















N 232 232 232 232 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: (1) and (2): Linear regressions of probability to choose Munz chocolate when none of the two products 
are connected with any payment on a treatment dummy. These specifications include the 6 subjects that made 
choices that are not monotone in money. Robust standard errors are used. (3) and (4): Tobit regressions (left-
censored at CHF -3, n=5; right-censored at CHF +3, n=9) of willingness to pay to receive the Munz chocolate 
instead of the Camille Bloch chocolate (WTP Munz) on a treatment dummy. These specifications include the 6 
subjects that made choices that are not monotone in money. Given that these observations have multiple 
switching points, it is unclear how to construct the WTP. I take the average of the WTPs calculated based on the 







Table F4: Treatment effects and similarity, Study 1  
Dependent variable: Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













Similarity intelligence  











Similarity moral values  








































p-value (undesirable) + 
(undesirable*intelligence) = 
0 
 0.121 0.105  0.966 0.793 
N 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target choice controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: (1)-(3): Linear regressions of probability to choose the same product as the target when none of the two 
products are connected with any payment on a dummy that captures whether the target was selected due to his 
intelligence or his moral values (1=intelligence round), similarity for moral values and for intelligence, a 
treatment dummy (1 = undesirable treatment), and an interaction between this binary variable and the 
treatment dummy (1=undesirable*1=intelligence). (4)-(6): Tobit regressions (left-censored at CHF -3, n=17; 
right-censored at CHF +3, n=10) of willingness to pay to receive the same product as the target instead of the 
other product on the same set of independent variables. Similarity moral values is defined as 1-|donation – 
target’s donation|/6. Similarity intelligence is defined as 1-|intelligence scores – target’s intelligence scores|/8. 
Because similarity moral values is only important for the moral values round, and similarity intelligence is only 
important for the intelligence round, these measures are interacted with 1-(1=intelligence round) and 
(1=intelligence round), respectively. t-statistics in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at subject level 




Table F5: Treatment effects and similarity, Study 2 
Dependent variable: Pr(Munz) WTP Munz 

















  0.557 
(0.97) 
Left-wing extremism 







































N 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: (1) - (5): Linear regressions of probability to choose Munz chocolate when none of the two products are connected with any payment on different measures of 
similarity and a treatment dummy. Robust standard errors are used. (6) - (10): Tobit regressions (left-censored at -3CHF, n=5; right-censored at +3CHF, n=9) of 
willingness to pay to receive the Munz chocolate instead of the Camille Bloch chocolate on different measures of similarity and a treatment dummy. Political position is in 
between 0 (=very left-wing) and 1 (=very right-wing), with mean 0.463 (s.d.=0.160). To measure Right-wing (left-wing) extremism, subjects are asked how much they agree 
(from 1= strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) with three statements that are typically accepted by right-wing (left-wing) extremists. I took the average of the three 
answers, and divided it by 7. The mean of right-wing extremism is 0.103 (s.d.=0.139) and the mean of left-wing extremism is 0.331 (s.d.= 0.216). To measure racism, subjects 
are asked how much they agree with seven statements related to racism, adapted from the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). I took the average of all answers, and 





Table F6: Perception of the products, Study 1 
(a) IQ and Pro-sociality 
 Camille Bloch/Munz Cup/USB Stick 
Product chosen by target,  
mean rating 
Product not chosen by target, 
mean rating 
Product chosen by target, 
 mean rating 
Product not chosen by target, 

























What do you think, how much does 













How good is the quality of the raw 
materials used? (1 = "very low 













How well is the product processed? 














When you think about using/eating 
the product, are you disgusted?  
(1 = "very disgusted"; 5 = "not 


















(b) Pro-sociality only 
 Camille Bloch/Munz Cup/USB Stick 
Product chosen by target, 
 mean rating 
Product not chosen by target, 
mean rating 
Product chosen by target, 
 mean rating 


























What do you think, how much does 













How good is the quality of the raw 
materials used? (1 = "very low 













How well is the product processed? 














When you think about using/eating 
the product, are you disgusted?  
(1 = "very disgusted"; 5 = "not 













Does the producer of the good 
promote conservative Christian values 
(e.g, fighting abortions and marriage 
for same-sex couples)? (1 = "yes, 













How popular is the product among 
conservative Christians? (1 = "not 













How popular is the product among 



















(c) IQ only 
 Camille Bloch/Munz Cup/USB Stick 
Product chosen by target, 
 mean rating 
Product not chosen by target, 
mean rating 
Product chosen by target,  
mean rating 


























What do you think, how much does 













How good is the quality of the raw 
materials used? (1 = "very low 













How well is the product processed? 














When you think about using/eating 
the product, are you disgusted?  
(1 = "very disgusted"; 5 = "not 













How popular is the product among 
intelligent people? (1 = "not popular 













How popular is the product among 
stupid people? (1 = "not popular at 


















Table F7: Perception of the products, Study 2 

















“What do you think, how much does a pack of Camille 
Bloch Torino (Munz) chocolate bars currently cost at 







 “How healthy are the products?” 







 „How long can you store them?“  







 „What is the quality of the raw materials used?”  







 „How sustainable are the raw materials used?”  







“What is the quality of the processing?”  







„When you think about eating the Camille Bloch (Munz) 
chocolate, are you digusted?“  





























“If you were to eat the chocolate in public, would people 
associate you with right-wing extremism?” 







“If you were to eat the chocolate in front of your family or 
friends, would you associate it with right-wing 
extremism?”  







“What do you think, does Camille Bloch (Munz) in any 
way promote right-wing extremism (for example, through 
party donations, employment of right-wing extremists, 
public support for right-wing extremist concerns)?”  







“What do you think, does Camille Bloch (Munz) in any 
way discriminate against minorities (for example, in the 
recruitment, pay and promotion of employees)?”  













Appendix G – Proofs Chapter 3 
Proposition. The relationship between 𝑥!
!∪!  and 𝑥
!
!∪!  is characterized by a threshold ∆𝑢 
such that 𝑥!
!∪!
 > max 𝑥
!







 if ∆𝑢 ≥ ∆𝑢 . 
Furthermore, ∆𝑢 is increasing in 𝛼. 
 
Proof: I will first derive the equilibria for the case that the 𝐴! -types have undesirable 
characteristics, c=b. Note that 𝑥
!
!!
= 1 and the restriction to monotonic equilibria implies that 
𝜌 𝐵 = 0 and therefore 𝑥!
!




. There are three potential equilibria: 
• 𝑥!
!
= 0. In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 = 1. This is an equilibrium iff ∆𝑢 ≤ 𝛼 𝑣!! − 𝑣! . 
• 𝑥!
!
= 1. In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 =
!
!!!



























− 1 . This 











Note that for each value of ∆𝑢 there is at least one monotone equilibrium, and at most three 






























𝑏 , 𝛼 𝑣−𝑐 − 𝑣𝑏
𝛿
1 − 𝛾




















! . Therefore, max (𝑥
!







!  and 
!
!!!






! . Figure G1 illustrates how 
𝑥
!
!∪! depends on ∆𝑢. 
																																																								
125 The number of equilibria could be reduced by restricting attention to undominated equilibria, as Bénabou & Tirole (2011) 
do. This equilibrium refinement criterion eliminates equilibria that are Pareto-dominated (weakly lower payoffs for all types, 
and a strictly lower payoff for at least one of them). The equilibria would then be given by: 𝑥!
!
= 0 for ∆𝑢 < 𝛼 𝑣!! − 𝑣! , 
𝑥!
!
∈ 0,1  for ∆𝑢 = 𝛼 𝑣!! − 𝑣!  and 𝑥!
!
= 1 for ∆𝑢 > 𝛼 𝑣!! − 𝑣! . If in addition the 𝐴!-types are assumed to care about 
their image (such that 𝑥!
!!
= 1 still holds), the equilibrium 𝑥!
!
= 0 for ∆𝑢 = 𝛼 𝑣!! − 𝑣!  would be Pareto-dominated by 
𝑥!
!




Next, I will derive the equilibria for the case that the 𝐴! -types have desirable 
characteristics, c=g. Note that 𝑥!
!!
= 1 and the restriction to monotonic equilibria implies that 
𝜌 𝐵 = 0  and therefore 𝑥!
!





. There are three potential equilibria: 
• 𝑥!
!
= 0. In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 =
!
!!!










= 1. In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 = 𝛾. This is an equilibrium iff ∆𝑢 ≤ 𝛾𝛼 𝑣! − 𝑣!! . 
• 𝑥!
!
















!! .  
Note that for each value of ∆𝑢 there is a unique monotone equilibrium. The number of A- and 

















































.  Figure G1 illustrates how 
𝑥!
!∪! depends on ∆𝑢. 
To finish the proof, define  ∆𝑢 = 𝛼
!
!!!












 for ∆𝑢 ≥ ∆𝑢 and that ∆𝑢 



















 𝑐 = 𝑔	




Appendix H – Additional figures Chapter 3 
Figure H1: Observers’ instructions  
 
	  
Remember that in Part 1, all participants did a test to measure their intelligence. 
 
The participant with the highest intelligence score and another, randomly drawn 
participant made a choice between two products, Camille Bloch chocolate and Munz 
chocolate. You will observe the product choice and portrait picture of one of these 
two participants. Which participant you observe is determined by a (virtual) coin 
flip: 
 
• With a probability of 50% heads comes up, and you observe the choice and 
the picture of the participant with the highest intelligence score, 
• With a probability of 50% tails comes up, and you observe the choice and the 
picture of the other randomly selected participant. 
 
The computer will not tell you whether heads or tails came up. However, you will 
learn which product was chosen by the participant with the highest intelligence 
score.  
 
Example: Suppose that the participant with the lowest intelligence score chose the 
Camille Bloch chocolate, the other randomly selected participant chose Munz 
chocolate. If tails comes up, you would see the following screen: 
	
The participant with the lowest intelligence score chose the Camille 
Bloch chocolate. 
 
The following participant is drawn: 
 
	




Figure H2: Presentation of product choices to neo-Nazis 
Left option  
(unatractive symbols for neo-Nazis) 
Right option  
(atractive symbols for neo-Nazis) 
Share 
Right 
Intenso Rainbow Line 4GB USB Stick 
Blau (Art. Nr. 3502450) 
 
Butlers HENKELBECHER KREUZ 
Grau (Art Nr. 10210598) 
 
0.1 
Intenso Rainbow Line 4GB USB Stick 
Blau (Art. Nr. 3502450) 
 
Kahla Tasse 0,18l 
Rot-Weiss (Art Nr. 27508877) 
 
0.6 
Kahla Colore Tasse 0,25l 
Grau (Art Nr. 204708A70705C) 
 
Butlers HENKELBECHER KREUZ 
Grau (Art Nr. 10210598) 
 
0.2 
Kahla Colore Tasse 0,25l 
Schokobraun (Art Nr. 
204708A72605C) 
 
Kahla Tasse 0,18l 
Rot-Weiss (Art Nr. 27508877) 
 
0.7 





Left option  
(unatractive symbols for neo-Nazis) 
Right option  
(atractive symbols for neo-Nazis) 
Share 
Right 
Intenso Rainbow Line 8GB USB Stick 
Grün (Art. Nr. 3502460) 
 
Butlers HENKELBECHER KREUZ 
Grau (Art Nr. 10210598) 
 
0.0 
Kahla Colore Tasse 0,25l 
Schokobraun (Art Nr. 
204708A72605C) 
 
Butlers HENKELBECHER KREUZ 
Grau (Art Nr. 10210598) 
 
0.3 
Intenso Rainbow Line 8GB USB Stick 
Grün (Art. Nr. 3502460) 
 
Intenso Rainbow Line 4GB USB Stick 




Notes: The colors show the symbols that might make a product more (red) or less (blue) atractive for neo-Nazis. 
“Rainbow” and “Schokobraun” (=chocolate brown) are symbols of cultural diversity (however, brown is also 
the color  of the Nazi Party,  besides black-white-red).  “HENKELBECHER  KREUZ” sounds similar  as 
“Hakenkreuz” (=swastika), “Rot-Weiss” (=red-white) are the colors of the Swiss flag, and 88 is a wel known 
Nazi symbol for Heil Hitler (H is the eight leter in the Alphabet). The sample of right-wing extremists did not 
like the “HENKELBECHER KREUZ.” The last two choices difer only litle in terms of symbols. The left option 
dominates the right option, if one abstracts from diferences in colors. I added this option for potential future 
research on the potential limits of identity signaling. (Does disconformity occur when neo-Nazis adopt a product 





Figure H3: Targets’ choices are revealed 
Notes: Translated from German.  
	
  
As announced, 10 participants from a previous study had to chose between two product. 
 
These participants are neo-Nazis. The neo-Nazis were recruited on the right-wing 
extremist websites ………….…. and ……………………….….. The neo-Nazis chose 
between products A and B. The chosen product was delivered to the participants while 
maintaining their anonymity. 
 
[Neutral treatment: These participants were recruited on the internet and chose between 
products A and B. The chosen product was delivered to the participants.] 
 
• 70 percent of participants are men. 
• The average age is 33 years.  
• Eighty percent of participants have completed at most upper secondary education. 
 
The 10 participants chose between the folowing products: 
 
Pack Camile Bloch Torino 
5 x 23g (Art. Nr. 3000652) 
 
Pack Munz Praliné-Prügeli Milch 
5 x 23g (Art. Nr. 3928213) 
 
 
Result: 9 out of 10 neo-Nazis [Neutral treatment: participants] chose Munz Praliné-
Prügeli Milch. 
 
Now, Part 3 folows: You have to chose among these two product. Which product do you 
want?  
 
○ Pack Camile Bloch Torino 





Appendix I – Additional results Chapter 4 
Figure I1 – Distribution of Player A choices in Experiment 1 
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Appendix J – Proofs Chapter 4 
Proposition 1: For any (𝑥, 𝑝) in 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!∈ !,! ,!∈ !,!  U 𝑥, 𝑝 , 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝.  
Proof: For any 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝, 1] and any 𝑥 ∈ 0,𝐾  we have that 𝑈 𝑥, 𝑝 > 𝑈 𝑥, 𝑝 :  
𝑈 𝑥, 𝑝 − 𝑈 𝑥, 𝑝 = 𝐸! 𝑑 − 𝐸! 𝑑 𝑣 1 − 𝑥  
+ 𝐶 𝑝 − 𝑝 − 𝐶 0 + (𝑃 0 − 𝑃 𝑝 − 𝑝 ) 
First, note that 𝐸! 𝑑 − 𝐸! 𝑑 𝑣 1 − 𝑥 > 0 as 𝐸! 𝑑 > 𝐸! 𝑑  and 𝑣 . > 0. Second, we have 𝐶 𝑝 − 𝑝 −
𝐶 0 > 0 as 𝐶′ . > 0. Third, 𝑃′ . < 0 implies that 𝑃 0 − 𝑃 𝑝 − 𝑝 > 0. Therefore 𝑈 𝑥, 𝑝 − 𝑈 𝑥, 𝑝 > 0, 
and 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝, 1]  cannot be a solution to (1). 
 
 
Proposition 2: Take 𝐾,𝐾′ in (0,1] with 𝐾! < 𝐾 and suppose that there is a unique solution to (1) for 
both 𝐾 and 𝐾′, then 𝑝′ ≤ 𝑝. 
Proof: Define  (𝑥, 𝑝) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!∈ !,! ,!∈ !,!  U 𝑥, 𝑝  and (𝑥′, 𝑝′) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!∈ !,!! ,!∈ !,!  U 𝑥, 𝑝 . 
Case i) Suppose 𝑥 ≤ 𝐾′, then (𝑥, 𝑝) is the solution of 𝑚𝑎𝑥!∈ !,!! ,!∈ !,!  𝑈 𝑥, 𝑝 , so 𝑝′ = 𝑝. 
Case ii) Suppose 𝑥 𝐾 > 𝐾′. Then 𝑥 𝐾′ <  𝑥 𝐾  (and 1 − 𝑥 𝐾! > 1 −  𝑥 𝐾 ). Note that the relevant Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker conditions for the problem are (Proposition 1 implies that the condition 𝑝 ≤ 1 is not 
binding): 
−P
! 𝑝 − 𝑝 − 𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥 + 𝐶′ 𝑝 − 𝑝 + 𝜆 = 0 (I) 
𝜆𝑝 = 0 (II) 
𝑝 ≥ 0 (III) 
𝜆 ≥ 0 (IV) 
Case iia) Suppose 𝑝′ = 0, then 𝑝′ ≤ 𝑝 due to condition (III). 
Case iib) Suppose 𝑝 = 0. Then (I) implies 
𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥  ≥ 𝐶′ 𝑝 − P
! 𝑝  (I!) 
Note that 𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥′ > 𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥  as 𝑣′ . > 0. This, together with (I’) and the 
assumptions on C and P imply  𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥′ > 𝐶
! 𝑝  − P! 𝑝 ≥ 𝐶! 𝑝 − 𝑝′  − P! 𝑝 − 𝑝′ . 
Then by (I), 𝜆′ > 0. Then by (II) 𝑝′ = 0. 
Case iic) Suppose 𝑝, 𝑝′ > 0. Then by (II) 𝜆 = 𝜆′ = 0. Then (I) simplifies to: 
𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥 = 𝐶′ 𝑝 − 𝑝 − P
! 𝑝 − 𝑝  (I′′) 
𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥′ = 𝐶′ 𝑝 − 𝑝′ − P
! 𝑝 − 𝑝′  (I′′′) 
Combining (I’’), (I’’’) and 𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥′ > 𝑑! − 𝑑! 𝑣 1 − 𝑥  implies: 
𝐶
! 𝑝 − 𝑝′ − P! 𝑝 − 𝑝′ > 𝐶! 𝑝 − 𝑝′ − P! 𝑝 − 𝑝  (𝑉) 




Proposition 3: 𝑝! = 𝑝 is the unique solution to max!!∈ !,!  𝑈 𝑝
! . 
Proof: For any 𝑝! ∈ (𝑝, 1] we have that 𝑈 𝑝 − 𝑈 𝑝! = 𝑃 0 − 𝑃 𝑝! − 𝑝 + 𝐶 𝑝! − 𝑝 − 𝐶 0 > 0 due to 
𝐶′ . > 0 and 𝑃′ . < 0.  
For any 𝑝! ∈ [0, 𝑝)  we have that 𝑈 𝑝 − 𝑈 𝑝! = 𝑃 0 − 𝑃 𝑝 − 𝑝! + 𝐶 𝑝 − 𝑝! − 𝐶 0 > 0 due to 
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